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ABSTRACT
LEADERSHIP: THE MISSING VARIABLE IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Osei K. Bonsu 
Old Dominion University, 2002 
Director: Dr. Francis Adams
Contemporary economic theories, modernization and dependency, have 
overlooked the fact that the development process depends on the interaction of social 
factors. Specifically, the theories have ignored the role of leadership in analyzing 
economic development. This dissertation seeks to incorporate the importance of 
leadership into the analysis of development. It argues that sub-Saharan African countries 
have not developed economically because leaders in the region have been less than 
successful in establishing a culture conducive to industrialization. African leaders have 
failed to establish the high moral and scientific cultures necessary to promote economic 
progress. In place of those cultural attributes, the leaders have fostered corrupt and 
authoritarian political cultures that undermine the general economic development of their 
societies.
This dissertation offers a detailed paired comparison of the colonial and 
postcoionial experience of Ghana and Botswana. The two countries constitute an 
effective comparison because they were once colonies of Great Britain and have similar 
resource endowments. Since independence, Botswana has achieved greater social and 
economic progress because its leaders have established a high moral culture. Ghana, on 
the other hand, has experienced stagnation, and in some respects actual decline, in its 
standards of living due to its leaders’ inability to establish a high moral culture. Despite
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differences in standards of living, neither country has achieved diversified 
industrialization due to a lack of a scientific culture.
The inability to establish high moral and scientific cultures is partially due to the 
colonial experience and the political philosophy of Senghorianism. Direct colonial rule in 
Ghana replaced the traditional leadership of the country that had shown a greater political 
commitment to the general public. In contrast, the colonial protectorate in Botswana 
recognized traditional leaders as autonomous authorities without undermining their 
legitimacy. Botswana’s leadership continuity preserved the government’s moral 
obligation to the general public.
The lack of socio-scientific culture in both countries is due, to a considerable 
extent, to the influence of Senghorian philosophy on post-colonial leaders. Senghorianism 
argues that analytical scientific thinking reflects the dichotomous European culture and 
contrasts with the holistic African intuitive mode of knowing. The adherence to this 
philosophy by sub-Saharan African leaders has inhibited the emergence of a scientific 
culture that would promote industrialization and economic development.
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This dissertation is dedicated to the global 
poor whose desire for material development 
has been set back by their own leaders.
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In 1992, Julius Ihonvbere, a Nigerian political economist, presented a grim picture 
of Africa. In his words, “hunger, malnutrition, poverty, uncertainty, disillusionment, 
ethnic, regional and religious conflicts, coups and counter-coups, the suffocation of civil 
society and gross human rights abuses, massive rural migration, crime, prostitution and 
violence, agricultural stagnation and urban decay, de-industrialization and delegitimation 
of the state have become common features.” 1 Ihonvbere’s brief summary of the continent 
is unfortunately true. In recent years, people in the region are being displaced by wars, 
ethnic conflicts, and the greed of their leaders. Today, the so-called African leadership 
has become the enemy within, repressing their people and plundering their continent.
Before independence African scholars had a different image of the continent.
They believed that the enemy was the colonizer from afar. Walter Rodney’s study of how 
European imperialism underdeveloped Africa possibly best represents this perspective.2 
Admittedly, Professor Rodney’s assessment had some merit, and his contentions drew 
upon considerable empirical evidence. The gap between the rich North and the poor
This dissertation is written along the stylistic requirements of The Chicago 
Manual o f  Style, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
1 Julius Ihonvbere, "The Third World, Africa and the New W orld Order," Unpublished Paper 
presented at the African and African-American Lecture Series. Central Connecticut State University, New 
Britain, CT. May 1992.
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South serves as a testament to this basic reality. Even today, half a century after 
independence, major colonial debris profoundly limits Africa’s economic and political 
development. It would, however, be an oversimplification to conclude that the colonial 
legacy is the only obstacle to economic and political advance in the region.
The problem of economic underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is more 
complex than the contemporary development literature admits. The problem is not mainly 
due to exogenous factors such as colonialism or the exclusion of the region from the 
global financial system. Even though these factors play some role, the economic 
improvement of Botswana and Mauritius in sub-Saharan Africa seriously undermines the 
case of African marginalization as its proponents claim.3 Part of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
economic stagnation and retrogression has to do with the failure of leaders in the region 
to establish a socio-scientific culture that promotes technological innovation and 
stimulates economic development.
The importance of leadership and culture to the development process has been 
well noted in social science studies. Lublin Doe, for instance, argues that the economic 
development of a nation is a complex phenomenon, where success or failure depends on 
the political will and determination of its leadership.4 Similarly, in a pioneering work, 
Mark Casson demonstrates the importance of leadership in building a national culture that
2 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard University 
Press, 1982).
3 Manfred Bienefeld, ‘The New World Order: Echoes o f  a New Imperialism," The World 
Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1994): 31-48.
* Lublin Doe, “Economic Development o f Francophone Africa: A Comparison with Republic of 
Korea,” International Social Science Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 1997): 105-21.
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reduces transaction costs and enhances national economic performance.5 Other scholars 
argue that the poor economic record of a nation may be attributed to leadership 
problems.6 This seems to be the case in sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development, 
because of failed leadership in the region.
In general, a review of the literature suggests that effective leadership is one of the 
most critical prerequisites for national economic development. As such, D. R. Ilgen, D.
A. Major, J. R. Hollenbeck, and D. J. Sego stress that “we cannot overlook the role of 
leaders and leadership” in economic development.7 Similarly, the importance of culture 
has been well established and noted by various scholars as part of the foundation for 
human activities. Institutional economists and other social science researchers have 
emphasized the relevance of culture in economic development.8 Casson, for example, 
argued that societies that are able to foster high morals and scientific beliefs have 
enhanced economic performance, while societies without these cultural attributes lack the 
prerequisites for economic development.9 It is the inability of postcolonial SSA leaders to 
foster and legitimize high moral and scientific culture that has resulted in the region’s 
economic stagnation.
5 Mark Casson, “Cultural Determinants of Economic Performance," Journal o f  Comparative 
Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1993): 418-42.
6 J. S. Oakland, Total Quality Management (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1989).
7 D. R. Ilgen, D. A. Major, J. R Hollenbeck, and D. J. Sego, ‘Team  Research in the 1990s,” in M. 
M. Chemers and R. Ayman, eds.. Leadership Theory and Research: Perspectives and Directions (San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1993), 248.
8 Ann Jennings and William Waller, “ Evolutionary Economics and Cultural Hermeneutics:
Veblen, Cultural Relativism, and Blind Drift," Journal o f Economics Issues, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 
1994): 997-1030.
9 Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
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In sub-Saharan Africa, the leadership has failed to initiate a cultural change to 
transform the region’s traditional production function into a dynamic technological 
production function. In industrial scientific terms, all the countries in the region depend 
on outside scientific cultures to meet their industrial goods needs. On the global scale, 
SSA has 20,000 research scientists and engineers. This means that the region has a 
meager 0.36% of the world’s research scientists and engineers, and produces only 0.3% 
of the world’s total industrial output. The whole region spends approximately 0.4% of the 
world’s total expenditure in research and development towards industrial scientific 
culture.10 This reflects the paucity of funds that leaders and their governments allocate to 
the scientific culture of creation in the region. This lack of leadership initiative and 
insight leaves SSA’s industrial scientific culture with negligible outcomes as far as 
industrialization is concerned. For example, in Ghana, according to the latest indicators 
available, low-end industrial production constitutes 5.9% of total economic output. 
Likewise in Botswana, the total economy depends on raw material production mostly in 
diamond mining and cattle raising, with only 4.7% of the total output in low-end 
industrial production.11
Instead of building a socio-scientific culture, the SSA leadership is marked by 
high levels of corruption.12 Political elites embezzle from the national treasury for 
personal use, thereby undermining the accumulation of financial capital resources
10 Aqueil Ahmad, “Science and Technology Policy for Economic Development in Africa," Journal 
o f  Asian and African Studies, Vol. 27, Nos. 1-2 (January-April 1992): 5-10.
11 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998).
12 David Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case o f  
Zaire (New York: Pregamon. 1980).
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essential for economic development. The personal accumulation of public wealth and 
funds by leaders cuts across the region. The late President Mobutu Sese Seko of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo had, according to one estimate, well over $5 billion in a 
foreign account, an amount about the size of Congo’s foreign debt at the time.13 The 
records o f extravagance of King Bokassa of the Central African Republic, President Idi 
Amin of Uganda, and President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria are all fresh in the 
memories of their compatriots.14
Politically, the SSA leadership has always built organizations where networks of 
trust are confined to families and cronies, and those of mistrust and suspicion are 
relegated to outside groups. They have intensified the divide-and-rule concept, left over 
from the colonial period, to serve their political interests. The horrible images of human 
rights abuses emanating from the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and economic 
impoverishment in the region, are partially attributed to the leadership’s inability to 
establish a cultural mindset capable of economic and political progress.15 SSA has not 
always been this way. In the late 1950s and 1960s, many countries in the region achieved 
economic growth rates ranging between 5 and 7 percent.16 Lately, however, the region’s 
economic and political deterioration are due to leadership ineptness.17 Prior to
13 The Economist, Vol. 327, No. 7807 (April 17, 1993): 82.
14 Tunde Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism: Betrayal o f a Historical Cause,” The Western 
Journal o f  Black Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer 1997): 106-16.
15 Lance Morrow, “Africa: The Scramble for Existence.” Time Magazine (September 7, 1992): 42-
44.
16 Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, (Paris: OECD, 1995).
17 Samuel M. Muriithi, African Crisis, Is There Hope? (NY: University Press o f America, 1996).
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colonialism and its subsequent postcolonial eras, there existed precolonial Botswana and 
Ghana in sub-Saharan Africa, headed by traditional leaders who organized and managed 
their societies with less economic and human suffering.
Precolonial Botswana was composed of a variety of autonomous nations ruled by 
traditional leaders. Politically, the nations were organized hierarchically with succession 
based on inheritance under participatory democracy and on the kgotla (ward) systems.18 
Economically, the leaders allocated lands and loaned cattle through the mafisa system 
that allowed citizens to undertake economic activities. Through that patronage system, 
both political and economic systems of the societies were stabilized, and the Tswana 
community as a whole progressed with fewer socio-economic problems. In times of 
security needs, leaders like Khama the Great rallied other traditional leaders and their 
followers to form alliances to repel attackers.19 In 1885 the territories became a 
protectorate under the British government, serving as a shield against the South African 
Boer invasion. The colonial protectorate system allowed the Tswana leaders to organize 
their societies without foreign interference in their domestic affairs. Throughout the 
colonial protectorate era, traditional leaders remained effective in maintaining social 
order, with their traditional laws guarded by socio-moral obligations between the ruled 
and the rulers.20
For almost a century, the protectorate system allowed leaders like Tshekedi 
Khama to preserve their national sovereignty and political institutions through a
18 Anthony Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History (NY: Bames and Noble, 1974).
19 Thomas Tlou, ‘The Nature o f Batswana States: Towards a Theory o f Botswana Traditional 
Government: The Batswana Case” Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 6 (1974): 57-75.
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traditional leadership legitimacy framework. Both leaders and their followers recognized 
their fiduciary relationship with each other and refrained from any immoral behavior that 
could have had negative consequences on societal welfare. In essence, high moral ethical 
standards were maintained in the community to protect gradual social progression. In 
1966, the colonial system came to an end and Botswana gained its independence. The 
country changed its political system from a hierarchical inheritance system to a 
representative political system without changing its leadership class.21 This elite 
continuity during the transition from colonial to postcolonial preserved the leadership’s 
moral obligation in achieving society’s welfare. The first postcolonial leadership, under 
Seretse Khama, emphasized high moral cultural standards and created institutions based 
on democratic principles to serve the collective interests of Botswana. Khama’s 
successors have adhered to a high moral leadership culture that minimizes corruption, 
thereby enabling them to use national financial resources to improve the living conditions 
of their people. Despite these efforts, however, Botswana remains industrially 
underdeveloped due to the lack of a scientific culture.22
The ability of Botswana’s postcolonial leaders to foster and maintain a high moral 
leadership culture that reduces corruption is unique among SSA leaders. In contrast to 
Botswana, the leaders of Ghana, which was also a British colony, have led their country 
into economic impoverishment since its independence in 1957. Precolonial Ghana was
20 Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History.
21 Jack Parson, ed.. Succession to High Office in Botswana (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press,
1990).
22 Marilyn Carr, “Intermediate Technology in Botswana: A Review of Botswana Technology." 
Occassional Paper, No. 10 (London: Intermediate Technology Development Group, 1984).
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similarly composed of different nations headed by traditional leaders and based on a 
hierarchical system of inheritance. The leaders controlled the economic system through 
allocation of land, and ensured that everyone had access to land to pursue their economic 
activities. Traditionally, there were fiduciary and moral obligations between rulers and the 
ruled, with traditional institutional arrangements preventing leaders from engaging in 
corrupt activities and abusing their power.23
Precoloniai Ghanaian nations waged wars among themselves and, as a result, 
were unable to amalgamate their societies into one homogenous grand society. Between 
1850 and 1902 the British colonized the nations and divided the region into three 
sections, instituting direct rule in all the areas.24 During the direct rule period, many of the 
traditional leaders and their institutions fell under the subjugation of British rule, while 
other leaders were sent into exile. This process severely strained the moral obligations 
established between leaders and followers, and resulted ultimately in a moral decline and 
lawlessness in the Ghanaian society.25
After the period of traditional leadership demoralization and subjugation, a new 
class of local leadership, made of people with western education, emerged. The new 
leadership group gained its legitimacy from the British colonizers who had utilized the 
group to gain its political and economic interests. At the end of colonial rule a century 
later, a political system adopted from the British helped transfer the national political
23 George B. N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos (NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999).
24 F. M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence 1919-1957 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1960).
25 Roger Gocking, “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony,” The 
Journal o f  African History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 1993): 93-113.
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power to the new educated leadership group. Lacking local legitimacy, the new group of 
postcolonial leaders recognized their authority and power to rule as emanating from 
Britain.26 As a result, they failed to see themselves as morally obligated to the welfare of 
the local population. Based on that mindset, they have continuously engaged in low-moral 
behaviors that serve their personal interests instead of high-moral behaviors that advocate 
collective social interests. Lacking a well-intentional leadership group, Ghana found itself 
unable to promote socio-economic development. In other words, when Ghana gained 
independence, the traditional leadership group, which held a moral obligation and 
fiduciary relationship with the local people, was sidelined. Thus, unlike in Botswana, the 
change to self-determination meant that the postcolonial era in Ghana began with 
leadership discontinuity and a new political machinery.
The first postcolonial leadership under Kwame Nkrumah, instead of initiating 
political socialization to include all the citizens in the political process, disenfranchised 
traditional leaders from national governance. Despite his popularity as the best leader that 
Ghana has ever had, Nkrumah did not institute high moral ethical standards among his 
political officials and inadvertently allowed them to engage in corruption.27 The Ghanaian 
situation, where low moral leadership culture facilitated corruption and institutional 
decay, is symptomatic of many sub-Saharan African nations. In addition to a culture of 
corruption, the regional leaders have been unable to establish a scientific culture.28 In
26 Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer. Ghana: End o f  an Illusion (NY: Monthly Review Press,
1968).
27 David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World (NY: St. M artin’s 
Press, 1989).
28 Ahmad, “Science and Technology.”
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essence, the lack of both high moral and scientific cultures undermines the economic 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. Even though countries in the region have repeatedly 
expressed their interest in economic development, a social phenomenon that received 
worldwide attention when the newly independent nations emerged after World W ar H, 
they remain largely underdeveloped.
Immediately following their independence, which coincided with the beginning of 
the cold war, both Botswana and Ghana embarked on a path of market-led economic 
development. However, due to lack of a development paradigm in the world at that time 
and to cold war politics, the countries became victims of the economic growth doctrine.29 
Both countries, along with many others in Africa, adopted an economic approach 
encapsulated in modernization theory and used it as a vehicle for achieving economic 
development. Based on the theoretical underpinning of modernization, that more capital 
investment leads to growth, the nations were encouraged to mobilize sufficient 
investment to accelerate growth without concern for establishing the appropriate cultures 
for development.30
A comparison between these two countries is instructive. Botswana has been able 
to minimize corruption with high moral leadership culture, while Ghana is marked by 
pervasive corruption because of the leadership’s low moral culture. These different 
cultural paths have one common denominator, the lack of a scientific culture. The 
postcolonial leadership of Seretse Khama in Botswana and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana 
failed to establish a scientific culture that could induce industrialization in their respective
29 Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (NY: Longman, 1985).
30 Peter W. Preston, Development Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell. 1997).
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countries. Their failure to foster and legitimize scientific culture is shrouded in both 
leaders’ adherence to Senghorianism. This philosophy, which was advanced in defense of 
Africans’ cultural denigration, postulates that the African mode of knowing is an intuitive 
form of rationality and is therefore different from western analytic scientific thinking, 
which Senghorian philosophy deemed un-African.31 The belief in this philosophy allows 
African leaders to move their culture away from criticism. In essence, it acts as a cultural 
inhibitor in leadership thinking and thus prevents them from accepting other human 
cultural traits that could aid in their nation’s economic development and growth.32
Given the lack of scientific culture that prevents both countries from being 
industrially developed, Botswana’s economy has improved, while Ghana’s economy has 
stagnated. The Leadership, Culture, and Development (LCD) model discussed in Chapter 
3 explains the reasons for the improvement in Botswana’s economy. The model, drawing 
on the theory o f association and the work of Mark Casson, stipulates that the two 
prerequisite cultural elements for economic development are high moral and scientific 
cultures. Leaders who are able to foster, legitimize, and establish these cultures are more 
likely to further economic development and prosperity than are those who are unable to 
do so. This logic explains Botswana’s better economic status compared to that of Ghana, 
with the former’s leadership success owing in part to its ability in establishing a 
comparatively higher moral culture.
31 Leopold Sedar Senghor, Prose and Poetry (London: Heinemann. 1976).
33 Olusegun Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest: The Problem o f Self-Definition 
and African Philosophy,” Africa Today, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1995): 26-38.
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The high moral culture has enabled Botswana’s leaders to curtail corruption, 
while the postcolonial Ghanaian leaders have not been able to do likewise. The difference 
in moral culture in the two countries is attributed to differences in the ways both countries 
were managed during the colonial era. A protectorate colonial system existed in 
Botswana and allowed the traditional leaders to maintain their political institutions with 
their high moral values. In Ghana however, direct colonial rule eliminated traditional 
leaders along with their political institutions, and undermined traditional moral values. In 
view of these social metamorphoses post-independence Botswana has had leadership 
continuity with high moral culture, while Ghana’s new leadership group has been unable 
to establish high moral culture conducive to development. Implicitly therefore, Ghana’s 
economic woes emanate partially from its postcolonial leaderships’ inability to establish 
either of the prerequisite cultural elements essential for economic development.
After Nkrumah’s democratically elected government was ousted from office in 
1966, the interlude leaderships that ruled Ghana until 1981 abandoned all 
industrialization projects that Nkrumah had started. However, they did not abandon the 
autocratic and corrupt cultures that had been initiated.33 Jerry Rawlings’ leadership, 
which lasted for 20 years and ended in January 2001, intensified those cultures. Rawlings 
further exacerbated those negative development cultures by committing severe human 
rights abuses. His leadership further undermined Ghana’s development through his 
Economic Recovery Programs (ERP). Under Rawlings’ ERP, the country accumulated
33 Youry Petchenkine. Ghana: In Search o f  Stability 1957-1992 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  rep roduction  prohibited w ithout perm iss ion .
13
approximately $6 billion in debt under the auspices of structural adjustment programs 
(SAP).34
In contrast to what happened in Ghana after Nkrumah, the leaderships in 
Botswana have ruled differently. After the death of Khama in Botswana, his successors, 
including the current president, Festus Mogae, have all followed a high moral leadership 
culture of intolerance for corruption. They further increased institutional efficiency in 
managing Botswana’s financial resources to enhance the country’s economy. Despite 
Botswana’s economic improvement, however, both countries have lacked leaderships that 
would have rallied their people to establish both high moral and scientific cultures. Only 
the simultaneous creation of these two cultures can lead to the sustainable economic 
development o f their countries. Without the leadership to foster and legitimize both 
cultures synchronously, sustainable development has stalled and will continue to do so in 
both countries, just as it will in the whole SSA region.
THE PURPOSE
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, it brings into focus an 
introspective analysis as to why development has stalled in most parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa by investigating the relationship between leadership, culture, and economic 
development in the region. In so doing, it extends the search for a strategic approach 
towards economic development in general for developing countries, most specifically for 
those in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, it analytically investigates and explains why 
immoral cultural behavior by leaders has impeded economic development in Africa. It
34 World Bank. World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank. 1997).
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does that by using the colonial rule differential factor to elucidate how some traditional 
African leaders with moral concern for society were replaced by those with less moral 
obligation.
ASSUMPTIONS, HYPOTHESIS, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There are two central assumptions in this research. The first assumption is that a 
low moral leadership culture impedes economic development in SSA. This assumption is 
predicated on the fact that when SSA leaders and their officials engage in immoral acts of 
corruption, they siphon national financial resources away from public accounts and into 
their private foreign accounts. This behavior diverts resources that could otherwise have 
been used for development. In the institutional organizational structure, low moral 
leadership creates economic moral decay that translates into production inefficiencies and 
increased transaction costs that undermine and slow development.
The second assumption is that SSA leaders’ inability to rally their citizens to 
establish appropriate socio-scientific cultures has caused the region to remain industrially 
underdeveloped and poor. This assumption is underpinned by the fact that development is 
a transformational process requiring the accomplishment of certain social human 
activities. In SSA, leaders have failed to foster and legitimize human behavioral activities 
that involve rigorous analytical thinking that builds scientific culture. The lack of that 
culture has inhibited the people in the region from indulging in scientific creativity and 
innovation. That, in tum, has prevented industrialization from occurring in SSA. 
Consequently, the region’s economic production depends on raw materials with little or 
no manufacturing. The inability to manufacture what they need to improve their lives
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makes the people materialistically poor and dependent on the outside world, which has its 
own scientific cultures that do provide that world with the industrial goods it needs.
Based on these two assumptions and the identified research gap in the scholarly 
literature on development, especially neglecting the importance of leadership and culture 
in economic development, this study posits the consideration of one hypothesis and three 
questions for empirical research. The main hypothesis asserts that African leaders have 
failed to establish a socio-scientific culture that promotes technological innovations and 
high moral culture capable of fostering sustainable economic development. To investigate 
this, the study considers three questions. First, in what ways has the leadership of SSA 
failed to establish the basic socio-scientific culture needed for economic development? 
Second, granted that there is failure, what culture has the leadership created in place of 
socio-scientific culture to impede economic development? Finally, it asks what colonial 
experience might have contributed to the ineffective leadership that undermines sub- 
Sahara Africa’s development. The main causal relationship for these questions and their 
answers will be tested through case studies in chapters four and five.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK
The neglect of leadership’s responsibility in creating culture conducive to 
development in SSA makes this work important.35 The failure to fully incorporate culture 
into past studies was probably due to the difficulty of untangling the convoluted elements 
of culture. In this project, the elements of culture are separated in order understand their 
impact on economic development. Also, due to the difficulty in operationalizing culture,
35 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics."
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traditional economic theorists focus their attention on rational analytic functions that 
exclude human issues. Hence, economic development theory has dealt with leadership 
issues and its functions, including that of cultural formation, from a distance.36 The result 
of this state of affairs has been the exclusion of the role of leadership in economic 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. This work will show that economic behavior and 
culture are complementary, as far as development outcomes are concerned.
This work collectively synchronizes those important variables in investigating the 
lack of development in Africa. The inclusion of leaders’ responsibility in the search to 
achieve economic development in underdeveloped areas makes this study significant. The 
importance of cultural inclusion in development is well articulated by several authors, 
including Samuel Huntington, who acknowledge the need for systematic and empirical 
study of the impact of culture on development.37 This research attempts to advance this 
agenda. The inclusion of leadership’s responsibility in development strategies extends the 
search for strategic approaches towards economic development in SSA. Last, by using the 
colonial factor as an explanatory tool, this work assists us in understanding why many 
contemporary African leaders indulge in immoral behavior that undermines the region’s 
economic prosperity.
36 Mark Casson, The Economics o f  Business Culture (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1991).
37 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Goals of Development,” in Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington, 
eds.. Understanding Political Development, 3-32 (Prospects Heights. 1L: Wave Press, 1994).
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METHODOLOGY
In order to test the hypothesis and make a contribution to the literature, this 
research investigation uses a deductive case study approach. This methodology is chosen 
for two reasons. First, it is a method that permits a systematic examination of theoretical 
propositions and thereby assists in confirming or denying a theoretical claim.38 Second, 
case studies allow for an in-depth empirical analysis, thereby enhancing the ability to 
make accurate inferences about the variables being studied. In this study, these variables 
include leadership, culture, and economic development. Most importantly, case studies 
are valuable for their methodological advantage in minimizing difficulties that are often 
hard to eliminate in cross-cultural studies.39 It further assists in discussing issues in 
details, clarifying the relationship of the theoretical components to the hypothesis being 
tested, and also demonstrating the real world applicability of this methodological 
approach. Finally, for this particular study, the operational difficulty in analyzing both 
leadership and culture makes the case study useful because it challenges the research gap 
by examining those variables academic development scholars avoid altogether or give 
only a cursory glance.
The two countries selected for analysis are Ghana and Botswana, both of which 
are located in the sub-Sahara region. Many factors make these countries unique and 
justify their choice for research. Both were once colonies of the United Kingdom during
38 Theodre Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, and Political Theory." World Politics. Vol. 
16, No. 4 (1964): 677-715.
3,Harry Eckstein. “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, 
eds.. Strategies o f Inquiry, Handbook o f  Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading. MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975): 
79-138.
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the colonial period. Since the two countries achieved their independence, Botswana has 
had a stable political system with virtually no political turmoil. Ghana, on the other hand, 
has been politically unstable and experienced several military coups. Beginning at 
independence, Botswana was comparatively poor vis-a-vis Ghana. It had a per capita 
income of about $50, with little or no economic infrastructure. In fact, the British 
government built the country’s capital of Gaborone only in 1960 at the dawn of the 
country’s independence. Prior to that, the country was administered from Mefiking, a city 
located in South Africa.40 By contrast, Ghana had a per capita income of about $242 and 
moderate infrastructure at the time of independence. Its state government had already 
been established at Accra, the current capital city. Both countries, however, are equally 
endowed with precious minerals (gold and diamonds) and their economies depend on the 
production of raw materials.
Since gaining independence, the economic performance of these countries has 
diverged considerably. In a dramatic turn of events, Botswana’s economic improvement 
has surpassed that of Ghana. Its current per capita income hovers above $3000, and the 
nation experienced a 7.7% annual growth rate between 1965 and 1997. By comparison, 
Ghana’s per capita income is around $400 and it experienced an anemic 0.9% annual rate 
of growth between 1965 and 1997.41 Given that they were both colonies of the same 
country, and possess roughly similar mineral resources, the current gap in economic
40 Willie Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation,” African Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 354 
(January 1990): 27-56.
41 P. Collier and J. W Gunning., “Why Has Africa Grown Slowly,” Journal o f  Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 1999): 3-22. The economic data are quoted from African 
Development Bank, Basic Indicators on African Countries (Abidjan, Ivory Coast: African Development 
Bank, 1999) and World Development Indicators (1999)
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prosperity in favor of Botswana makes their comparison an important area of research. 
The information gathered from the case studies will be used for comparative analysis in 
investigating how leadership has impacted the economic status of these two countries.
The information gained from the research will shed light as to whether the leadership role 
has an impact on development.
In order to investigate the relationship between leadership, culture, and economic 
development in relation to the research hypothesis and questions, the relationship 
between leadership and culture is first be established. Thereafter, the relationship between 
culture and economic development is also established. Then, utilizing the theory of 
association,42 this study explains the relationships between the three key variables. In an 
appropriate operating format towards answering the research questions, leadership is 
employed as the independent variable. As a transitional mode, culture is employed as the 
intervening variable, while economic development becomes the dependent variable.
Culture is divided into reserve and universal zones.43 The distinction allows the 
identification o f the cultural elements that are essential and ought to be established in 
order to spur development. This separation will be equally important to establish the 
reason why a developmental culture has not been established in Africa. The 
categorization will also assist in determining the strengths and the weaknesses of the 
cultural problems, and the kind of transformation that the nations of Africa need to 
undergo to enable them to cope with development challenges.
42 Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
43 Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture (London: Cambridge University Press,
1980); Oladipo, “Reason, Identity and the African Quest.”
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CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 provides a literature review on 
leadership, culture, and the two main theoretical schools of economic development— 
modernization and dependency. The chapter summarizes the major economic 
development debates from these two perspectives. Attention is also paid to governance.
To avoid any confusion, the chapter makes a distinction between governance and 
leadership. It also makes a distinction between economic growth and economic 
development. Based on the detailed literature review, I argue that the two major 
development camps have neglected to consider the importance of leadership and culture 
in their economic developmental analyses in general, and with respect to sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular. The failure to include a domestic institutional analysis provides a 
theoretical foundation from which I develop assumptions, hypothesis, and research 
questions for empirical investigation.
Chapter 3 uses the theory o f association to build a theoretical framework that 
links the variables of leadership, culture, and economic development. It uses the 
leadership-culture-development (LCD) model to illustrate how the cultures that leaders 
legitimize impact the outcome of national economies. The LCD emphasizes culture, and 
explains how it can be divided into two broad aspects o f the reserve zone and the 
universal zone. It further examines and isolates scientific and high moral cultures as 
essential cultural elements for economic development. In addition, the chapter analyzes 
the historical antecedents that led to the Senghorian philosophy that restrained 
modernization by suppressing the actions of SSA leaders in establishing scientific culture.
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Chapter 4 offers a case study of Botswana. The chapter examines Botswana’s 
leadership from the precolonial era through the colonial protectorate era, including its 
contemporary leadership. This section also analyzes how the various leaders organized 
their societies towards economic and political progression throughout these times. It 
offers explanations as to how the colonial protectorate system was different from that of 
direct colonial rule in other parts of Africa. In addition, the chapter explains how 
leadership continuity was made possible during the protectorate era. The chapter gives an 
account of how Seretse Khama instilled high moral culture into his political officials, to 
minimize corruption once independence was achieved. This analysis demonstrates how 
Seretse strategically built efficient democratic capitalist economic institutions such as the 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), and the Botswana Meat 
Commission (BMC) to advance his country’s economic progress. Finally, it touches on 
how Khama’s belief in the Senghorian philosophy intervened to discourage him from 
embarking on a path that would establish scientific culture.
Chapter 5 turns to the Ghanaian case. The chapter similarly examines leadership 
and economic development from the precolonial era through the colonial era, including 
that nation’s contemporary leadership. Emphasis is placed on demonstrating how the 
direct colonial rule in Ghana disrupted the moral obligatory relationship between 
traditional leaders and their followers. Of critical importance is the vacillation of colonial 
policies and practices, and how two groups of leaderships were created in Ghana, 
resulting in the ultimate moral decay of its institutions. The moral decline in the 
contemporary leadership ranks has legitimized and spurred corruption and human rights 
abuses in the country. The chapter further examines Ghana’s experience with military
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
2 2
leaders and coup d ’etats beginning with Kwame Nkrumah’s ouster from power up 
through the Rawlings’ coup, which put him in power for twenty years. In addition, it 
examines how the interlude leaders helped legitimize a corrupt culture that has 
undermined the Ghanaian economy. Finally, I look at Rawlings' economic policies under 
the structural adjustment program (SAP) which exacerbated the nation’s economic 
problems.
The comparative analysis of the two case studies is the focus of chapter 6. Here, I 
examine how the colonial differences affected the leaderships of Botswana and Ghana. 
The section compares the economic cultures that leaders in both countries established, as 
well as the impact of those cultures on the economic development outcomes of these 
countries. It compares and analyzes the economic status of Botswana and Ghana by using 
the LCD model to offer a theoretical explanation for the economic position of each 
country. The chapter reviews the economic cultures that exist in both countries and 
analyzes what brought about those conditions. Towards the end, the chapter uses the 
Senghorian dimension to explain why both countries lack scientific cultures.
Chapter 7 concludes the research with a summary of the empirical investigation. It 
calls attention to the inability of sub-Saharan African leaders to establish the essential 
cultures needed for economic development. The chapter discusses implications that this 
research on leaders in the region might have, and suggests what could be done to 
minimize the underdevelopment in the region. Finally, the chapter suggests that future 
studies on economic development strategies need to include analysis of leadership and 
culture.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Since decolonization, the study of sub-Saharan Africa’s economic and political 
development has been dominated by liberal views that envision the development of 
market system democracies similar to those found in the Western countries.1 This 
approach is encapsulated in the modernization paradigm.2 Modernization theory uses 
modem economic theory and statistical analysis to portray the internal process of changes 
that developing countries ought to go through if they are to become successful in attaining 
sustainable economic growth.
However, the modernization euphoria was challenged from 1960 to the mid-1980s 
by dependency theorists who demonstrated that political and economic developments can 
proceed in many paths. Dependency views underdevelopment in Third World countries in 
terms of international and domestic power politics, institutional and structural economic 
rigidities, and the proliferation of dual economies and dual societies both within and 
among the nations.3 Dependency theory, therefore, emphasizes that external and internal 
institutional and political structures constrain economic development in poor countries, 
including those in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to resolve the underdevelopment
1 Peter J. Schraeder. African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation (NY: St. Martin’s, 
2000); Richard Higgot, Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate (London: Croom Helm, 
1983).
2 Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World ; Preston. Development Theory.
3 Raul Prebisch. The Economic Development o f Latin America and its Principal Problems (NY: 
United Nations, 1950).
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problems, dependency theory advocates the restructuring of the global system and fails to 
mention the need for cultural re-orientation of underdeveloping nations by their leaders.4
The overall structure of the arguments in the literature can be viewed as a series of 
related claims about the nature of social theorizing and the business of theorizing 
development. However, any specific theorizing with respect to the dynamics of complex 
changes towards development in the Third World, according to Peter Preston, must be 
understood as a discrete exercise in order to make sense out of the arguments.5 In other 
words, the business of analyzing social developments, whether politics or economics, is a 
complex descriptive task that requires one to disentangle crucial axes of development 
events. The central purpose of this chapter is to review some of the cumulative 
information regarding theories of leadership and development.
In order to assist in deciphering the social complexities related to the hypothetical 
question posed in chapter one, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first reviews 
the theories of modernization and dependency. In the second part, attention shifts to 
reviewing the literature on leadership and cultural theories, including the role of 
leadership in development. In part three, I analyze the historical antecedents of SSA 
leadership as a prelude to my empirical research.
4 Paul Streeten. The Frontiers o f Development Studies (London: Macmillan, 1972).
5 Preston, Development Theory.
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MODERNIZATION THEORY
Earlier twentieth-century economists believed in an economic orthodoxy that was 
based on an equilibrium concept.6 Among those theorists were W. S. Jervons, Alfred 
Marshall, Leon Walras, and Vilfredo Preto. They argued that if the market were left 
alone, it would function to maximize the well-being of society at large.7 Unfortunately, 
the human misery of the great depression in the 1930s called into question the 
equilibrium thesis and gave prominence to a state intervention scheme constructed by 
John Maynard Keynes.
Keynes demonstrated that economies could go into depression equilibrium where 
various factors of production are left idle. This fact, Keynes argued, results in 
unemployment, misuse of resources, and a possible domination of the economy by 
monopoly firms. To rectify this problem, Keynes proposed an alternative view involving 
deficit spending to stimulate economic growth.8 In this way, Keynes introduced the 
intervention growth theory into development economics. As an approach within 
development studies in the Third World, the growth theory was elaborated upon between 
the 1940s and 1950s and was absorbed into modernization theory. It became the first 
legitimate intervention development approach until the arrival of neoliberal development 
policies such as structural adjustment program and governance in the 1980s.9
6 Ibid.
7 C. Napoleon, Economic Thought o f  the Twentieth Century• (London: Martin Robertson, 1972).
8 K. Kurihana, ‘T h e  Dynamic Impact o f  History of Keynesian Theory,” in R. V. Eagly, ed.. 
Events: Ideology and Economic Theory, 178-199 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968).
9 Julio Faundez , Good Governance and Law: Legal Reforms in Developing Countries (NY: St. 
Martin’s, 1997).
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The theoretical underpinning for modernization theory is that more investments 
lead to more growth, which ultimately results in development.10 In this context, the 
process of development is seen as a series of gradual and successive stages.11 In order for 
poor countries to go through the process, they are told to mobilize sufficient investments 
from both domestic and foreign sources to accelerate economic growth.12 In another form, 
the modernization growth theory indicates that for an economy to develop, capital, in the 
form of new investment, is necessary.13
The outspoken advocate for the doctrine of economic growth under the banner of 
modernization was the economic historian W. W. Rostow. According to Rostow, all 
countries go through “stages of growth” as leaders seek to transform their traditional 
agriculture-based economies into industrial economies. The stages of growth doctrine 
argue that industrialized nations have gone through the first three stages and passed to the 
stage of “self-sustaining growth.” Thus Rostow believed that undeveloped countries 
could do the same in propelling themselves into sustainable growth.14
In addressing development problems of African countries, modernization theory 
emphasizes structural changes in production. This approach involves mechanisms by 
which countries can transform their economic production from a traditional to a modem
10 E. Hosbaum, Ages o f  Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London: Michael 
Joseph, 1994).
11 Paul Baran and E. Hobsbaum, ‘T he  Stages of Economic Growth,” Kyklos, Vol. 14 (1961): 234-
42.
12 W. W. Rostow, The Stages o f  Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960).
13 Preston, Development Theory.
14 Rostow, The Stages o f  Economic Growth.
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system, one composed of industrialized, diverse manufacturing products and services. A 
well-known structural change approach is based on a model of development formulated 
by Nobel Laureate W. Arthur Lewis in the mid-1950s, known as the “two sector surplus 
model (TSM).”13 The model was later modified and extended by John Fei and Gustav 
Ranis and became accepted as the theory of development process in labor surplus in 
Third World countries.16
TSM focuses on both the process of labor transfer and the growth of output and 
employment in the industrialized modem sector. According to Lewis and his colleagues, 
the underdeveloped economies consist of two sectors. One of the sectors is the 
overpopulated rural traditional agriculture sector characterized by zero marginal labor 
productivity and thus classified as having surplus labor. The other sector is the modem 
industrial sector with high productivity but without sufficient labor. The model 
recommended that the excess labor in traditional agriculture should be transferred to the 
urban modem industrial sector to increase output to stimulate growth and economic 
expansion.17 Economic expansion, according to this theory, is determined by the rate of 
industrial investment and the capital accumulation in the modem sector.18
15 Arthur W. Lewis, The Economic Growth (Homewood. IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1955).
16 John C. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Development o f the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
17 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation; Todaro, Economic 
Development; Lewis, The Economic Growth.
18 Preston, Development Theory; Todaro, Economic Development.
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The transfer of labor from the rural sector is made possible by high productivity in 
the modem industrialized sector, which means high wages in that sector. The economic 
rationalization of higher wages in modem industry is based on the usual assertion that 
wages are determined by the marginal product of labor (MPL) which is equal to the wage 
of production (WP). The Lewis model assumed wage rates in the urban industrial sector 
would have to be at least 30% higher than the average rural income to induce workers to 
migrate from their homes.19
To ensure an appropriate environment for growth, modernization theory offers a 
proposal for political stability in the developing world. In the political domain, 
modernization theorists place emphasis on classic theories of democratic pluralism.20 
They believe that the key to political development is a rapid growing electorate both 
willing and able to participate in domestic politics. According to the theory, political 
participation plays a crucial role in economic development.21 The political approach that 
became popular with modernization was structural functionalism. Structural 
functionalism assumes that all political systems perform similar “functions” despite 
structural differences. It is, therefore, assumed that a senator in the United States 
Congress and a chief in Nigeria perform the same political function within their 
respective political systems.22
19 Todaro. Economic Development, 68.
20 A. F. K. Organski, The Stages o f  Political Development (NY: Knopf. 1965).
21 Schraeder. African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation..
22 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, Politics in Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, I960).
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According to Peter Schraeder, structural functionalism represents modernization 
advocates’ desire to promote a “value neutral [bias-free] scientific framework for 
comparing any political system, regardless of its culture or history.”23 By this assumption, 
modernization theorists believe structural functionalism can enable ethnic divisions in 
Africa to cease. In essence, this logic represents wishful thinking on the part of architects 
of the structural-functionalist approach. Their framework suggests that all African 
political systems will ultimately evolve into stable multiparty democracies similar to that 
of the United States and other Western countries. In spite of its good intentions, 
modernization theory overlooks the importance of local leadership in the creation of the 
democratic culture.
Criticism of Modernization Theory: A Cultural Perspective
There are many shortfalls of the Keynesian-based modernization theories. 
However, we look at the deficiencies that are relevant to development in sub-Saharan 
Africa. First, the theory is derived from advanced economies based on implicit 
assumptions of efficient and adequate institutional structures that are characteristics of 
industrialized countries. Cultural attributes which are absent in most developing 
countries, particularly those in SSA. This underscores incompatibility of modernization 
theory in the region, especially when there is leadership absence to establish the culture 
that is conducive to the applicability of the theory.
23 Schraeder. African Politics and Society: A M osaic in Transformation, 25.
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Second, the TSM assumes that surplus labor exists in the rural agriculture sector, 
while there is full employment in the urban industrialized sector. Most contemporary 
research seems to indicate that the reverse is true in developing countries. That is. in 
general there is substantial unemployment in urban areas as opposed to surplus labor in 
the rural areas. This condition seems to be substantiated by the fact that “development 
economists today seem to agree that the assumption of urban surplus labor is empirically 
more valid than the opposite Lewis assumption of a general rural surplus labor.”24
Lewis’ assumption of the automatic transfer of readily available trained skilled 
labor is also troubling because it indicates that the rural areas in the developing nations 
have trained labor. Contrary to this assumption, it is the lack of a diversified 
industrialized culture of skilled labor in those areas that constitutes problems for 
development in SSA. As agrarian economies, labor in the region is not alternatively 
trained and therefore lacks any industrialized culture that makes it readily available to be 
utilized in the modem sector. Following this line of reasoning, unless the TSM is 
associated with some sort of skill training— which is usually lacking in developing 
countries— Lewis’ theory of labor transfer could be considered less relevant with respect 
to economic development. Quite to the contrary, it can be argued that without the proper 
leadership to establish the appropriate culture, the TSM model under the modernization 
paradigm undermines growth. This conclusion is based on the fact that many rural 
migrants, before their migration to the urban areas in search of jobs, were productive, 
regardless of how meager the actual scale of production.
24 Todaro, Economic Development.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss ion  of th e  copyrigh t ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
31
Characterization by the TSM model that the MPL of labor in the rural sector is 
equal to zero could be argued to be invalid because labor in the rural sector is not applied 
to the production of one product, nor is all labor applied to one unit of land. People in the 
agricultural industry, just like other industries, have equally important though different 
functions that make the division of labor also applicable to rural labor. Contrary to this 
reality, the model attempts to group all labor under one task, allowing the theory to 
validate its assertion of zero marginal productivity of labor.
Modernization assumes that the faster the rates of capital accumulation, the higher 
the growth rate of the modem sector and faster the rate of new job creation in that sector. 
Two flaws arise from these assumptions. First, there is no guarantee that profits will be 
reinvested in those countries since the capital for the modem industrial sectors are often 
mobilized from offshore.25 It has been argued by dependency theorists that foreign 
investors in those sectors repatriate their profits to their home countries.26 Even when 
capitalists decide to re-invest, as Todaro has argued, they may do so by investing in 
sophisticated labor-saving equipment, rather than by hiring more labor as the Lewis TSM 
model assumes.27
In the political arena, several trends call into question optimism about 
modernization’s structural functionalism in developing countries in Africa. At the time 
the strategy was intensively advocated, the political culture for such a system was (and 
still is) non-existent in those areas. One example among the trends in the region at the
25 Ibid.
26 C. Furtado, Accumulation and Development (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1976).
27 Todaro. Economic Development.
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time, and even today, is political violence. There was a spread of guerrilla insurgencies 
and civil wars along the terrain, notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. 
In fact, the trend later caused a shift in modernization literature from optimism in political 
and economic developments in SSA, to a pessimistic expectation, which was 
characterized by Huntington as political decay.28 In a later work, Huntington argued that 
rather than contributing to democracy and stability in Africa, modernization’s political 
recommendations rendered the developing countries in the region politically unstable.29 
Drawing on Huntington’s analysis, it is fair to argue that modernization’s political 
structural functionalism was incompatible with the political cultures that existed in some 
developing nations and could have contributed to instability in some areas of the region.30
One shortcoming of modernization theory in SSA has to do with investments. The 
theory’s ambiguity on investments for development has made economic planners from 
developing nations view pecuniary investment as a panacea for their development 
problems. Because of this, they neglect other vital variables, such as leadership and 
scientific cultures, which are essential for development. On the other hand, if the 
proponents of the theory should argue that by investment, they mean all possible factors 
that make development possible, then modernization theory has definitional problem for
28 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Order in Changing Societies and Political Decay,” World 
Politics. Vol. 17, No. 3 (1965): 386-430.
29 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968).
,0 Leonard Binder, Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971).
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investment.’1 This definitional vagueness makes the theory fall short of its prescriptions 
for development since investments in any of the above-mentioned areas (scientific 
culture, leadership, etc.) contribute towards economic development in the less developed 
countries. This ambiguity creates obstacles and puts constraints on the potential 
effectiveness of modernization’s growth model.
If one takes into account the labor saving bias, reinvestment alternative, the 
possibility of capital flight in the form of profit repatriation, the nonexistence of rural 
surplus labor, the growing urban labor surplus, and the unavailable skilled labor to be 
transferred to the modem sector, then modernization in the form of a TSM of 
development needs modification to make it suitable for development in SSA. Ironically, 
as a state intervention approach, modernization fails to mention the role of state 
leadership in its economic development. Coupled with that, it fails to address the cultural 
environments in which its recommended policies should be implemented. In short, the 
theory is silent on cultural compatibility in which state economic policy would be applied. 
Despite its many flaws, it is modernization’s state approach to development that has come 
under attack from the neoliberal advocates in its own camp. They profess that the failure 
of development in Africa and elsewhere is due to state intervention. In the subsequent 
paragraphs, I consider the neoliberal concept of modernization.
'' Maurice Scott Frietzgerald argues that investment be sought in other things besides innovative 
technological changes. W hile this assertion may be technically correct, it fails to direct developmental 
planners which directions to take in their pursuit of national development. Please see: Maurice Scott 
Frietzgerald . A New View o f  Economic Growth (NY: Oxford University Press. 1989).
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Neoliberalism and the New Development Paradigms
In the past, underdevelopment was largely seen as a consequence of a series o f 
structural constraints, which called for a massive increase in domestic investments relying 
mostly on the state. Under the new approaches by neoliberal economists, the diagnosis 
and prescription have both changed. Structural constraints have come to be regarded as 
distorted consequences of misguided state intervention that could only be overcome by 
greater reliance on free markets.32 The free market paradigms have therefore become 
dominant in developmental strategies in SSA and all other developing countries.33 The 
crux of these new neoliberal developmental strategies is that if the developing countries 
want to develop, then they should open their economies to the outside world. The 
paradigm under the auspices of globalization espouses that the opening up of markets by 
underdeveloped nations will bring them investments, technology, management skills, and 
other resources necessary for their economies to grow and ultimately develop.j4
To benefit from this “open border” development mechanism, the sub-Saharan 
African countries are told to embark on export promotion to sell their products, which 
consist mainly of raw materials.35 In conjunction with export promotion, the countries 
are advised to privatize their national companies and cut social services to their citizens
Montek S. Ahluwalia. “Structural Adjustment and Reform in Developing Countries," in United 
Nations. International Monetary and Financial Issues fo r  1990s, Vol. 4, 129-141 (NY: United Nations, 
1994).
' '  Faundez, Good Governance and Law.
>4 Ahluwalia, “Structural Adjustment and Reform."
“ John Sender, “Africa’s Economic Performance: Limitations of the Current Consensus,” Journal 
o f Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1999): 89-114.
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to reduce government expenditures.36 These neoliberal approaches in sub-Saharan Africa 
are being pushed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, under 
their Structural Adjustment Program and “good governance” policies.37 Consolidation of 
the strategies has been accelerated by the decline of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the removal of socialist ideology. These events have helped to alter the socioeconomic 
development of the underdeveloped nations around the world, including those in the SSA 
region, in favor of the liberal tradition and at the expense of revolutionary nationalists in 
Africa.38
The irony of the neoliberal free market approach in the form of structural 
adjustment programs, however, lies in its historical antecedents. As previously stated, the 
economic orthodoxy of the industrialized world was once based on the free market 
equilibrium concept, a condition which was identical to what neoliberalism advocates 
today for the developing countries and one which ultimately led to the great depression in 
the 1930s. The question that arises to undermine the validity of the SAPs then becomes: 
What makes the neoliberals believe that these similar conditions will result in 
development in sub-Saharan Africa when the region does not have the productive culture 
that the industrialized world had when it experienced its depression under similar 
conditions? In other words, the neoliberal development policies that advocate a hands-off
36 World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda fo r  Action, 
(Washington. DC: World Bank, 1981).
37 Fantu Cheru. The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy (London: 
Zed. 1989).
38 Timothy Shaw, “Reformism. Revisionism, and Radicalism in African Political Economy During 
1990s," The Journal o f  Modern African Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1991): 191-212.
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state approach without examining other human social factors, such as leadership and 
culture, stands to contribute little in terms of development for African nations.
As the Ghanaian experience shows, the new neoliberal development paradigm, 
with its disregard for leadership to establish the appropriate culture for sustainable 
development, has many flaws. In Ghana, the adoption of SAP policies in 1983 resulted in 
the dismissal of 20,000 workers from the National Cocoa Board, thereby exacerbating the 
living conditions of many Ghanaians/9 Advocates of the program pointed to Ghana’s 
growth rate of 5% for three consecutive years and hailed Ghana as a development miracle 
without mentioning the fact that the average citizen has been made worse off now than 
prior to the introduction of SAPs.40 According to reports on Ghana, adjustment programs 
have not improved, but rather have worsened the poor’s basic needs measured in terms of 
income, consumption, and access to social services. The devaluation of the Ghanaian 
currency associated with the program also has brought massive increases in living costs to 
all residents in the country.41
One major dilemma for neoliberalism is that in terms of development, SAPs 
can hardly be characterized as a developmental tool if development includes social justice 
and democracy.42 The dilemma stems from the incompatibility o f SAPs and social
39 Ibid.
40 Africa Research Bulletin. No. 11347 (July 16- August 15, 1993).
41 Hutchful Eboe, “Smoke and Mirrors: The World Bank's Social Dimensions of Adjustment 
Program," Review o f  African Political Economy. Vol. 62 (1994): 569-84.
42 Claude Ake, ‘T he New World Order: A View from Africa,” in Hans-Henrik Holm and George 
Sorensen, eds.. Whose World Order: Uneven Globalization and the End o f  the Cold War, 19-42 (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1995); For social aspect for development, please see Gunnar Mydral, “What is 
Development?” Journal o f  Economic Issues. Vol. 8 (1974): 729-36.
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democracy. The program can only be successful in non-democratic environments where 
social resentment to the program is repressed by dictatorial rules.4j Due to the non- 
democratic nature of the program, its implementation undermines the democratic political 
side of the development equation. For example, the Ghanaian growth rate cited by the 
IMF as a success story can be attributed to the dictatorial rule of the Rawlings regime in 
the country for the last twenty years.44
The idea that SAP is an economic growth tool makes it less of a development tool 
because the two concepts (growth and development) are not the same, and as it will be 
shown in chapter three, growth does not necessarily lead to development45 For that 
reason, the SAP cannot be labeled as a developmental tool for developing countries, 
including those in SSA. As this study will also show, neither will governance culminate 
in development. Governance relates to the administration of a status quo and is therefore 
only a managerial tool with little or nothing to do with development, which is a 
transformation process.46
Despite the flaws of modernization theory and its free market approaches, 
classical modernization theorists and their neoliberal cohorts are optimistic that the 
correct mixture of economic policies by developing nations will generate economic 
development. However, the dependency school, by contrast, is much less optimistic with
43 Jeong Ho-Won, “Ghana: Lurching Towards Economic Rationality,” World Affairs, Vol. 159.
No. 2 (Fall 1996): 64-71.
44 Ibid.
45 The distinction between growth and development is revisited in chapter three o f  this dissertation.
46 Christopher Hood, “A Public Management For All Seasons.” Public Administration, Vol. 69 
(1991): 3-19.
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the structural change development approach. Not only do they disagree with the 
structuralists, but also the dependency school argues that structuralists divert attention 
from the real issues in the global economy that prevent the Third World countries from 
developing.47
DEPENDENCY THEORY AND ITS REVOLUTION
Dependency theory emerged as a major alternative to liberal theories of 
development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Dependency specialists criticize both 
liberal and critical theorists alike for being too “Westemcentric” in their analyses 48 
Dependency wages most of its wars against capitalism just as Marxism does 49 Ironically, 
it criticizes Marx as a European who was primarily concerned with the fate of Europeans, 
but not Asians or Africans.30 Dependency theorists are more concerned with 
understanding why the regions of the southern hemisphere are suffering from economic 
stagnation, dictatorial leaders, unrest, and political instabilities despite the optimistic 
projections of modernization theory.
47 Preston, Development Theory.
48 Andre G. Frank. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies o f  
Chile and Brazil (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1967).
49 Avineri Shlomo, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His Dispatches and other 
Writings on China, India, Mexico, Middle East, and North Africa (NY: Doubleday, 1968).
50 Stephen Katz, ‘T he Problem of Europecentrism and Evolutionism in Marx's Writings on 
Colonialism,” Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1990): 672-86.
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The core argument of dependency is that “international relations between 
capitalist countries and the developing areas are inherently exploitative, and that the 
international capitalist system is the primary source of this exploitation.”51 It is this 
relationship that has impeded development in Africa, Latin America, and large parts of 
Asia. In How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Walter Rodney argued that prior to the 
spread of international capitalism in the sixteenth century, Africa was developing 
politically and economically, in much the same way as other regions of the non-European 
world.52 According to Rodney, the European invasion of Africa culminated in a form of 
direct colonial rule, and led to the total incorporation of Africa into the global capital 
system. This had profoundly negative consequences for the continent’s development. As 
a result, he concludes that European domination led to the underdevelopment in Africa. 
According to Rodney, African development was “blunted, halted, and turned back.”53 In 
order to resolve the underdevelopment problem in developing countries, dependency 
theorists advocated restructuring the global financial and production system.54 One strand 
of dependency that places emphasis on global production and trading discrepancies 
between the developed North and underdeveloped South is the circulationist view.
Drawing on the works of Arghiri Emmanuel, a group of scholars emerged in the 
1970s under the banner of dependency. They became known as the circulationists. This 
group offered more sophisticated analyses of the development and underdevelopment
51 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
52 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
53 Ibid., 224.
,4 Prebisch, The Economic Development o f Latin America.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
40
thesis by focusing on the international trade relationship that benefits industrialized 
nations at the expense of developing nations.53 In a massive three-volume work,
Immanuel Wallerstein detailed the historical analysis of what he refers to as “the 
capitalist world economy,” a worldwide capitalist system controlled by exploitative 
industrial powers. The author believes this system is intentionally manipulated to improve 
the economies of the metropolis while the economies of the satellites grow more 
impoverished.56
By using a concept based on the indirect rule model, Wallerstein explains that 
capitalism has orchestrated a pyramid scheme making it more difficult to accumulate 
capital for the development of economies of poor countries. Drawing from the 
metropolis-satellite model originally proposed by Andre Gunder Frank, Wallerstein 
pointed to and added a third tier of nations, which he called the semi-periphery. These are 
the nations he considers as neither very powerful nor very impoverished but as rising 
regional economic and politically powerful nations with aspirations that someday they 
will join the metropoles in controlling the global capitalist system.37
The theoretical argument of the circulationist is that the semi-periphery nations 
have become buffer zones. They are being exploited by the metropoles, while the semi­
55 Emmauel Arghiri, Unequal Exchange: A Study o f  Imperialism o f Trade (London: New Left, 
1976).; Higgot, Political Development Theory.
56 The titles of Wallerstein’s three volumes are as follows according to the volume numbers. 
Volume One: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins o f  European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century 
1979; Volume Two: Mercantilism and the Consolidation o f the European World-Economy 1600-1750. 
1980; Volume Three: The Second Era o f Great Expansion o f  the Capitalist World-Economy 1730-1840s. 
1989. Academic Press in New York published all volumes.
57 Immanuel Wallerstein. “Dependence in an Interdependence World: The Limited Possibilities of 
Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy,” African Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1974): 24- 
30.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
41
periphery nations turn around and exploit the periphery countries in their regions.58 The 
intermediate role played by the semi-periphery nations prolongs the polarization needed 
to keep the capitalist regime in place by undermining the creation of a unified front 
against the metropoles. This structure maintains the capitalist reign, keeping the 
underdeveloped nations impoverished and undermining their political and economic 
development. While circulationists concentrate on a comprehensive analysis for all the 
regions in the South, the neo-Marxist strand of dependency emphasizes the development 
of African workers vis-a-vis their relationship with the capitalist North.
Neo-Marxism
While the classic dependency and circulationist theorists focus on the exploitation 
of the developing nations by the metropoles, the neo-Marxists, also under the umbrella of 
dependency, emphasize the importance of African workers who are kept in the 
underdeveloped status quo. The neo-Marxists dominated the critical traditions of African 
politics in the late 1970s and 1980s. For them, what is important to socialist African 
leaders are labor laws and working conditions for workers in their countries.59 Samir 
Amin serves as the intellectual bridge between neo-Marxists, dependency theorists, and 
circulationists. Using West Africa as an example, Amin argues that the unequalization of 
the regions is made possible because the economies in the regions are structured around 
production that serves the interest of the metropoles but not that of the developing
58 Karen Mingsi. "The Ivory Coast at the Semi-Periphery o f  World Economy," International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32 (1988): 259-74.
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countries. This state of affairs, he further argues, has been made possible because leaders 
in West Africa have reinforced this structural reality.60
Amin uses the economy of Senegal as an example and points to the fact that the 
country’s economy has been planned around the production of only groundnuts. 
According to Amin, this agricultural specialization provides France with inexpensive oil, 
which is a derivative of groundnuts grown by Senegalese, and hampers the economic 
development of Senegalese workers by paying them little or nothing for their labor. While 
dependency theory does well at describing the structural relationship between the North 
and South, it does not offer concrete solutions to the underdevelopment of the South.
The only proposal put forward is for the South to divorce itself from the international 
economic structure, a strategy that does not seem to be especially feasible.
Criticism of Dependency Theory
Dependency theory is effective in describing the global capitalist system. It claims 
that the industrialized capitalist nations have undermined social and economic progress in 
less developed countries. However, this theory, fails to offer a strategic approach for 
development in the periphery countries, though there is some validity in the assertion that, 
via trade, some surplus might have been extracted from the satellite areas. It is equally 
valid to argue that the development of the metropoles was not contingent upon the surplus
59 For the overview o f the neo-Marxists’ literature and the critique o f both classical Marxism and 
Dependency, see Marenin Otwin. "Resolving Epistemological Contradictions in Marxist," The Journal o f  
Modem African Studies. Vol. 27. No. 4 (1989): 641-70.
60 Samir Amin. Neo-colonialism in West Africa (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1973).
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from the South.61 In that sense, dependency may be inaccurate in attributing all 
responsibility for the lack of development in the underdeveloped countries to the 
metropoles.
One of the core arguments of dependency is that the lack of development in the 
underdeveloped world stems from its association with the industrialized world. 
Realistically, no matter how convincing this argument may sound, it remains invalid 
because development is a process o f endogenous transformation. Therefore, the 
peripheral countries could have pursued a self-reliant development path as the core 
European countries did in sixteenth century. In fact, in arguing against this core-periphery 
argument, Amin in, ‘Delinking Towards a Polycentric World’, suggest that the periphery 
can pursue autocentric development by gradual withdrawal in various degrees from the 
capitalist world economy.62 Amin further rejects the circulationists’ thesis by arguing 
that the capitalist world economy is not the only mode of production within the 
international system.63
In addition to Amin, Claude Ake also rejects the development of 
underdevelopment thesis of dependency. Even though Ake agrees that capitalism is 
exploitative, he disagrees with dependency theory’s contention that the expansion of 
capitalism has permanent regressive effects on Africa. Instead, Ake views the spread of 
capitalism to Africa as one “developmental” stage in the overall movement towards
61 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
62 Samir Amin, Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World (London: Zed, 1990).
63 Samir Amin, “Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation o f Peripheral 
Capitalism,” New York Monthly Review (November 1976): 293-386.
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socialism.64 Even within the dependency camp itself, there is no unanimity about the 
negative impact of capitalism on the development of the peripheral areas. As the literature 
indicates, there are dependency scholars who believe that the periphery can achieve 
development within the capitalist world system.03
If Henrique F. Cardoso’s assessment that development for the south is possible 
within the prevailing global structure is correct, then the lack of development in those 
areas can be attributed to some of their endogenous factors. In this respect, an internal 
analysis of domestic culture and leadership’s role is warranted. Yet, dependency fails to 
examine either. Even though the theory describes the structural collaboration between 
local and external leadership in exploiting local workers, it fails to explain that 
collaboration. It fails to say anything about the culture that the “compradors” have 
legitimized to undermine potential development in poor countries.66 In short, while both 
dependency and modernization are state-oriented theories, they fail to incorporate in their 
development analyses an explication of the leadership that controls the state apparatus.
On a more crucial note, the two theories are silent on culture, the socially accepted 
systems of practices and behavior upon which economic operations rely.
64 Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
1996).
65 Henrique F. Cardoso, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979).
66 Compradors are local elites in less developed countries who collaborate with the core countries 
to undermine economic development at home through exploitation for their personal gain as opposed to 
national interest.
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CULTURE
Even though the two dominant theories in development-modernization and 
dependency— might overlook culture, the importance of culture in development has been 
well established and noted as part of human activities by various scholars.67 For the 
purpose of this study, culture is defined as an accepted system of social practice of 
behavior and prescriptions.68 This definition means that cultures are meaningful orders of 
persons and things. In an economic sense, cultures are compatible with the view that 
individuals optimize, and their behaviors sustain an economic equilibrium. This 
equilibrium reflects the values and beliefs of the leaders who establish the culture o f the 
group. The accepted systems of cultural behavior are an unfolding process. Their 
evolution can be viewed as an evolving hermeneutic system. The evolving nature allows 
culture to be dynamic. It also means open-endedness rather than closure, allowing 
cultural flexibility and the potential for human intent, discretion, and problem solving 
with critical reasoning.69 Culture’s dynamic characteristics make it not a rigid “set,” but 
an open-ended complex set of rules, an organized and organizational hermeneutic 
network in which no trait of rule stands alone or drives any cultural force apart from its 
context. In the broad sense, culture is everywhere and it is everything. In its generalistic
67 Amartya Sen, “A Matter o f Choice: Is Culture Merely an Adjunct to Development?” UNESCO 
Courier (September 1996): 10-13.
68 Diane Hughes, Edward Seidman, and Nathaniel Williams, “Cultural Phenomena and the 
Research Enterprises: Toward a Culturally Anchored Methodology,” American Journal o f  Community 
Psychology. Vol. 21, No. 6 (December 1993): 687-703.
67 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics"; Casson, "Cultural Determinants.”
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term, culture is an interpretive integration of material objects, behaviors, and their
70meanings.
Anthropologists have made the study of culture paramount in their field. 
Institutional economists and other social science researchers emphasize the importance of 
culture in economic development.71 For example, Casson argues that cultural activities 
and behaviors have significant impact on economic development. He also notes that 
societies with high morals and scientific beliefs as cultural attributes have high economic 
performance, while societies with low characteristics of these cultural attributes lack the 
prerequisites for economic development.72
Similarly, other scholars have suggested that the difference in economic 
development may be attributed to culture. Findings by Adelman and Morris indicate that 
religious and linguistic diversity impact economic development.73 In the area of political 
development, Haug finds that cultural diversity negatively impacted political stability.74 
In a more recent study, Reynolds compares 37 less developing nations and concludes that 
the culture of each of those nations affects their economic growth rates.75 In another 
comparative study by Mardsen, the author establishes that not only is there a big gap
70 Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture; Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics.” 
Casson. "Cultural Determinants.”
71 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics.”
■ Casson . The Economics o f  Business; Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
77 Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Moms, Society, Politics, and Economics Development 
(Baltimore. MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1967).
4 Marie R. Haug. “Social and Cultural Pluralism as a Concept in Social System Analysis.” 
American Journal o f  Sociology, Vol. 73 (November 1967): 294-304.
7< Lloyd G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in The Third World 1850-1980 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 1985).
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between African countries and their counterparts in Asia, but that the difference in
economic development between the two regions is due to their cultural differences.76
From this he concludes that culture is an important factor in development.
There is widespread agreement in the literature that culture is one of the most
important variables in economic development.77 To the extent that Brad Lian and John R.
Oneal emphasize that, “ignoring cultural influences on economic development seems
particularly unwise,” they see the current neglect of the cultural variable in development
analysis as misguided.78 Vernon Ruttan shares this position. He summarizes the situation
in the following way:
Cultural consideration have been cast into the “underworld” of develop­
mental thought and practices. It would be hard to find a leading scholar 
in the field of developmental economics who would commit herself or 
himself in print to the proposition that in terms of explaining different 
patterns of political and economic development... a central variable is 
culture.79
Though the authors emphasize the importance of culture in economic growth, they fail to 
identify which cultural elements are important and essential for economic development. 
Neither do they mention leadership’s responsibility for establishing the right culture for 
promoting economic development.
76 Keith Mardsen, “Why Asia Boomed and Africa Busted,” Asian Wall Street Journal (June 11,
1985): 8.
77 Mardsen, “Why Asia Boomed”; Adelman and Morris, Society, Politics, and Economics 
Development; Reynolds, Economic Growth in The Third World; Haug , “Social and Cultural Pluralism”; 
Casson, "Cultural Determinants.”
78 Brad Lian and John R. Oneal, “Cultural Diversity and Economic Development: A Cross- 
National Study o f 98 Countries, 1960-1985,” Economic Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 46, No.l 
(October 1997): 61.
79Vernon W. Ruttan “What Happened to Political Development?,” Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, Vol. 39 (January 1991): 275.
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Criticism of Culture
As the literature shows, many scholars have argued that culture is crucial to 
development. The problem, however, is that the literature fails to identify and distinguish 
which cultural attributes are essential for development. For example, in a cultural study
by Adelman and Morris, the authors use ethnicity and language as variables to determine
80economic development. The authors overlook the cultural attributes they employ in 
their studies. The ones that they identify have no value bearing on the transformation 
process and are, therefore, negligible to development, though they are only strictly 
utilized for self-actualization.81
Aside from failing to make the distinction between cultural attributes based on 
their usage, the literature on culture fails to make leaders responsible for cultural 
engineering. This neglect allows leaders to escape accountability for a dysfunctional 
culture as far as economic development is concerned. The one exception in this regard is 
Casson, who shows that leadership is responsible for cultural establishment through
o-,
legitimation of behavior. “ Leadership’s responsibility in establishing an appropriate 
culture for social progression in politics and economics illustrates the importance of 
leadership in development.
80 Adelman and Morris, Society. Politics, and Economics Development.
81 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington. IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1996); Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture.
82 Casson, ‘Cultural Determinants."
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THE POSITION OF LEADERSHIP
Although the phenomenon of leadership has been around since antiquity, the 
systematic study of leadership did not start until the beginning of the early 1930s.83 Since 
then, a considerable amount of work has been done in the fields of psychology, sociology, 
and business, which contribute to the accumulated information in the literature on 
leadership. However, the literature is deficient with respect to studies of political 
leadership.84 The findings related to team leadership, however, provide information 
useful for understanding the importance of political leadership on group performance in
Q C
general, including that of economic development. In this section, I review the literature 
on leadership theories and make a distinction between leadership and governance. The 
remainder of this section is devoted to the review of African leadership from a historical 
perspective.
Leadership theorists point to a wide range of definitions on the concept of 
leadership with little consensual agreement among them as to which definition is 
appropriate.86 Despite the definitional confusion, there is a fair degree of consensus 
concerning the nature of leadership in the literature that focuses on the study of 
phenomenon. Bums, one of the pioneer scholars o f leadership theory, defines the concept 
as “the reciprocal process of mobilizing, by persons with motive and values, various
83 Robert J. House and Ram N. Aditya, The Social Scientific Study o f Leadership: Quo Vadis? ” 
Journal o f  Management, Vol. 23, No. 3 (May/June 1997): 409-73.
84 Ibid.
85 M. J. Steven and M. A. Campion. "Staffing Teams: Development and Validation of the 
Teamwork-KSA Test,” Unpublished Paper presented at the Ninth Annual Conference o f the Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Nashville. TN. April 1994.
86 A. I. Bryman, Leadership and Organizations (London: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1986).
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economic, political, and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order 
to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers.”87
From the same perspective, Bryman suggests “the common elements in these 
definitions imply that leadership involves a social influence process in which a person 
steers members of a group towards a goal.”88 Therefore, the common consensus among 
scholars of leadership issues is to define the concept of leadership as an influencing 
process that integrates the purpose of leaders and followers into a symbiotic and mutually
SOinterdependent relationship. Kenneth Boulding distinguishes this relationship from 
threat and exchange and identifies it instead as a source of power.90 Although leaders and 
followers are bound together by a common quest. Bums clarifies the definition of 
leadership by drawing a distinction between leaders and followers. According to him, a 
leader “takes the initiative in making the leader-led connection.”91 A leader becomes the 
active focus of the group, and therefore “exercises a determining influence on the 
behavior of the group members and on the activities of the group.”92
87 J. M. Bums, Leadership (NY: Harper and Row, 1978).
88 Bryman, Leadership and  Organizations.
89 G. Gemmil and J. Oakely, “Leadership: An Alienating Social Myth?" Human Relations, Vol. 45 
(1992): 113-29; Bums, Leadership.
90 K. E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).
91 Bums, Leadership, 20.
92 B. M. Bass. Handbook o f  Leadership (London: Macmillan. 1990), 27.
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Bums draws attention to a differentiation in leaderships by categorizing them into 
transactional/supervisory and transformational/strategic leaderships.94* This taxonomy has 
taken on considerable importance in the literature on leadership because it assists in 
drawing a clear distinction among leaders. Transactional leaders operate within the 
framework of the self-interest of the followers, engaging them in a quest with the promise 
of a reward. On the other hand, transformational leaders usually look for potential 
motives in followers, seeking to satisfy their high needs, and engage them to achieve their 
mutual quest. As a result, transforming leadership is based on a relationship of mutual 
stimulation and elevation that make leaders effective moral agents.94
For Bums, leadership is further categorized by making a distinction between 
supervisory and strategic leadership. Strategic leadership usually gives purpose, meaning, 
and guidance to organizations. This they do by providing a vision with inspirational 
appeal to the members of organizational and external constituencies on which they are 
dependent. In terms of large organizational groups like a nation, strategic leadership 
functions include: making strategic decisions that concern the welfare and security of the 
inhabitants, allocating and distributing resources, providing direction for the nation’s 
prosperity, and most importantly, establishing a systematic culture that possesses the 
capabilities to improve and maintain the entire group’s interests.95 Supervisory 
leadership, on the other hand, is a behavior that provides guidance, support, and 
corrective feedback for day-to-day activities of the group members. In other words,
'*' Joe L. Wallis, “Integrating the Ideas of Dissenting Economist into Theory of Transformational 
Leadership.” Review o f  Social Economy, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring 1993): 14-39
1,4 Bums, Leadership.
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supervisory leadership is a task involving person-oriented leadership behavior void of 
making any significant changes.96 In conjunction with Bums, Bass argues that 
transformational leaders have both charismatic and inspirational traits.97
Charismatic leaders are considered to be exceptional individuals who inspire the 
creation of organizational cultures that subsequently become tradition.98 Modem studies 
of charismatic leadership find that the charismatic phenomenon is widely distributed 
throughout every social community.99 All writers on leadership, however, do not share 
this view of charismatic leadership.100 Leadership literature focuses on the search for 
individual characteristics that differentiate leaders from non-leaders. In doing so, it 
identifies several studies in which traits are associated with leaders’ effectiveness.101 In 
the coming paragraphs, I review some of those traits and what they reveal about 
leadership.
95 House and Aditya, ‘T h e  Social Scientific Study of Leadership.”
96 Ibid., House and Aditya provide elements o f strategic leadership for organizations but caution 
that those elements can be modified to suit the needs o f individuals.
97 B- M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (NY: Free Press, 1985).
98 House and Aditya, ‘T h e  Social Scientific Study of Leadership."
991. A. Conger and R. A. Kanungo, ‘Towards a Behavioral Theory of Charismatic Leadership in 
Organizational Settings," Academy o f  Management Review, Vol. 12 (1987): 637-47.
100 C. Lindholm. Charisma (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. 1990).
101 R. M. Stogdill. ‘‘Personal Factors Associated With Leadership : A Survey o f the Literature,” 
Journal o f Psychology, Vol. 25 (1948): 35-71; C. A. Gibb, ‘T he Principles and Traits o f Leadership, ” 
Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 42 (1947): 267-84.
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The Leadership Trait Paradigm
There are a number of specific traits that are associated with effective leadership. 
Studies that investigate personal characteristics include psychological traits and motives 
such as authoritarianism, intelligence, need for power, needs for achievement, and 
appearance to measure the effectiveness of leaders.102
In line with trait theory, McClelland’s Achievement Motivation Theory has had a 
great deal of relevance to the practice of leadership.103 The core of McClelland’s theory is 
that individuals who engage in goal-setting and self-regulating behavior are high 
performers who become effective leaders.104 It has been empirically demonstrated that 
groups that are managed by such leaders perform better than groups that are managed by 
non-achievement motivated leaders.105
Similarly, McClelland’s 1975 work argued that the combination of nonconscious 
motives such as high power motivation and high concern for moral exercise of power are 
predictive of leaders’ effectiveness. This combination of motives is referred to by 
McClelland as the Leader Motive Profile (LMP). Power motivation theoretical logic 
centers on the assumption that nonconscious concern for acquiring status and having an 
impact on others derives from a desire to have power. Thus, it induces leaders to engage
102 Stogdill, Personal Factors Associated With Leadership.
103 D. C. McClelland. J W. Atkinson, R. A. Clark and E. L. Lowell, The Achievement Motive ( 
NY: Irvington, 1976).
104 A. Bandura. Social Foundation o f Thought and  Action: A Social Cognitive Theory 
(Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1986).
105 G. H. Litvin, and R. A. Stringer Jr., Motivation and Organizational Climate (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 1968).
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in social influence, a behavior that is required for effective leadership. The central 
argument o f this leadership theory is that highly motivated individuals obtain more 
satisfaction from the exercise of influence, and this satisfaction sustains their interest in 
the exercise of leadership. Therefore, if enacted in a socially constructive manner, high 
power motivation results in effective leadership performance.106 The problem is unless 
disciplined to use the power in a constructive manner, power motivated leaders exercise 
power in an impetuously aggressive manner for self-aggrandizing purposes that are a 
detriment of their communities.107
The theory further hypothesizes that leaders with high concern for the moral 
exercise of power act in an altruistic and collective-oriented manner. Such leaders are 
ethically concerned about the consequences of their actions on others.108 The point of 
LMP theory, therefore, is that the combination of higher power motivation and high 
disposition towards the moral exercise of power results in leadership that induces 
followers’ trust and respect for the leader, and commitments to the leader’s vision.
Parallel to the power motive within the LMP is affliative motivation. It is a 
nonconscious concern for establishing, maintaining, and restoring close personal 
relationships with others. Leaders with affiliative motivation are non-assertive and are 
reluctant to monitor subordinates even when required to do so. Leaders with this trait 
manage on the basis of personal relationships and show favoritism towards some people.
106 D. C. McClelland. Power: The Inner Experience (NY: Irvington, 1975).
107 House and Aditya. "The Social Scientific Study of Leadership.”
108 D. G. Winter and N. B. Barenbaum, “Responsibility and Power Motive in Women and Men." in 
A.J. Stewart and M. B. Lykes. eds.. Gender and Personality. 247-267 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1985).
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In comparing the two traits, leaders with a need for power do not engage in dysfunctional 
behavior that is associated with leaders with affiliative motivation such as favoritism, 
submissiveness, and reluctance to monitor and discipline subordinates.109 Contrary to 
affliative motivation, when the self-aggrandizing tendency associated with the power 
motivated leader is inhibited by a high concern for morally responsible exercise of power, 
leaders with the power motive trait engage in an effective exercise of power.110
The above theoretical analyses indicate that achievement motive is predictive of 
leadership’s effectiveness.111 Robert J. House, for example, found in 1991 that motive 
components of the LMP predicted U.S. presidential charisma and presidential 
performance effectiveness.112 In another study, House also contended that leaders with 
high confidence, strong motivation, and strong convictions in moral correctness of their 
beliefs are strongly motivated to attain and assert influence in society. This group of 
leaders he referred to as charismatic leaders. These are the leaders who advocate change 
and are usually determined to accomplish their objectives. Due to their confidence, 
convictions, and willingness to transform society to meet their higher needs, they often
109 D. C. McClelland, Human Motivation (Glenview, IL: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985).
110 These theoretical expectations have been confirmed; see R. J. House, S. Shane, and D. Harold, 
“Rumors o f the Death of Dispositional Theory and Research in Organizational Behavior are Greatly 
Exaggerated,” Academy o f  Management Review, Vol. 21. No. 1 (1996): 203-24.
111 D. C. McClelland and D. H. Burnham. “Power is the Great Motivator,” Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January-February 1995): 126-39.
112 R. J. House, ‘T he  Distribution and Exercise of Power in Complex Organization: A MESO- 
Theory,” Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1991): 323-52.
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challenge the status quo."3 They are more persistent in the face of obstacles and 
therefore become effective leaders.
The works by Simonton, Spangler, and House have shown that assertiveness and 
self-confidence associated with charismatic leaders is usually correlated with their risk- 
taking and pro-social dominance. In different operationalizations of the same data, both 
studies found that U.S. presidents’ risk-taking behavior is related to presidential greatness 
and effectiveness.114 Charismatic leaders are effective because of their ability to mobilize 
people to follow the leader’s vision. Usually, such leaders advocate the vision of a better 
future for the collective social system and, in all cases, avoid self-aggrandizement. From 
these accounts in the literature, the success and the effectiveness of leaders are associated 
with their sense of social responsibility and collective interests rather than self-interest.115
From the above theoretical discussion, it can be asserted that traits such as 
intelligence, morals, motive for power, and affiliation motive help to differentiate leaders. 
Also, in the domain of trait theory, pro-social influence motivation and achievement 
motivation help to explain how leadership effectiveness is enhanced in certain situations. 
For example, achievement motivation illustrates effectiveness and success when tasks are 
challenging. Despite its usefulness, questions regarding the accuracy of predictions of
113 R. J. House, “A Theory o f Charismatic Leadership." in J. G. Hunt and L. Larson, eds.. 
Leadership: The Cutting Edge. 189-207 (Carbondale, IL: South Illinois University Press, 1977).
114 D. K. Simonton, Greatness: Who makes History and Why (N Y : Guilford, 1994); W. D. 
Spangler and R. J. House, “Presidential Effectiveness and the Leadership Motive Profile,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (September 1991): 364-96.
115 House and Aditya, ‘T he Social Scientific Study of Leadership.”
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trait theory on the effectiveness of leadership sparked the formulation of other theories, 
such as Leadership Member Exchange theory.116
Leadership Member Exchange Theory
As opposed to traits or behavior of either the leader or the follower, leadership 
member exchange (LMX) examines relationships. It explains that a high degree of mutual 
influence and obligation between leaders and followers will result in several important 
positive outcomes such as high performance in a group, citizenship behavior, satisfaction, 
and commitment of the group. The core of the theory is that effective leadership consists, 
in part, of the good relationship between leaders and followers.117 A good relationship in 
this sense is characterized by trust, respect, and mutual obligation. These traits, in tum, 
generate mutual loyalty and influence between superiors and subordinates, and result in 
high performance of the group. In a recent study, Deluga finds evidence of an association 
between the quality of LMX and self-reported citizenship behaviors. These include 
desirable courtesy, conscientiousness, altruism, and sportsmanship— elements that are
t i o
necessary for economic and other social developments. Despite the usefulness o f the 
above theories, the leadership studies have a number of weaknesses.
116 These theoretical expectations have been confirmed., see R. J. House, S. Sahne and D. Harold, 
“Rumors of the Death of Dispositional Theory.”
117 G. B. Grean and M. Uhl-Bien, “Relationship-Based Approach to Leadership: Development of 
Leadership Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership over 25 Years: Applying a Multi-Level Multi-Domain 
Perspective," Leadership Quarterly. Vol. 6, No. 2 (1995): 219-47.
118 R. J. Deluga. “Supervisor Trust Building, Leaders-Member Exchange and Organizational 
Citizenship Behavior," Journal o f  Occupational and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 67 (1994): 315-26.
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Criticism of Leadership Theory
One salient problem within the leadership studies is that leadership research has 
been studying management and supervision and not leadership as it claims to do. This has 
been done because it has always been easier to study supervisors and managers than 
higher level executives, and also because relatively large samples of lower-level 
managers are more accessible to investigators. The problem, however, is that leadership 
studied at those levels is almost exclusively supervisory as opposed to strategic. For 
classifying managers as leaders, the leadership studies have mainly focused on business 
environments and have completely overlooked the importance of strategic 
transformational leadership in national development.119
With respect to national development, leadership studies are deficient on the 
question of political leadership.120 The exceptions to the political leadership flaw are the 
two separate works done by Simonton and House on the effectiveness of U.S 
presidents.121 These works, however, only address local leadership— in this case the 
United States— and cannot be universally applied due to reserve zone cultural 
differences.1-2 Leadership is an integrative process in all societies that influences other 
social functions such as economics in different societies, including those in Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa, which should not be overlooked. Neither should leadership, as a
119 Abraham Zaleznik, ‘T he  Difference Between Leadership and Management." Han ard Business 
Review (May/June 1977): 67-78.
120 House and Aditya. ‘T he Social Scientific Study o f Leadership.”
121 Simonton. Greatness: Who makes History; Spangler and H ouse, ‘‘Presidential Effectiveness.”
122 “Reserve zone” in this case means cultural attributes that deal with self-actualization. This 
concept is clarified in chapter three, where culture as a comprehensive concept has been categorized into 
two broad aspects.
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behavioral concept, be left to the studies of only a few disciplines such as psychology and 
business, as seems to be the norm. Rather leadership studies should incorporate other 
areas, such as development, because such efforts will strengthen the utilization and the 
application of the knowledge resource provided by the leadership discipline. For example, 
a clear distinction between leadership and governance within the field of leadership itself, 
as provided next, clarifies the roles of people in those positions.
The Difference Between Leadership and Governance
As earlier alluded to, the distinction between leadership and governance, as 
management has come to be called, is warranted in the literature for the clarification and 
assignment of responsibilities in social affairs.123 Even though a distinction exists and 
has been clearly articulated by Zalezink, the literature obfuscates the distinction and uses 
governance and leadership synonymously.124
Leadership, as defined earlier, is a transformational process that involves 
articulating organizational vision, introducing of major changes, providing inspiration, 
and dealing with troublesome aspects of both internal and external environments of an 
organization. On the other hand, governance or management is viewed as the 
implementation of leaders’ vision and changes introduced by leaders as well as the 
maintenance and administration of organizational infrastructures. Subsequently, after 
Zaleznik’s categorization, a similar distinction between managers and leaders by Bennis
123 Faundez. Good Governance and Law.
124 Zaleznik. ‘T he Difference Between Leadership and Management.”
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and Nanus was made. They state that “managers do things right and leaders do the right 
things.”125 Some scholars of leadership contend that these distinctive findings are 
qualitative suggestions and therefore need empirical demonstrations through rigorous 
methodologies.126
For the development scenario, a contemporary demonstrative empirical evidence 
for this distinction is the vision of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
that economic development in the developing countries can be accomplished through 
structural adjustment programs with emphasis on good governance. This view led both 
institutions to instruct the leaders in those countries to implement structural adjustment 
programs. The articulation of that vision, and its introduction by IMF and the World Bank 
in conjunction with instructions to the developing countries to adopt, implement, 
maintain, and administer those institutional infrastructures serves as empirical evidence 
of a distinction between leadership and governance. In this example, both the IMF and the 
World Bank played the strategic leadership role and the so-called leaders of the 
developing countries became managers or governors or, at best, supervisory leaders in 
implementing the SAP vision formulated by both institutions for development purposes 
in sub-Saharan Africa.
As the above example illustrates, leadership and governance involve separate 
processes. Leadership is a social process that needs to be undertaken by people, and even 
though the leaders need not be present at all times, if the process is being done then
125 W. Bennis and B. Nanus, Leaders: The Strategies fo r  taking Charge (NY: Harper and Row,
1985).
125 House and Aditya, ‘T he Social Scientific Study of Leadership.”
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leadership is being exercised. The essence of the argument between the two concepts is 
that managers or governors are oriented towards stability and leaders are oriented towards 
innovation.127
Based on the contrast between leadership and governance, it can be asserted that 
governance is a behavior of one in a position of formal authority to maintain compliance 
of the group members with their normal role requirements. Its other functions include: 
coordinating and staffing the components for the group activities, administering the 
infrastructure of the organizations, and handling the day-to-day problems that emerge in 
the process of strategy and policy implementation and ongoing organizational functions. 
In short, there a is difference between leadership and governance: the former provides 
vision, direction, strategy, and inspiration to group units and behaves in a manner that 
reinforces the vision and its inherent values, while the latter manages, implements, and 
administers the vision of the leader.
Given the clarification between leadership and governance plus the relevancy of 
leadership as some of the theories illustrate, the essential question for our purpose is: 
What is the importance of leadership to development? As noted earlier, there is a 
deficiency in the leadership literature regarding political leadership. However, the 
findings relating to team leadership provide information useful for understanding the 
importance of leadership in development.128
127 G. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations. 3rd. ed. (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994).
128 Steven and Campion, “Staffing Teams."
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
6 2
IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP IN DEVELOPMENT
The importance o f leadership in development has been noted in the social science 
studies. For example, in comparing the economic development of Francophone Africa 
and Republic of Korea, Lublin Doe shows that economic development of a nation is a 
complex phenomenon, where success or failure depends on the political will and 
determination of its leadership.129 Also, in a pioneer work, Casson demonstrates the 
importance of leadership in building a national culture, which reduces transaction costs 
and ultimately enhances the economic performance of the nation as a group.130 In other 
works, scholars have argued that most failures in teamwork can be attributed to 
leadership problems and not to individual team members.131
According to Larson and Lafasto, leadership does more than just influence team 
effort. Effective leadership fundamentally changes what a team effort is all about.132 
Burgess, Riddle, Hall, and Salas further explain the relationship between leadership and 
group effectiveness, stating that “effective team leader behavior will lead to effective 
team performance, and ineffective team leader behavior will lead to ineffective team 
performance.” lj3 Likewise, Pratt and Jiambalvo suggest that team effectiveness cannot be 
maximized without addressing issues of leadership behavior.134
129 Doe, “Economic Development of Francophone Africa.”
130 Casson, The Economics o f  Business; Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
131 Oakland, Total Quality Management.
1 C. E. Larson and F. M. J. Lafasto, Teamwork: What M ust Go Right /  What can Go Wrong 
(Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989).
133 K. A. Burgess, D. L. Riddle, J. K. Hall, and E. Salas, “Principle of Team Leadership Under 
Stress," Paper Presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Association,
Knoxville. TN., March 1992.
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In general, a review of the leadership literature suggests that leadership is one of 
the most critical ingredients in effective team performance, such as the economic 
development of a nation, impacting all team processes, both directly and indirectly.135 As 
such. Ilgen. Major, Hollenbeck, and Sego stress that as we look at teamwork, of which 
economic development of a nation is part of, “we cannot overlook the role of leaders and 
leadership.”lj6 Given all the economic performance failures in developing countries, 
especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, several important questions arise: Why have 
development theories not evaluated the region’s leadership experience? Where does the 
African leadership fit in this framework of global economic development? Do the 
region’s leaders play a legitimate role in the region’s economic development?
All the above questions are pertinent, yet the development literature continues to 
ignore the role of leadership in the region’s development. One exception is the recent 
work by Marina Ottoway, who looked at new African leaders and their neoliberal 
economic policies designed towards economic growth.137 Ottaway’s work utilizes a 
neoliberal perspective to evaluate some African leaders who are adopting market 
liberalization and democratization policies for growth. By contrast, this research 
investigation focuses on leadership’s role in establishing cultural conditions that make
IM J. Pratt and J. Jiambalvo, “Relationship between Leader Behaviors and Audit Team 
Performance," Accounting Organizations and Society, Vol. 6 (1981): 133-42.
1 ” Casson. “Cultural Determinants," ; Bums, Leadership-, House and Aditya, 'T he Social 
Scientific Study of Leadership,” ; Pratt and Jiambalvo, “Relationship between Leader Behaviors,” ; Larson 
and Lafasto. Teamwork; Doe “Economic Development of Francophone Africa."
' ,h Ilgen. Major, Hollenbeck, and Sego, ‘Team  Research in the 1990s."
1 Marina Ottaway, “Africa’s New Leaders: African Solution or African Problem?” Current 
H iston. Vol. 97, No. 619 (May 1998): 209-13.
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development possible. However, before the leadership role is addressed, a review of sub- 
Saharan African leaderships and their relation to the developmental joumey of the 
African people needs to be undertaken.
African Leadership in Historical Context
Leadership in sub-Saharan Africa can be divided into three historical periods: 
precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial. Here, the first two leadership groups are briefly 
discussed. Precolonial leaderships in SSA were made of two main types of indigenous 
political institutions with a further differentiation within each. The first type is based on 
tribal grouping. Tribes existed as separate political entities and governed themselves 
independently. They were headed by chiefs chosen by the people, and their attendant 
administrative and judicial institutions were referred to as chiefdoms. The second type 
was the imperial rule. This was when some conquered tribes came under the hegemon of 
others, as in kingdoms and empires.138 In matters of serious consequences concerning the 
entire population, including new laws and declaration of war, the chief summoned all 
members of council elders in addition to his advisors. At such meetings, the chief 
presided over the council and sought its opinion. Such practices were common 
throughout most parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Tribes that practiced this leadership model 
included the Yoruba of Nigeria and the Swazi and Zulu of South Africa.139
118 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
IW D. Boama-Wiafe, Africa: The Land, People and Cultural Institutions (Omaha. NB: Wisdom 
Publication. 1993).
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The African village meeting under the tree and the European parliament were just 
different locational, structural, and administrative forms of the same institution of 
democracy. The only salient difference was that the indigenous African system was based 
on direct participatory democracy, while its European counterpart was, and still is, a 
representative democracy. The unique characteristic of the precolonial African 
democratic system of government was that it was open and inclusive. One did not have to 
belong to a political party or a family to participate in the process. At village meetings, 
the people expressed their views freely, and no one was punished for disagreeing with the 
chief.140
Leadership Role in Precolonial Economy
Precolonial leaderships established the cultural conditions for their citizens to 
conduct economic activities. In agriculture, the role of the chief and the king was to 
ensure that access to land was available to everyone who wanted to farm. The supervision 
of access to land did not inhibit the freedom of choice because the leadership did not 
interfere or dictate what crops the peasants should raise.141 The cultural sentiment was 
that a restriction placed on an individual’s economic activity translated into a burden on 
the economic welfare of the entire society.”142 The notion was that as individuals 
prospered so did their families and the societies at large, and unless an individual act of
140 J. K. Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours 1700-1807 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1971).
141 P. Wickins, An Economic History o f  Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
142 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos. 109.
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economic activity conflicted with society’s well-being, the leaders had no authority to 
interfere.
Outsiders, mostly Europeans and Arabs, who first came upon precolonial 
Africans’ ways of living, denigrated the culture as a primitive communism.143 Ironically, 
postcolonial nationalist leaders joined the denigration chorus and described the 
indigenous culture as socialism. Both assertions are incorrect. African communities did 
not run communal enterprises or have widespread state-ownership of the means of 
production.144 The means of production in precolonial Africa were privately owned and 
the profit motive was present in all market transactions. People did not seek permission 
from their chiefs before conducting economic activities. They engaged in economic 
activities based on their own initiatives and free will.145 Economic activities, however, 
were made possible due to civic cultural conditions of honesty, trustworthiness, and 
security that existed at the time, conditions that were made possible by leadership 
guidance through legitimization and interpretations of moral and ethical norms.
Unfortunately, the power of the precolonial leadership was disputed and 
challenged by the intruding colonial power. In most instances, the colonial powers used 
force to take power from indigenous leaders.146 By those actions, it is correct to state that 
the colonial powers staged coup d'etats against democratic governments. Such actions
143 C. L. R. James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution (London: Allison and Bushy, 1977).
144 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
145 Ibid.
146 Adam Hochschild provides convincing evidence as to how Europeans terrorized African leaders 
to impose colonization. See Adam Hochschild. King Leopold's Ghost (N Y : Houghton Mifflin. 1998).
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ultimately disrupted the prevailing political and economic systems in precolonial 
Africa.147 The question then becomes, what kind of leadership did the colonial power 
offer to sub-Saharan Africa?
Colonial Leadership
African colonization by Europeans received its official seal of approval at a 
conference in Berlin between 1884 and 1885. At the conference, the African continent 
was formally partitioned among the then seven European powers: Belgium, Britain, 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.148 The colonial leadership adopted different 
but similar administrative apparatus to rule their colonies. British colonialism took on 
two specific forms. In territories with white settlers, the British envisioned granting some 
form of independent status within the British Commonwealth following the models of 
Australia and New Zealand. In the remainder of the colonies in Africa, with few 
exceptions, British colonization was based on institutional direct rule.149 French 
colonialism, by contrast, was based on a centralized form of direct rule based on 
assimilation.150
147 The intrusion o f colonial powers in Africa is a vital concept because it sets up the foundation 
for the illegitimacy, in most African minds, o f the contemporary governments in Africa. For a brief 
description o f the conflicts between the Asante Empire and the British colonial intrusion, and how the 
British forcefully deposed an Asante King, see "Asante And Ghana: A Close-Knit Glove” Africa News 
Service (August 5, 1999).
148 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
149 C. Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994).
150 Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900-1945 (NY: Pica Press, 1971).
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In the aftermath of the imposition of colonial rule, colonial leaders forcefully re­
arranged trading routes to ensure that all economic interactions within a given empire 
took place exclusively between European colonial powers and their individual colonies. 
For example, in the colony of Togoland, the German colonial leadership eliminated cross- 
border trade with the British colony of Gold Coast and the neighboring French colonies of 
Dahomey and Upper Volta and, instead, restricted Togoland’s trading economic ties 
exclusively to Germany.151
The forced colonization of Africa came with the imposition of five destructive 
conditions that crippled the region’s developmental potential. These conditions included 
the imposition of the European nation system, incorporation of several African nations 
into one state, destruction of indigenous checks and balances, introduction of 
authoritarian political regimes, and the creation of export-oriented mono-crop economic 
industry.152 All the above conditions are important to our hypothesis in chapter one, and I 
examine the three that are crucial to the development of the region.
The first of the three destructive conditions to the region’s development was the 
erection of authoritarian state rule in Africa. As mentioned above, in the precolonial days, 
African politics reflected democratic principles, in which the relationship between the 
leadership and the masses was based on legitimacy, freedom, and free dialogue.153 On the 
contrary, the colonial leaderships lacked the legitimacy but intended to rule, and thus 
created authoritarian states. The authoritarian model of state-society relations became
151 Woodruff D. Smith, The Germany Colonial Empire (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1979).
132 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
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commonplace in colonial Africa and was usually referred to as “Bula Matari,” which in 
the context of state-society relations embodies the vision of a state that crushes all 
resistance.154 Parts of its apparatus were coercive police-military forces that maintained 
the enforcement of local compliance with colonial rules and regulations. Unfortunately, 
this authoritarian state model remains in place in contemporary Africa as a carryover from 
the colonial era inhibiting all forms of democratic developments in the region.
A second far-reaching colonial leadership impact in the region was the imposition 
of the European nation state system on the rich and varied African political system that 
existed in precolonial days.155 The grafting of the European nation-state system created a 
series of artificial states that did not evolve gradually according to the wishes of the 
indigenous African people. Today, that colonial legacy, as usually witnessed on 
television, has contributed to the ethnic violence across sub-Saharan Africa, impeding any 
political cooperation that could make development possible.
The third colonial economic legacy was the turning of the states into mono-crop 
economies designed to serve as convenient and cheap sources of raw materials for 
European industry. One most cited example of this model is the relationship between 
France and Senegal, where France artfully manipulated the Senegal to cultivate peanuts to 
feed the France’s industries and made Senegal’s economy dependent on only peanuts.156
153 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
154 Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. 1.
155 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos; Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
156 Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West (Boulder: Westview,
1995).
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The above vestiges of colonial leadership in sub-Saharan Africa embodied in 
authoritarianism, a closed economy, and the dependency on raw materials, have become 
impediments to the region’s development. Unfortunately, postcolonial leaders have not 
been able to eradicate colonial social cultures and, in their places, erect cultures of 
democracy, private ownership, regional trade, honesty, and scientific culture. In 
proverbial terms, the colonial leadership acted as a double-edged sword: one side halted 
African’s precolonial social democratic system, while the other side simultaneously 
undermined regional economic integration and progression.
POSTCOLONIAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN LEADERSHIP
The roots of the collective African contemporary leadership can be traced to the 
formation of the Pan-African Congress movement of the twentieth century, which shaped 
the struggle for Africa’s independence. The initial objective of Pan-Africanists such as 
Edward Blyden and, George Padmore was the salvation of blacks in the new world.157 In 
1927, during the fourth Pan-African congress meeting in New York, Africans from the 
Gold Coast (modem Ghana), Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria added their voices to the 
demand for greater autonomy, liberty, freedom, and self-development.158
The organization changed its objective and strategy in 1945 and directed its 
attention to Africans who acknowledged their capacity to overthrow colonialism. From 
then on, the activities of the Pan-African congress became instrumental in the attainment
157 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
158 J. Langely Ayodele, Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973)
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of independence by African nations. Its first success came in 1957, when it assisted the 
black African nation of Ghana to gain its independence.159
With the attainment of independence, most African leaders, notably Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Julius 
Nyerere of Tanazania tried to keep the Pan-African spirit alive. Since the organization 
facilitated the independence of most African nations, Nkrumah advocated its 
immortalization into a continental union of Africa.160 But, against Nkrumah’s advocacy 
of a continental African Unity, Nigeria’s first Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa raised a 
staunch opposition by asserting that a United States of Africa was premature.161
Even though many African leaders, then, including Kenneth Kaunda, Sekou 
Toure, and Julius Nyerere, spoke in favor of continental African unity, the new 
independent nations remained divided as the colonial power had left them. Each state 
proceeded to develop and nurture micro-nationalist consciousness that eventually 
multiplied to threaten the corporate existence of the states. The lack of consensus on the 
part of leadership to bridge the states together, as the United States had done 150 years 
earlier, can be construed as a partial explanation for the continent’s woes today. For, 
continental unity could have brought the African people peaceful coexistence if not quick 
material development, given that the freedom of movement could have preemptively 
resolved some of the ethnic conflicts that engulf most of the states.
159 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
160 Some Essential Features o f Nkrumaism (London: Spark and Panaf Books, 1975).
161 Gideon C. M. Mutiso and S. W. Rohio, eds.. Readings in African Political Thought (London: 
Heinemann, 1975).
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Nkrumah made several attempts to address the complex task of nation building 
beyond achieving national sovereignty. As reflected in his writings and speeches. 
Nkrumah called upon African leaders to initiate policies that catered to the well-being and 
welfare of their societies, with the intention of reconciling the disparate ethnic groups and 
wielding them into a nation.162 In essence, Nkrumah sought to resolve the structural 
contradictions inherited from colonial leaders and to pave the way for advancing human 
welfare.163 His idea of African prosperity was shared by many African leaders including 
Nigeria’s first president, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who added in his own words that “the African 
leviathan -- whatever form it takes — (shall) enhance the standard of living of Africans, 
safeguard their existence, guarantee freedom under the law, with fundamental human 
rights.”164
The above observations reflect the dedication of some earlier postcolonial leaders 
and their intentions to move their communities towards social and economic 
development. However, the call upon their fellow leaders to assume responsibility for the 
welfare and prosperity of the African people proved to be problematic because some of 
the leaders turned out to be immoral minorities whose interests were more personal than 
the collective interest o f their societies. That group includes leaders like Mobutu Seseku 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Idi Amin of Uganda, and Leopold Senghor of
162 Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism: The Stage o f Imperialism (NY: International Publishers 
Company, 1966).
163 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
164 Nnamdi Azikiwe, “My Plan for Africa.” in Rupert Emerson and Martin Kitson, eds.. The 
Political Awakening o f  Africa, 157-175 (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965).
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Senegal of the earlier days, and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Charles Taylor of Liberia, and 
General Abacha of Nigeria these days.
Contemporary Leadership and Development
Politically and economically, African leaders have adopted different development 
strategies. Economically, at the time of independence, some leaders inherited or adopted 
economic systems based on the capitalist model of development. Others decided to 
approach their inherited economic strategies differently.165 Cote d ’Ivoire, under the 
leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, adopted a brand of capitalism that relied on a 
close link to France. President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya adopted capitalist values which 
Daniel Arap Moi, his successor, has maintained.160 Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal 
maintained close economic ties with the West and promoted a national development that 
drew on capitalist principles.167 Under these models, the countries have virtually 
depended on the free market system for development and have produced only raw 
materials for international trade.
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, on the other hand, launched a socialist development 
experiment in Tanzania under a traditional name of Ujamaa (brotherhood). However, 
twenty years after its inauguration, the program brought no development and has
165 John Sender and Sheila Smith, The Development o f  Capitalism in Africa  (London: Methuen,
1986); Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism: The Struggle fo r  Ascendancy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988).
166 David Throup and Charles Hornsby, Multi-Party Politics in Kenya (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 1998).
167 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
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therefore been gradually dismantled by Nyerere’s successors.168 In most cases, the leaders 
continue the mono-crop production policies that were instituted by the colonial leaders. 
Similarly, their trading partners continue to be their former colonial masters. Moreover, 
the postcolonial leaders have failed to diversify production in their countries and continue 
to export raw materials, while importing domestic consumer goods from the 
industrialized world.169 Regional trade, such as the trans-Sahara trade that had 
invigorated the West African economy during the precolonial days, but which was halted 
by the colonial leadership, has not been resuscitated to spark regional development in 
trade. In short, all the five destructive vestiges of colonialism previously mentioned are 
left untransformed by the postcolonial leaders. Consequently, none of the economic 
development approaches adopted by the leaders has been fruitful in their respective 
countries.
Politically, whether a civilian or military government, most African leaders have 
maintained the authoritarian state they inherited from their colonial predecessors, thus 
making the development of political democracy impossible in most parts of the region.
In the early 1960s, the lack of economic development coupled, with political repression 
by the leaders, brought resentment and dissatisfaction in many African countries that 
ultimately led to military coups in the region. By 1998, there had been as many as 83 
successful military coups in Africa, with the majority of them occurring in SSA. The
168 Rodger Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
169 Wosene Yefru, ‘T he African Challenge to Philosophical Paradigm: The Need for a Paradigm 
Shift in Social. Economic and Political Development of Africa.” Journal o f  Black Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 
(January 2000): 351-82.
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phenomenon brought in a new form of leadership, made of military officers.170 Today, out 
of the 45 countries in the region, only five (Eritrea, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, 
and Djibouti) have not experienced a coup d'etat and thus may have been spared from a 
military dictatorship.171
Military leaderships, like their previous civilian counterparts, have been less 
effective in transforming economic and political institutions that could bring about 
development in SSA. Political developments in the region show that the military leaders 
learned some useful lessons from their predecessors, lessons that have become crucial to 
their own political survival. They retained the divide-and-rule policies from colonialism 
and have been accentuating the problems of multi-ethnic differences and tensions instead 
of resolving them. Though the leaders often profess to address “national interests,” their 
development policies and programs focus on narrow sectional and ethnic biases. To 
maintain their political power and security, they often appealed to and coopted their 
respective ethnic and regional constituencies and, in the process, turned people against 
each other.172
Social harmony has been lacking in many African communities because 
postcolonial African leaders, with the exception of a few like presidents Khama of 
Botswana, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Mandela of South Africa have failed to harmonize 
their discordant ethnocentric and cultural groups. The increase in ethnocentric 
provincialism and economic deprivation are evident in sub-Saharan Africa. Though in
170 Pierre Englebert, “Precolonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in 
Tropical Africa." Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. I (March 2000): 7-36.
171 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
76
varying degrees, the embers of ethnocentrism, fueled by leaders’ egocentric attitudes, 
splinter the countries. Nigeria is a prominent example of this phenomenon. As a result of 
demands by particular ethnic groups for their own separate political framework, Nigeria 
is tom between conflicting demands for secession and independence by aggrieved and 
alienated minority groups.173
The situation in Nigeria is a microcosm of socio-political development in sub- 
Saharan African countries. This situation results from leadership neglecting to defend and 
sustain the interest and aspiration of the African people. As leaders reneged on their 
responsibilities, the citizens began to search for a sense of meaning and identity within 
their separate and respective ethnic enclaves, making it possible for the cancer of 
ethnocentrism to further fragment Africans, turning many into second-class citizens in 
their own countries, and under their own governments. One outstanding exception to the 
contemporary African leaders’ behavior is that of former president Nelson Mandela of 
South Africa, who was able to bring freedom to his people through his own personal 
sacrifice.174
Another example from Nigeria illustrates how the leaders have publicly 
denounced their responsibilities to the African people. About a decade ago, when Nigeria 
faced hunger and starvation, the domestic attention zeroed in on the visible and 
unjustifiable affluence of members in the ruling class. The then information minister,
|7'  Englebert. “Precolonial Institutions.”
173 Adeleke. “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
174 Kent R. Rasmusseen, Modem African Political Leaders (NY: Facts on File. 1998).
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Tony Momoh, told the citizens of his country that the government did not owe any of 
them a living.175
In addition to separating their citizens into ethnic enclaves to advance their own 
political interest, another leadership behavior that has done extensive damage to the 
region’s development is corruption. For our purpose, corruption will be defined as the 
abuse of public office for private gain. The term will be limited to those actions by 
government officials that are illegal, such as when public officials use authority to 
advance personal interests rather than encompassing those interests that government was 
designed to serve. In this sense, corruption includes both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
benefits. Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon;176 however, the type of corruption 
endemic in African leadership has been especially detrimental to the region’s economic 
growth and development.177
Notorious among African leadership corruption is the late President Mobutu of 
Congo. Mobutu and his associates plundered more than $8 billion from their country’s 
coffers, of which Mobutu siphoned about $5 billion into his personal accounts around the
jig
world. Unfortunately, the Mobutu regime and its officials were not the only predators 
in SSA. A long list of corrupt leaders and officials exists, such as Midibo Biko, one-time 
Oil Minister of Nigeria, who took $3 billion and fled to Great Britain. Moussa Traore,
175 Blaine Haren, “Foreigner’s Impression.” African Concord (January 27, 1996): 46-48.
176 A. J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption Reading in Comparative Analysis (NY: Holt Rinehart 
and Wiston, 1970).
177 Gould. Bureaucratic Corruption.
178 Ibid.
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once president of Mali, also salted away $1 billion.179 In all instances, the leaders left 
their countries stranded and in need of foreign financial capital for economic 
development. This high-level theft has directly contributed to the lack of economic 
development in the region.
Regardless of how African leaders assume power, whether by the military or 
civilians, the above-mentioned tactics are employed in weakening societal cohesion. This 
is one of the tragic paradoxes of sub-Saharan Africa. While it is no longer threatened 
from outside, the national sovereignty, human welfare, and economic development of the 
countries in the region have fallen victim to the policies and behaviors of the very leaders 
entrusted with their defense. From the previous analysis, it is obvious that in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the lack of efficient and adequate institutional structures, characteristic of 
developed countries, acts as a constraint on development. Therefore, in order to spark 
development that will yield social and material satisfaction for the African people, similar 
scientific cultural characteristics must be established to make development possible. It is 
the establishment of these cultures that makes leadership utterly important in the 
development of the less developed nations. This transformation is essential because, as 
Paul Bowels once wrote, “things don’t just happen, it depends on who comes along.”180 
In terms of social development, whether in politics or economics, the ones who come 
along to make things happen are transformational leaders.
179 The Economist, Vol. 327, No. 7807 (April 17, 1993), 82.
180 Paul Bowels, “Shattering Sky." New York Monthly Review (December 1999): 18-24.
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LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL ROLES: NEGLECTED GAPS IN DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES
The literature review makes it clear that economic development theorists have 
largely overlooked the role of leadership and the importance of culture in economic 
development in developing countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa.181 Even 
though both modernization and dependency theories suggest that Third World states have 
a promethean capacity for economic and social development through industrial 
modernization, both are silent on the question of leadership.182 Furthermore, the theories 
also neglect to consider the cultural behaviors that the state and its leadership should 
establish and maintain towards achieving developmental goals. Due to this neglect, little 
research has been conducted that links the role of leadership to nation building and 
development in less developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Likewise, the importance of cultural behavior has been neglected in economic 
development analyses of developing nations with the simple assumption that economic 
rationality is not compatible with cultural subjectivity.18j
This neglect has created a gap in the development literature because development, 
as previously defined, is a social transformation process that requires leadership guidance 
that has not been discussed in the literature. The exclusion of leadership in the 
development analysis renders the theories and their impacts incomplete. In fact, it is not 
the lack of leadership alone that is critical to development, but also the cultures that
181 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics."; Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
182 Franck Petiteville, ‘Three Mythical Representations of the State in Development Theory,” 
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 50. No. 1 (March 1998): 115-24.
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leaderships establish. Even though the literature does not deny the importance of culture 
in social development,184 the dominant theories, as alluded to, have downplayed the 
significance of culture when analyzing development in the global South. This neglect of 
culture, like that of leadership, again leaves a gap in our understanding of why African 
countries have experienced developmental stagnation. The concern for this cultural gap 
has been raised by many authors, including Samuel Huntington. Huntington argues that 
culture and its impact on development require systematic and empirical study.185 This 
dissertation addresses that concern. It categorizes cultural elements for easy utilization in 
developmental analysis, isolates cultural elements that are necessary for development 
purposes, links leadership and culture to development, and uses both concepts to explain 
why development has not progressed in sub-Saharan Africa. By doing this, the 
dissertation offers an original contribution by filling the leadership and cultural gaps that 
currently exist in the development literature.
I8? Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
184 Sen, “A Matter of Choice."
185 Huntington, ‘The Goals of Development.”




As the previous chapter has shown, modernization, dependency, and neo-Marxist 
theorists have failed to examine how economic developmental successes are shaped by 
the interaction between leadership convictions and cultural attributes at the global, 
national, and local levels. Most studies of economic development conducted under these 
three dominant doctrines are focused on other variables than leadership and culture. 
Implicitly, the three theories have ignored the fact that development processes are 
complex and depend on the interaction between social factors.
The exclusion of these social factors, it can be argued, has contributed to the 
inability to effectively explain the dismal economic progress in sub-Saharan African 
countries. This, in tum, produces dissatisfaction with the above theoretical models 
because the attempts to explain the economic dynamic process in sub-Saharan Africa fall 
short of reality.1 According to Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhil and Rothchild, this 
shortcoming means “social scientists have had little alternative but to undertake a search 
for a new conceptual framework that would afford a fuller insight into the dynamic 
processes unfolding on the continent.”2 Many scholars such as Hyden argue that “Africa
1 Samir Amin, “Underdevelopment and Dependency in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary 
Forms,” Journal o f  M odem  African Studies, Vol. 10 (1972): 503-24 ; Colins Leys, Underdevelopment in 
Kenya: The Political Economy o f  Neocolonialism  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Claude 
Ake, “Rethinking African Democracy,” Journal o f  Democracy, Vol. 2 (1991): 32-44.
2 Naomi Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhil and D. Rotchild, eds.. Politics and Society in 
Contemporary Africa  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1983).
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needs a new paradigm, or set of paradigms” to explain the region’s development 
processes. 3
Using the ideological message of association,4 this chapter builds a theoretical 
framework that links leadership, culture, and economic development. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. Part one examines the relations between leadership and 
culture. Part two looks at the relations between culture and development. The phenomena 
between and within these three elements create a framework from which an answer will 
be sought for the question posted in the hypothesis. The second section separates culture 
into two broad aspects in an attempt to isolate and identify the cultural elements essential 
for economic development. Part three provides the philosophical and historical debate 
surrounding Africans’ cultural dilemma that prevents the leadership from establishing the 
appropriate culture for development. Before delving into the relationships, section one 
begins with the definitions of the basic concepts: culture, economic development, and 
leadership.
Definitions of Culture, Economic Development, and Leadership
As stated, culture is defined as accepted systems of social practice of behavior and 
prescriptions. This means that culture is a meaningful order of persons and things. In an 
economic sense, culture is compatible with the view that individuals optimize, and their
3 Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1983 ), 193.
* Association theory relates cultural values to economic performance, and leadership is part o f  the 
mechanism that links the two. Unlike sociological theory, association retains the methodological 
individualism of economic analysis. Associationists' standpoint is represented by institutional economics.
For more on association theory, see R. H. Frank. Choosing the Right Pond (NY: Oxford University Press, 
1985); Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
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behaviors sustain an economic equilibrium. This equilibrium reflects the value and 
beliefs of the leaders who establish the culture of a group. This accepted system of 
behavior (culture) is an unfolding process. Its evolution can be viewed as an evolving 
hermeneutic system. The evolving nature allows culture to be dynamic and prevents it 
from becoming static. It also means open-endedness rather than closure, allowing cultural 
flexibility and the potential for human intent, discretion, and problem solving with critical 
reasoning.5
Culture’s dynamic characteristics make it not a rigid “set” but an open-ended 
complex set of rules, an organized and organizational hermeneutic network in which no 
“trait” of “rule” stands alone or drives any cultural force apart from its complex 
processual context. In the broad sense, culture is everywhere and it is everything. In its 
most general sense, culture is an interpretive integration of material objects, behavior, and 
their meanings.6
In this work, economic development is defined at a national level. Development 
occurs when a nation, through accumulative causation by virtue of cultural process, 
acquires the understanding of natural law of creation and uses it to attain the 
technological capacity to enable it to produce diverse products to satisfy its population’s 
need. In other words, a society develops economically as its members jointly increase 
their capacity for dealing with their environments. This capacity for dealing with the 
environment is dependent on the extent to which they understand the laws of nature
5 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics” ; Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
6 Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture.
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(science), and to the extent to which they put that understanding of knowledge into 
practice by devising tools (technology), and in the manner in which work is organized to 
benefit and sustain the entire welfare of the society.7
Economic development thus reflects the utilization of the understanding of natural 
law to devise technology so as to enable mankind to harness resources to sustain and 
improve their living. On the national level, development is when a group of human 
species confined within a geographical location has been able to understand natural law to 
enable them to collectively organize to increase their capacity of production through 
technological innovations.8
Leadership is a reciprocal process of mobilizing people by individuals with 
motives and values and other resources in order to realize goals that are independently or 
mutually held by both the leader and the group members.9 Leadership occurs when an 
individual, or a group, with a high moral quality has the capability of inspiring citizens of 
a nation and engaging them to achieve a mutual objective. There are transformational and 
transactional leaderships. Transformational leadership usually seeks to satisfy the high 
needs of their groups and engages the group members in achieving those needs. It is 
based on a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts leaders into high 
moral agents.10 Transactional leadership, as opposed to transformational leadership,
7 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
8 Richard L. Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development: Towards a Conceptual 
Clarification," Journal o f  Economic Issues, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 1995): 1171-88; Simon Kuznets, 
Economic Growth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Myrdal, “What is Development?”
9 J. C. Rost, “Leadership Development in the New Millennium,” The Journal o f  Leadership 
Studies, No. 1 (1993): 99-108.
10 Bums, Leadership.
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operates within the framework of self-interest and promises rewards to followers.11 Both 
transformational and transactional leaders can be inspirational and charismatic.12
Writers on leadership point to a wide range of definitions for this phenomenon. 
However the common elements in all the definitions imply that leadership involves a 
social influence process in which a person or a group of persons steerfs] members of a 
group towards a goal.13 Leaders and followers are bound together by a common quest. 
However, the leader becomes the focus of the group actively and therefore exercises a 
determining influence on the behavior of the group. Through such a role, leadership is 
able to legitimate some behaviors while denouncing others, and consequently creating a 
culture for the group.14 Leadership, regardless of the type, is a source of power that 
rallies group members to modify cultural behavior.15
LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE: THE LINK
In most groups leadership is responsible for establishing a culture conducive for 
welfare and development. The assumption here is that leadership has good morals, the 
right ethical beliefs, and is able to rally group members towards a mutual quest to their 
benefit. The above assertion is based on the premise that, in every nation, citizens 
delegate social regulation to leadership with an implicit assumption that the leadership is
11 Ibid.
12 Bass, Handbook o f  Leadership-, Bums, Leadership.
13 Bryman, Leadership and Organizations.
14 Bass, Handbook o f  Leadership.
15 Boulding, The linage.
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responsible for engineering the social system. Politically, this is synonymous with a 
mandate. The delegation of such a responsibility from the population to the leadership 
always comes with authoritative power of some kind allowing the leadership to legitimate 
cultural behavior deemed conducive to achieving national welfare. In other words, a 
nation entrusts its leadership with the practice o f intellectual division of labor in 
processing information to establish an appropriate environment to enable the nation to 
maintain and improve its existence. Therefore by the theory o f association, the culture 
that leadership ordains through interpretation and legitimation has an impact on a nation's 
ability to achieve its economic material needs.16 In this respect, the leaders are 
responsible for engineering a culture that effectively coordinates all social intricacies 
within a nation to improve and sustain the national economy.
The unspoken contractual relations between the citizens and leadership make the 
latter obligated in providing a social aura in the form of a culture conducive for society’s 
economic satisfaction. The inherent leadership responsibility is important because, from a 
cultural point of view, a nation’s economic operational systems is like that of a firm. They 
both encounter a coordination problem that can lead to high transaction costs. However 
this problem can be overcome in a nation by moral manipulation of leaders through 
engineering a sense of obligation by articulating legitimate objective. This indeed is the 
main role of leaders, by which they create national cultures.17
16 It is important to note that leaders play an instrumental role in association theory. According to a 
recent work done by Casson, the author established that association theory relates cultural values to 
economic performance and leadership is the link between the two. See Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
17 Casson, The Economics o f  Business.
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As an evolving accepted system of social practices and behaviors, cultural
behavior and its formation implies that evolutionary selection is part of, rather than
subsequent to novel cultural variation. The psychological mechanics that cause
individuals to behave the way they do, also known as teleological actions, are rooted in
18the complex meaning of the cultural matrix in which the actions occur. The reason is 
that the hermeneutic complexity sets limits on the ranges of both the meanings of various 
acts and the actions that individuals are likely to consider as they pursue their objectives. 
The important point is that the social logic that acts as the behavioral regulator is 
designed by leadership’s legitimation and interpretation as previously mentioned. This 
ability gives leaders the power to influence or modify the cultural behavior of citizens.
But why, it may be asked, are group members so easily influenced? Do not their 
own life experiences dictate their preference? Theoretically, the answer is that preferences 
need to be psychologically legitimized and life experiences need to be interpreted. As 
Casson explains, “preference legitimation requires a moral systeml9and interpretation of 
life experience requires a scientific theory of some kind.”20 Both services are provided to 
members of a group by leadership. By providing both legitimation and interpretation of
18 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory o f  the Leisure Class (NY: Mentor, 1953). The idea of teleological 
act was originated by Veblen when he offered the description o f complexity in the Theory o f the Leisure 
Class in 1899; the concept was again reprinted in 1953 by Mentor Publishers. Recent work by Ann Jennings 
explained that the concept equally applies to complex cultural processes. Individual and group cultural 
behavior is formed in response to a given stimulus and will necessarily affect the character of the response 
to other stimuli. As a result, the modification o f human nature at any point becomes a modification to the 
general population as a whole. See Jennings and Waller, "Evolutionary Economics.”
19 There is no definitive way of appraising moralities. Therefore in our case, the implicit ranking of 
moral systems is by their instrumental contribution to material economic development.
20 Casson, "Cultural Determinants,” 422.
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the system, the leader legitimizes certain kinds of culture and denounces others.21 This 
makes a leader responsible for establishing cultural expectations. Armed with the 
overbearing power of influence, it becomes obvious that leadership relativism can reduce 
cultural dynamics by requiring adaptations to comport with fewer cause and effect 
relationships. The point being made here is that the kind of culture and how a culture of a 
society changes to suit a mutual quest depends on a leader’s beliefs.
Cultural formations can amplify problems and dislocations, requiring more 
concerted and coordinated efforts than single individuals can provide to induce change 
within the system. On such occasions, legislative and judicial actions by governments can 
provide solutions. Here too, the importance of leadership in cultural establishment 
becomes imperative. A good example of this is what Daniel Rodger described as the “ 
transformation of social meanings of the state” in relation to “democracy and the people” 
during the Jacksonian era in the United States.22 As earlier alluded to, the mechanics of 
social engineering comes by legitimation and interpretation. The interpretation helps to 
provide the acquisition methodologies. Acquisition in this context signifies the way and 
manner in which the intended cultural evolution is undertaken by the leadership. There 
are two options, speciation and adaptation, that are usually available for undertaking such 
cultural evolution23.
Cultural adaptation involves reinterpreting hermeneutic linkages to accommodate 
the novelties arising from individual, and some times group, teleological behavior. It does
21 Ibid.
22 Daniel T. Rodgers. Contested Truths (NY: Basic Books, 1987).
23 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics."
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not refer to changes in singular behaviors or habits, but to the complex patterned habits 
and activities that constitute individual lives in a cultural setting.24 It is commonly 
applied ex-post to changes that have already appeared, meaning the changes that are made 
are “selected” as beneficial adaptations.25 In most cases, conventional notions of 
beneficial evolutionary “selection” express both dominant cultural habits of thought and 
self-congratulatory cultural impulses. Meaning adaptations are filtered but not 
predetermined.26
Speciation, on the other hand, occurs by reintegrating the existing structural 
elements of an organism and recreating the organism-environment relationship. It is a 
tautological “default category” containing those cases that do not seem to fit adaptation. 
Speciation is a discontinuous change, in contrast to the “continuous” change of 
adaptation. As a discontinuous cultural change, speciation is important in part because it 
offers an explanation for why, in an analytical sense, economic development in some 
developing countries has become problematic. It involves more dramatic reintegration of 
the cultural hermeneutic than those permitted by ambiguous flexibility. It implies a 
cultural leap into interpretations that are highly countered intuitive from the standpoint of 
earlier understandings, consequently yielding relativism in human knowledge across 
cultural species.27
24 Veblen, The Theory.
25 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics."
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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Macroevolutionary biological theories, used by some anthropologists have 
discussed speciation as an event involving regulatory, rather than structural formation.28 
However, it is necessary to note that neither relativism in human knowledge nor cultural 
discontinuity is absolute because ambiguity in culture accommodates the interpretive 
potential needed for cultural evolution. Dialectically, as the above analysis indicates, the 
legitimation and interpretation power of leaders makes them the cultural architects of a 
group. Thus leaders become responsible for providing the milieu in which the expected 
outcome for national welfare will be possible. The role of leadership in providing 
appropriate culture is essential because from an economic point of view, nations and the 
groups of people within them are no more than a nexus of contracts. The contracting 
parties are individuals each playing some functionally specialized role that requires an 
optimistic view of other individuals’ intentions and moral commitments of one’s own to 
bring about successful outcomes. Therefore, when leadership fails, through its 
legitimation and interpretation, to establish a appropriate cultural milieu, the result is a 
negative performance of the nation’s economy.
Some Implications For sub-Sahara Africa
The implication of the above discussion of leadership’s role as a cultural engineer 
concerns its link to cultural relativism among leaders and its impact on social progress. In 
most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, elitist and leaderships form limits evolutionary 
potential by restricting the cultural dynamic and protecting the cultural myths that sustain
28 Paul Diener, “Quantum Adjustment, Macroevolution, and the Social Field: Some Comments of 
Evolution and Culture,” Current Anthropology, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1980): 423-30.
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social hierarchy. Consequently, this undermines the cultivation of rigorous analytical 
cause-and-effect scientific culture that possesses the capability to spark material 
economic development. In that region of the world, the cultural myth, as identified in 
Senghorian philosophy, has created a scenario that avoids inter-and intracultural 
communication in the domain of thought, especially in critical scientific thinking. The 
belief in mythology has maintained the status quo for the countries in the region to engage 
in counter-productive development approaches based on the neoclassical Keynesian 
doctrine of growth.
CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE LINK
As the hypothesis infers, a relationship exist between economic development and 
culture. However, the question remains as to how economic process is connected to 
culture. From a general observation, culture clearly plays a significant role in economic 
development in the sense that it influences individuals’ values and serves as a motivating 
force for them to achieve what they deem essential.29
The Veblen dichotomy serves as one explanation of the connection between 
culture and economic development. The dichotomy can be interpreted as having a 
dynamic technology juxtapose to ceremonial nature of social institutions. The inference 
here is that technology conceptualized as social capital and permeable to scientific 
knowledge serves as a dynamic instrumental function in improving economic living.30 In 
the same line of reasoning, Kuznets characterized economic development as an epoch in
29 Sen, “A Matter of Choice.”
30 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development.”
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which both economic production and social organization became permeable to the 
application of science.31 Such a culture-conception of technology, which includes both 
social (factory system) and material (steam engine) factors, helps to explain the 
connection between technology and culture.
In fact, there is no distinction between technology and culture because they are 
opposite sides of the same coin, the coin of useful knowledge. For, knowledge as a 
protean concept appears in its application form as technology and in store as culture. Here 
culture, as previously defined, is the accepted systems of practices and behavior. Through 
this technological association, we see that the relationship between culture and economic 
development becomes clearer.32 This establishes the link between the two.
By definition then culture is omnipresent, thus making cultural behavior both 
deeply habituated and systematically complex in all social endeavors, including that of 
economics. A careful observation reveals that economic interest does not act in isolation 
from ones cultural behavior. Indeed, the matrimony between culture and economics is so 
complete and everlasting that it enabled Veblen to write “the economic interest does not 
act in isolation, for it is but one of the several vaguely isolable interests on which the 
complex of teleological activity is carried out by the individual.”33
Veblen’s observation is applicable to market economies of the contemporary 
world. For, if we focus on a “subset” of our social process, it is recognized that market 
activities are predicated upon an entire complex of individual teleological activity rather
31 Kuznets, Economic Growth.
32 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development.”
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than vaguely isolated economic interests. A salient indication that economic behavior, 
though as uniquely complex and non-compartmentalistic as it may be, is rooted in 
cultural continuity, a significant evidences that economic development and cultural 
process cannot be partitioned.
Culture, as previously stated, is an accepted system of social practice and behavior 
that in economic terms has a collective subjective connotation. Subjectivity has two 
meanings in economics. One has to do with the idea that individual preferences are not 
directly measurable but are revealed only indirectly through behavior. The other meaning 
of subjectivity is within the context of probability. Unfortunately, probability too cannot 
be measured directly. It, however, can be observed that when individuals maximize their 
expected utility, changes occur in their behavior. The changes that occur when people 
maximize their utility are affiliated with the modification of an individual’s subjective 
probability.34 Deductively, what this implies is that behavior or culture is economically 
driven via utility maximization.
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that there is a clear link between 
culture and economic evolution and its development. One caveat about the two meanings 
of subjectivity mentioned above is that individual preferences and beliefs differ.
However, generally speaking, people belonging to the same group do have similar 
preferences and beliefs. The explanation for this similarity is that preferences and beliefs 
are malleable and that individuals exposed to the same influence tend to conform in these
33 Veblen, The Theory, 77.
34 This conditional probability is well discussed in psychology and is the same concept underlying 
Pavlov’s work. For more information see Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
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respect. These influences, in turn, affect individual behavior through its impact on 
preferences and beliefs. An attribute that is critical within the realm of economic 
development to the extent that Casson wrote, “it affects individual behavior towards each 
other. Which in turn can affect both efficiency and equity within the group.”35 These 
characteristics are essential in economic development and in all organizing economic 
societies.
Figure 3-1.
The Leadership, Culture and Development (LCD) Model for Developing Nations.
As the above analysis has qualitatively shown, there is a correlation between 
leadership, culture, and economic development. As Figure 3-1 shows, through 
legitimation and interpretation of values, leadership establishes an accepted system of 
practices and behavior that leads to a culture of a group, in our case, a nation. The Veblen 
dichotomy serves as one explanation for the connection between culture and economic 
development through technology. Culture as a technology is linked to economic 
development as a social capital. It is also clear that from an economic perspective, culture 
is compatible with an individual’s utility optimization. Deductively therefore, culture 
becomes economic driven and becomes linked to economic development. The 
phenomena between and within these three elements demonstrate the relationship
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between leadership and economic development, practically, in all human social groups. 
There is one problem, however regarding how development and growth are treated in the 
contemporary development literature that needs some clarification.
As one may recall from chapter two, different scholars have identified several 
cultural elements and their contribution to economic growth, when they are in fact 
addressing development problems. This situation means that growth is equal to 
development or will ultimately lead to development. This view allows writers to use the 
two terms synonymously.36 This however is a serious misconception that has been taken 
for granted in the discussions of developmental approaches, one that often leads to ill- 
defined developmental policies in less developing nations including those in SSA. In 
what follows, a distinction is made between those two terms, growth and development, in 
order to clarify the prevailing misconception.
The Difference Between Economic Growth And Development
Contemporary economics based on neoclassical synthesis has always treated 
economic development and economic growth as virtually synonymous.37 The difference 
between the two is discussed here to assist in alleviating the confusion that exists within 
the contemporary development theories for using the two terms synonymously. The lack
36 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development."
37 H. W. Ardnt, Economic Development: The History o f  an Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987); Robert Dorfman, “Review Article: Economic Development from the Beginning to Rostow,” 
Journal o f  Economic Literature, Vol. 29 (June 1991): 573-91.
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of clarification may have contributed to irresponsible policy formulation that has 
undermined prospects for economic development.38
Economic development is a dynamic transformation, which takes place between 
equilibrium positions such as from tradition to modernity. In a simple context, it is a 
transformation that deals with sequential pattern of structural changes; a process whereby 
one structure gives rise to a new structure with the acquisition o f  knowledge.39 It is 
associated with non-traditional economic variables such as transformation of values and 
the impact of technology.40 Development serves as an independent variable upon which 
growth is dependent. In other words, it is development that leads to growth, not vice- 
versa, as the conventional development theories, (modernization, dependency, and the 
neoliberal globalization) suggest.41 It is a change that has a continuous direction and 
which culminates in a phase that is qualitatively new from the previous phase.
A country’s economic development reflects a long-term rise in capacity to 
produce diverse economic goods for its population. This growing capacity is based on 
technology, as well as social and ideological cultural institutions that are essential for its 
support. One institutional economist who emphasized the social nature of the 
developmental process is Gunnar Myrdal, who defined development as “the movement 
upward of the entire social system.”42 The entire social system, depicted by Myrdal, is
38 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development.”
39 Ibid.
40 Myrdal, “What is Development?”
41 Simon Kuznets, “Modem Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections,” American Economic 
Review, Vol. 63 (June 1973): 247-58; Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development.”
42 Myrdal, “What is Development?” 729.
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what one British anthropologist referred to as “that complex whole,” known as culture.43 
Culture constitutes the substantive nature of that which experiences accumulation and 
metamorphosis in the dynamics of economic evolution.44
Economic growth, on the other hand, is a quantitative static analysis, or at best, 
one of comparative static. It deals with changes within a structure without relating to the 
transformation of the structure. Growth by itself is seen as a replication of a given 
structure that does not lead to development. It is a measure of development, but by itself 
is not development, and it is measured by a quantitative concept of GNP/capita.45 The 
discussion of prerequisite technology and social transformation lay outside the Keynesian 
matrix upon which a growth model rests. Hence, an economic growth model, as a 
derivative of the Keynesian matrix is inadequate to explain the social and cultural 
transformation structures that are required in a theory of the dynamics of economic 
development.46 This deficiency is not unknown within the economic profession. Indeed, 
some economists have sought to overcome the comparative static inherent in the growth 
model.47
43 R. L. Brinkman, "Growth Vrs. Development,” in F. N. Magil, ed.. Survey o f Social Science: 
Economics Series, Vol. 2,948-955 (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 1991); R. L. Brinkman. "Culture Evolution 
and the Process o f  Economic Evolution,” International Journal o f  Social Economics, Vol. 19 (1992): 248- 
67.
44 Brinkman. “Culture Evolution.”
45 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development” ; Myrdal, “What is 
Development?”
46 Brinkman, “Growth Vrs. Development”; Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa-, M yrdal, 
“What is Development?”
47 R. F. Solow, Growth Theory: An Explanation (NY: Oxford University Press, 1970).
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In drawing a line between growth and development, it can be concluded that 
growth is a measure of development. It relates to the replication of the same structure.
The process of economic development, however, is different. It is a dynamic 
transformation whereby one structure gives rise to a new structure. The transformative 
capacity is based on the acquisition of technology. The levels of GNP/capita characteristic 
of economic growth are achieved not by growth process but are due to the results from 
developmental process of cultural and social transformations.
As discussed in chapter two, there is a general consensus in the literature that 
culture has an impact on economic performance. Even though this assertion is valid, there 
has been no identification as to what cultural characteristics have a direct correlation with 
development. In what follows, cultural elements essential to economic development are 
identified. Before that is done, however, culture as a whole is categorized into two broad 
aspects to help avoid the generalization that is often associated with cultural analysis. The 
categorization will assist in identifying the cultural characteristics that are essential to 
spurring development in developing countries.
THE TWO BROAD ASPECTS OF CULTURE
The fact that culture is not well understood is often interpreted as an inherent 
limitation of the subject, either because it is difficult to quantify or because it is 
everywhere. In order to overcome this impending stumbling block so as to enable us to 
utilize culture in an acceptable manner in this analysis, this section categorizes culture 
into two broad aspects. This distinction is important, at least for our purpose, because in
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Africa cultural sensitivity is so high that some clarification is warranted to avoid the 
misrepresentation that is often associated with cultural analysis.
In sub-Saharan Africa, the sensitivity to invoking culture in economic 
development debates has a subjective legitimacy as opposed to an objective one. This is 
mainly due to the complex nature of culture as a sociological attribute for self- 
identification and the difficulty associated with deciphering the network of culture as a 
whole. Therefore, the distinction will help create a rational understanding for shedding 
some of the cultural emotional sensitivity. Lastly, the distinction helps to alleviate the 
confusion that hangs over culture by allowing us to separate the needed prerequisite 
cultural elements essential to development from the convoluted cultural elements. In 
doing so, it assists in our efforts to resolve the African developmental dilemma by 
highlighting the coexistence between culture and economic development. In the African 
context, the distinction is not only critical but it is also very important, for the failure to 
categorize cultural elements and understanding their implications is one of the major 
weakness of cultural traditionalism that implicitly undermines African development.48
The Distinction
Culture is a complex human phenomenon or attribute. It is seen in people’s work 
and recreation, in their worship and courtship, in their way of investigating nature, and in 
utilizing the possibilities of nature. Culture is also seen in the manner in which people 
house and clothe themselves, their method of conducting war and peace, their system of 
statecraft, education, of rewards and punishment; the way they regulate personal relations;
48 Oladipo, "Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”
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and the ideas underlying these institutions and practices.49 In this sense, it is easy to 
acknowledge that culture is an amorphous complex human phenomenon.
Despite its complexity, culture’s constitutive elements are of two broad types. 
There are those that “have no essential bearing on the question of either human well­
being, truth, or falsehood.”50 These aspects of culture include procedures, customs, and 
usage such as language, style of apparels, dance, music, recreation, and style of courtship. 
These according to Oiusegun Oladipo constitute the reserve zones, in which each nation 
is able to develop its own identity. Within the reserve zone, all nations can cultivate their 
identities without compromising the idea of unity and equality of the human species.51 
Kwasi Wiredu strengthens the reserve zone by adding to it that, “all of this and more are 
contingent,” in the sense that adopting one rather than the other “often makes no objective 
difference to human well-being or to one’s belief about the world.” 52 Due to this reason, 
“there cannot be any compelling reason to change such elements of culture in favor of 
foreign ones.”53 To do the contrary, however, is to engender a loss of identity.
As opposed to the reserve zones, the other aspect deals with the elements of 
culture that are anchored in truth-value or have some essential bearing to the quality of 
human life. These include philosophy, science, and religion. In these areas the story is
49 Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture.
50 Kwasi W iredu, “Problems in Africa’s Self-Definition in the Contemporary World," in Kwasi 
Wiredu and K. Gyekye, eds.. Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, NO. I (Washington, 
DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. 1992), 65.
51 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest." 30.
52 Wiredu, “Problems in Africa’s Self-Definition,’’ 66.
53 Ibid., 65.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
101
different. Here, it is unwise to ignore development in other cultures because they are areas 
that are not crucial to self-definition.54 Wiredu’s assessment suggests that these “are 
areas of human experience in which the effects of cultural differences could conceivably 
be eliminated through peaceful give-and-take dialogue among cultures.”55 The key point 
is that, since this sector of culture is primarily concerned with the domain of thought 
where truth is sought, it would be foolish for any culture to ignore whatever development 
has taken place in other societies by invoking the protection of self-definition or 
actualization.56
The above analysis helps to categorize culture into two sectors as Figure 3- 2 
illustrates. One of the sectors, the reserve zone, is unique to certain groups of people who 
are sometimes confined within a geographical area. So this term is utilized for self­
definition. The universal zone, by comparison relates to the domain of thought. It 
comprises philosophy, science, and religion, and suggests that an overlap exists among 
human beings regardless of geographical location.57 The universal zone is the one that 
contains the culture of ingenuity. It is within the universal domain that one finds the 
science of creation that offers informative ways of understanding natural law to enable 
human beings to improve their living. It is equally within this universal domain that 
religion is anchored. Religion offers the moral guidelines upon which society as a whole 
is organized towards improving human lives. In organizing human economic affairs,
54 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity and the African Quest” ; Wiredu, "Problems in Africa’s Self- 
Definition."
55 Wiredu, “Problems in Africa’s Self-Definition.” 65-
56 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity and the African Quest.”
57 Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars.
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morality, a derivative of religion, regulates a culture of trust, which is essential for the 
synchronization of economic activities.
Figure 3-2














Reserve Zone:Self Identification Universal Zone:Domain of Thought
This diagram draws upon “Two Aspects o f  Culture" intellectual constructs separately 
presented by Professor Kwasi Wiredu and Professor Olusegun Oladipo in their 
respective works “Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspectives " and 
“The African Quest: The Problem o f Self-Definition and African Philosophy”.58
What this indicates is that it is within the universal domain of thought, rather than 
the reserve zone that is often associated with high subjectivity, that nations should seek to 
improve their scientific and moral cultural elements to enable them to acquire knowledge 
that will assist them in producing their material needs. The above distinction between the 
two broad aspects of culture illustrate that the reserve zone points to self-definition while 
the universal zone is associated with values of absolute truth that contribute to quality of
58 Professor Wiredu believes there are universal cultural attributes that are shared by all human 
beings, and it is based on these attributes that universal human communication becomes possible regardless 
o f race or geographic location. Those interested may see Kwasi Wiredu Cultural Universals and  
Particulars. Professor Oladipo’s work compliments Wiredu’s work by further drawing the distinction 
between the Reserve Zone and the Universal Zone, and the utilization o f the former for identification. See 
Olusegun Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”
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human life. The underlying implication here is that “a culture can shed off many of its 
traits and gather foreign accretions without losing its identity.”59
This being the case, nations need not demonstrate their uniqueness, especially 
within the domain of cultural thought by clinging to all elements of their traditional 
culture to maintain their cultural identity. In fact, by using Wiredu’s distinctive rational 
analysis, what they need to do to ensure their self-identity is to safeguard those contingent 
aspects of their culture. This action will reduce cultural confusion and allow them to avail 
themselves to the opportunities offered by advances made by others in those areas of 
culture relating to the domain of thought (e.g. in science, which has a positive impact on 
human well-being). This route is the only logical one that developing nations, particularly 
those in Africa, can use to guarantee that their intellectual future will not be “exclusively 
decided by the fact of the economic and technological superiority of the already 
hegemonic cultures of the metropolitan world.”60 This method of safeguarding their way 
of life is the most likely way they can effectively participate in the quest for development 
which is “a continuing world-historical process in which all peoples, Western and non- 
Westem alike, are engaged.”61 Now that it is clearly established that a nation can pursue 
its self-actualization without hampering its economic development, the question o f what 
cultural elements need to be established in order to spur economic development takes 
precedence.
59 Wiredu, “Problems in Africa’s Self-Definition.” 65.
60 Anthony Kwame Appiah, “African-American Philosophy," The Philosophical Forum: A 
Quarterly, Vol. 24, Nos. 1-3 (Fall/Spring 1992-93): 23.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss ion  of th e  copyrigh t ow ner.  F u r th e r  rep roduction  prohibited w ithout perm iss ion .
104
PREREQUISITE CULTURAL ELEMENTS FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
In an attempt to answer the question posted with our hypothesis in the first 
chapter, one objective of this investigation is to show that the African leadership has 
failed to establish the essential cultural characteristics appropriate for economic 
development. The logical question therefore becomes what are those cultural 
characteristics? As one institutional economist has identified “it is surprising as well as 
disappointing that no such model has been advocated.”62 Though economic theory of 
culture does not yet exist, contemporary market analysis makes it possible to identify 
some key cultural characteristics that condition the economic development performance 
of a nation.
The following section identifies two basic cultural prerequisites that are essential 
to economic development. This is done with the affirmation that economic performance 
of societies are inversely related to these cultural characteristics and without them it will 
be difficult, if not impossible, for an economy to develop.63 In what follows, I identify the 
culture of scientific differentiation and trust as the two basic cultural prerequisites 
essential for economic progress in all developing nations.
61 Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture, 43.
62 Casson, “Cultural Determinants,” 431.
63 Casson, The Economic o f  Business.
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Scientific Culture
A vital prerequisite culture for material economic development is scientific 
culture with moral differentiation that enables the utility of science for material 
improvement.64 Morality in this sense is identified with legitimation of ends, in other 
words, what society accepts as socially right or wrong, while scientific knowledge is an 
informed and appropriate means of doing things—creating technology.65 It is acquired 
through a linear methodological investigation and the understanding of natural law of 
creation.66 Scientific culture is characterized with the application of science to processes 
of material production. In other words, accepted systems of practice and behavior allow 
both material production and social organization to become permeable to scientific 
knowledge acquired through the investigation of natural law and creation.67
The origin of scientific culture is attributed to discoveries of scientists and 
philosophers like Copernicus, Newton, and Bacon, whose works were eagerly studied by
enthusiastic middle class Europeans who were eager to apply new ideas to industry and
68commerce. Scientific culture propagates a cultural paradigm with a mindset that is 
helpful in understanding the process of innovation and invention. It is a culture that
64 Kuznets, Economic Growth; Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development"; 
Casson, “Cultural Determinants”; Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. All these authors have 
illustrated the importance o f science in economic development. Walter Rodney specifically illustrates how 
Europe’s economic development was accelerated by scientific technology.
65 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism”; Casson “Cultural Determinants.”
66 John F. Wilson, "Scientific Culture and the Making of Industrial West," Business History, Vol. 
40, No. 2 (April 1998): 152-53.
67 Kuznets, Modem Economic Growth.
68 Wilson, “Scientific Culture."
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influenced the European Industrial Revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
by improving their understanding of nature.69
Scientific culture is a convoluted behavior mixed of material technology and 
social technology that provides the power of science and reveals an orderly 
understandable universe, thereby laying an enduring base for free rational discourse 
towards innovation and inventions. Wrapped in a passion to know, scientific culture 
nurtures collective knowledge to investigate natural law and contributes to indefinite 
human progress. On the other hand, this approach avoids metaphysics and despises 
revelations and dogma. It is a culture that provides a practice of intensive creative 
thinking through education, honesty, and void of corruption in human behavior. This 
culture sees our universe as one in which humanity, through continued inquiry, 
perpetuates development.70 In its real sense, scientific culture offers a society the ability 
to manipulate the environment for the purpose of enhancing the process of living.
SCIENTIFIC CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The literature shows that the importance of scientific culture in economic 
development goes far back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries during the industrial 
revolution in Great Britain.71 Similarly, the American Progressive Era (1896-1916) was 
fueled by the quantum leap in American scientific culture at which time technical
69 Ibid.
70 Edward O. Wilson, “Back to the Enlightenment: We must know. We will know," Free Inquiry, 
Vol. 18, No. 4 (Fall 1988): 21-22.
71 Ian Inkster, Scientific Culture and Urbanization in Industrial Britain (Ashgate, VT: Aldershot 
and Brookfield, 1998).
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rationality was laid.72 It was a scientific cultural revolution that precipitated science-and 
technology-driven socioeconomic development in Europe and led to the formation of 
scientific societies that were later emulated around the industrialized world. For example. 
Academic des Sciences in Paris in 1666, the Akademie der Wissenschften in Berlin in 
1700, and the New York Academy of Sciences in 1817 are some of the first scientific 
societies to emerge in the industrialized world.73
All those scientific societies and their national leaderships recognized the 
importance of scientific culture for development in the West. In England, the Royal 
Society is credited for pioneering the movement in 1660.74 The point here is that societies 
that are able to establish a culture of understanding the natural law of creation enhances 
their technology and increases their ability to improve living by manipulating natural 
laws. In comparison, societies that lack the scientific culture of understanding natural 
laws are less likely to possess the ability to manipulate natural law to their benefit.
In developed countries, there are scientific cultures that seek to understand the 
appropriate way of doing things through the understanding of natural law of creation. 
Those countries have further distinguished between science and morality. This does not 
suggest that industrialized countries are secular. In fact, developed nations are not secular, 
but what they have done is differentiate science from morals. This distinction enables 
them to devote science in discovering natural laws, while regulating their societies with
72 Guy B. Adams and Virginia H. Ingersoli, “Culture, Technical Rationality, and Organizational 
Culture,” American Review o f  Public Administration, Vol. 20. No. 4 (December 1990): 285-302.
73 Leo T. W. Hin and R. Subramaniam, “Chemical Societies Boost Development.” Chemistry and 
Industry (February 7, 2000): 90-91.
74 Ibid.
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moral laws. This cultural ability to differentiate science from morals is the key to material 
development. Differentiation opens up the route to economic development through 
technological advancement, thus making it possible to raise material consumption above 
subsistence levels. This process becomes possible because natural restrictions are 
surpassed by progressive missions that harness resources to higher levels, whiles morality 
is used to establish norms of both equity and efficiency for society.75
Efficiency
In all human endeavors as with all aspects of life, efficiency is not only critical but 
also paramount for human progress. This is especially true with respect to economic 
development where “culture that encourages a realistic and sophisticated view of the 
environment is likely to support better informed and more successful decision.”76 Within 
this line of reasoning it becomes apparent that a culture that encourages good behavior 
such as trust and integrity is likely to improve the coordination of different individuals’ 
decision, reduce transaction costs, and enhance efficiency to economic development.
Culture of Trust
Trust is an optimistic view o f parties’ intentions and moral commitments of one’s 
own. If parties have trust then each will validate the others beliefs and a successful
75 Gunnar Mydral explains how society as a whole has to be elevated to high level within the 
framework of development. It can be argued that his intentions were affiliated with moral aspect o f 
development with works in convolution with scientific aspect o f culture. Societies that are able to dissect 
and at the same connect the two stand the chance of becoming sophisticated from an economic point o f 
view.
76 Mydral. “What is Development?” 733.
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equilibrium outcome in the market will be achieved.77 Between the two cultural 
prerequisites identified here as essential for economic development, trust is the most vital
7Rone in all social organization. Indeed, if the culture o f scientific knowledge is 
considered as the engine behind economic development, it is unequivocally right to 
isolate trust as the lubricant that keeps the developmental engine running most smoothly. 
For without trust, both the moral and the scientific cultures will break down, the trio 
works simultaneously together. A market economy depends on the culture of trust. When 
trust is high, buyers and sellers function with more confidence and less pessimism. 
Different stages of the national economy can be safely delegated to different firms, since 
the risk of contractual default between them is low. In every economy, developed or 
underdeveloped, synchronization of valid and accurate information is essential to keep 
the day-to-day mechanics of the economy operable in such a manner that reduces 
transaction costs. When low transaction costs are associated with a high trust culture, 
economic outcomes are realistically more egalitarian.79
In societies where a pessimistic view of human nature is prevalent, it is more 
difficult to foster economic development because transaction costs are high and the 
problems are well known.80 In other words, a person’s beliefs about human nature affect
77 A. Parfit, “Prudence, Morality, and Prisoner's Dilemma," in J. Elster, ed.. Rational Choice, 34- 
59 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Amartya Sen, Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
78 N. H. Leff, Trust. Envy, and the Political Economy o f  Industrial Development: Economic 
Groups in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
79 J. Coleman, The Foundations o f Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1991); J. Widner and R. Putnam, Associational Life, Government Effectiveness and Economic Development 
in Africa (Washington DC: World Bank, 1993); A. Mundt and J. Widner, “Researching Social Capital,” 
Africa, Vol. 6, No.l (Winter 1998): 1-24.
80 P. Milmgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management (Englewood Cliff: 
Prentice Hall, 1992).
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both his own behavior and his expectation of other people’s behavior. Therefore, 
pessimism of human nature in the absence of trust can precipitate self-validating distrust, 
which will simultaneously ruin any potential for building a sustainable economic 
development. Hence, a culture of trust is imperative in providing an optimistic view of 
human nature to make economic development possible in a market economy.
High Trust Generates Labor Specialization
In a national economy the internal synergistic operation runs well to inhibit 
economic bottlenecks when trust is high. Trust culture encourages specialization because 
everyone surrounded by a cultural aura of trust becomes confident that the specialists 
upon whom their needs rely on will not let them down. This sense of feeling does not 
only apply to production, but rather permeates all other spheres of economic functions 
including that of decision-making.
In the realm of economic development, trust is particularly important for all kinds 
of investments, in the sense that human resource investors are assured that their 
specialties will be demanded. Financial investors, likewise, have the trust that their 
pecuniary investments will not only come back, but they do come back with profits. Due 
to this unspoken assurance emanating from trust, people in high trust societies will be less 
reluctant to release the resources they own to other people, or to delegate the decision 
about the use of their resources to other decision-makers.81 In both cases, the resource-
81 In field research conducted by Mundt and Widner in Botswana and Tanzania, it was found that 
in regions o f those two African countries where there was trust among the members there was a high local 
investment. For more analysis on that research, see Mundt and Widner, “Researching Social Capital.”
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owner and the decision-maker who make decisions on their behalf act judiciously but 
with less hesitation when there is an atmosphere of trust. For example, the fact that forty 
percent of Africa’s wealth is held in overseas investments, indicates that African 
resource-owners have a greater sense of security investing overseas.82
The point is that civic cultures, particularly those that deal with efficiency, 
honesty, and trust, constitute a social capital that shapes economic productivity. Even 
though they are by no means the only factors involved in economic development, their 
contributions are substantial. For example, it is the trust culture that allows economic 
sectors like engineering departments in high institutions of learning to work jointly with 
businesses on product development to create society’s material wants.83 In regard to the 
decision-making, an obvious question that comes to mind is, how does the decision­
maker arrive at a decision? This question represents critical function that is required of 
leaders. This brings us to the relativism on leadership’s ability in establishing an 
appropriate environment for economic development, which is judgment.
Judgment: The Deciding Factor
The question as to how leaders make strategic decisions to benefit their nations is 
important because of the success and the consequences of that decision. Here too, culture 
is important. In decision-making, some societies emphasize a theoretical approach and 
others emphasize a pragmatic approach. People who choose a theoretical culture in
82 J. E. Stigliz and L. Squire, “International Development: Is it Possible?” Foreign Policy (Spring 
1998): 138-51.
83 Mark Dogson, “Learning. Trust, and Technological Collaboration,” Human Relations, Vol. 46, 
No. 1 (January 1993): 77-95.
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decision-making are usually more interested in understanding the situation before acting. 
On the other hand, those who emphasize pragmatism believe that it is sufficient to know 
that a certain action produces good results in certain circumstances without knowing 
exactly why this is the case.84 The consequential differences between theoretical and 
pragmatic decisions are reflected in social organizations and have an impact on economic 
development. Therefore a leader’s orientation in any of the two has an impact on his or 
her nation’s economic performance. However, the question as to which one of the two is 
appropriate for development is difficult to discern.
In reality, neither of the cultural approaches has an absolute comparative 
advantage over the other. Because, even though, the theoretical culture is useful for 
interpretation of evidence, no single theory is ever entirely adequate. On a similar note, 
pragmatism by itself is not always sufficient in interpreting evidence without theory. In 
this respect, a successful combination of theory and pragmatism is the hallmark of a 
successful decision-maker, a quality that is needed for the smooth functioning of all 
economic systems.85
The foregone analysis has identified two key cultural characteristics, a scientific 
culture with moral differentiation and a trust culture as prerequisite factors that are crucial 
for sustainable economic development. The lack of these basic prerequisite cultural 
elements will have a negative impact on any process of economic development. Societies 
that have established these behavioral characteristics, and have improved their scientific
84 Casson, The Economics o f  Business.
85 Mark C. Casson, The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982).
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culture, have been characterized as developed economic countries. Those that have not 
established the prerequisite scientific cultures are still producing their material needs 
within the constraints of nature without the ability to manipulate natural laws to reduce 
their transaction costs. This deficiency restricts those societies from harnessing natural 
resources to meet their needs. For that reason, they are considered less developed 
countries and associated with material poverty.
The last scenario is the predicament in which sub-Saharan African countries find 
themselves. Leaders in that region of the world have not established the prerequisite 
culture o f scientific know-how to understand the law of nature so as to enable those 
countries to manipulate nature to their advantage. Part of the leaders’ inability to establish 
the appropriate culture stems from their deficiency in interpreting how the world around 
them is constructed. This has become a hindrance to their ability to legitimate the culture 
needed to make scientific knowledge possible.86
As the theoretical section of this chapter demonstrates, there is a relationship 
between leadership beliefs and cultural environment within groups, such as a nation.
Hence the presence or the lack of a specific cultural environment can be attributed to 
leaderships’ orientation and beliefs. Through this associational concept, the economic 
situation in a country can be linked to the leadership’s ability to create the needed culture 
for p ro sp ero u s development. In this respect, it is important for leaders to be evaluated 
based on the cultures they have legitimized and what becomes of the culture as far as 
economic development is concerned.
86 Casson, “Cultural Determinants"; Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
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As discussed in chapter one, both current political and economic pictures of 
Africa demonstrate that developmental conditions of the African people look 
disappointing; from hunger in Somalia and Ethiopia, to political violence in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The perturbing question is why Africa 
finds itself in such a debilitating situation and why is it that the leaders are unable to 
minimize the misery of the African people. In other words, why are the African leaders 
unable to establish scientific cultures that could have made sustainable economic 
development possible? There are multiple reasons for the current impoverished economic 
conditions in the region. Many scholars have pointed to colonialism and postcolonial 
encroachment in the global financial system.87 Returning to the colonial debate alone 
will only propagate the same paralysis of analysis that African scholars have been 
engaged in for the past half-century88.
However, in order to understand the African developmental predicament, it is 
important to understand some of the images that were established during the colonial era 
as explanatory tool for a point of departure. Out of those images is the difference between 
colonial protectorate and direct rules that helps explain why there is high moral leadership 
consciousness in Botswana as compared to Ghana. The theoretical logic of the difference 
emanates from the fact that the protectorate system allowed traditional leaders to maintain 
their institutional legitimacy, and in doing so preserved the moral contractual relationship 
between leaders and followers in Botswana. On the contrary, under the direct rule that 
existed in Ghana, the high moral cultural relationship that existed between leaders and
87 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
88 Yefru, ‘T he African Challenge."
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their followers was replaced by a low moral relationship between postcolonial leaders and 
their citizens. Those images form part of the background knowledge with which the 
African leadership has failed to establish cultures conducive to economic development.
In other words, the images of colonized Africa that were established during the colonial 
days have continued to influence the way most postcolonial African leaders think. For 
that reason, I offer a brief summation of the origin of contemporary African cultural 
dilemma that is inhibiting development in sub-Saharan African.
THE ORIGIN OF THE CULTURAL DILEMMA IN AFRICA
The lack of an appropriate economic culture in Africa is linked to how Africans, 
mainly the postcolonial leadership, take culture in its totality as only a tool of self- 
identification. In doing so, they apply both broad aspects of culture in all areas without 
the appropriate distinction. This problem originated from the colonial and post-colonial 
attempts by African nationalist leaders to defend African culture against its denigration by 
European scholars. It is one of the issues, according to Masolo, which defines “the 
struggle for identity in Africa by means of definition of reason, its nature, and its 
functions.”89 The attack of the African culture by Europeans and its defense by Africans 
poses two problems. The first pertains to the question of how best to respond to the 
European denigration of African cultures and traditions. The second problem relevant to
89 D. A. Masolo, African Philosophy in Search o f  Identity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1994).
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African development is how can Africans achieve the prerequisites for economic progress 
without compromising their identity.90
The Debate
There has long been a European discourse on Africa that underestimated, 
denigrated, and disparaged African culture and identity. Specifically, the discourse 
“denied that reason played a significant role in the development of society and culture in 
Africa as it did in Europe.”91 To the Africans, this assertion was part o f an ideological 
myth that was designed to legitimate the European colonial enterprise. C. L. R. James, an 
authority on African politics, eloquently summarizes that myth in its elemental terms as 
follows:
Africans are, and always have been, a backward and barbarous people who 
have never been able to establish any civilized society of their own.... these 
barbarous people were brought into contact with civilization by the brutalities 
of the slave trade. However, the unhappy slave trade is happily behind us, and 
as a result of their contact with European civilization, primitive Africans be­
come a part o f unified world.92
James’ description makes it quiet obvious that, to the colonizers, Africans were an
inferior race of people who lacked intellectual and moral acumen. Hence, it was deemed
the moral mission of the Europeans to “civilize” the Africans.
90 Oladipo, “Reason. Identity, and the African Quest.”
91 Ibid., 26.
92 James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution, 29.
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To correct this denigration of their culture by the Europeans, Africans had to 
initiate a counter discourse. The purpose of the African discourse, of course, was to 
reclaim African humanity. The reclamation was made in the form of demonstrating the 
rationality of African beliefs within the framework of people’s world-views and cultural 
practices. In epistemological terms, according to Oladipo, “it involved the postulation of a 
form of rationality unique to Africans who, in metaphysical terms were said to have 
personality different from, but not in anyway inferior to, the European personality.”93
THE SENGHORIAN PHILOSOPHY
One African scholar who exemplifies the above description is Leopold Sedar 
Senghor who postulated an “ African mode of knowing.” For Senghor and his 
followers,94 the African mode of knowing is a holistic one, in which dualism between 
man and nature, subject and object, mind and matter are absent.95 The mode of knowing 
is contrasted with another, which is considered to be characteristically European. This 
mode of knowing is analytic and therefore promotes all sorts of dichotomies between man 
and nature, subject and object, and body and mind. Senghor gave the proper 
characterization of this contrast when he wrote:
93 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest,” 28.
94 K. C. Anyawu, The African Experience in the American Market Place (NY: Exposition Press, 
1993). Anyawu is one o f  the important followers of Senghor’s philosophy.
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The life surge of the African, his self-abandonment to the other, it[is] thus actuated 
by reason . But here the reason is not the eye-reason of the European, it is the 
reason-by-embrace which shares more the nature of logos than ratio. Ratio is 
compass, set-square and sectants, measure and weight, where logos, before its 
Aristotelian tempering, before it become diamond, was living speech. Speech, 
which is the most typically human expression of neo-sensory impression, does 
not cost the object, untouched, into rigid logical categories. African speech, in 
raising itself to the word, rubs and polishes things to give them back their original 
color, with their transparency penetrating their surreality, or rather their under­
lying reality, in its freshness. Classical European reason is analytical and makes 
use of the object. African reason is intuitive and participates in the object.96
The above contrast marked the beginning of “the struggle over the control of identity by
means of the definition of reason, its nature and functions” in the arena of scholarly
discourse in Africa.97 The Senghorian philosophy has become the mythological bedrock
upon which African leaderships unknowingly undermine the development of their people
by neglecting to create scientific cultures.
In Senghor’s response to the European degradation of African culture and 
traditions, there is a certain kind of African cultural traditionalism with certain 
characteristics. Among them are affirmation of an African world-view that is guarded by 
a distinctive form of rationality; a certain degradation of scientifico-technical rationality; 
and an acceptance of intuition as an alternative source of knowledge. A situation 
described by Oladipo as “an attempt to move African culture to a site out of criticism by 
celebrating locality as the ultimate determinant of cultural authority, and belief action; 
and recommendation of a solution to the crisis of self-definition in Africa which says that
95 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
96 Ibid., 33-34.
97 Masolo, African Philosophy, 40.
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Africans should discover what they were previously and take steps to be such again.”98 
However, taking and accepting the demarcation made by Senghor carries negative 
consequences for African development.
Implications of Senghorian Philosophy on Africa’s Development
Before we examine the implications of the above position, it is important to 
understand that the Senghorian demarcation was a response to the European degradation 
of the African personality. The dehumanization and the social subjugation were regarded 
by Africans as not only insults but also as enemies “of their authentic African traditions 
and their will to cultural identity.”99 It was, therefore, psychologically necessary that those 
traditions and identities be protected by any means necessary. This protection was vital 
not only because of the need to undermine the ideological myth of the colonial enterprise, 
but also essential because of the need for the Africans to regain “pride in themselves as 
worthy human beings inferior to none.” 100
In fact, there is nothing wrong with the affirmation of an African identity in the 
face of European ethno-centrism. The problem, however, is that the Senghorian response 
considers Africans as different from other human beings. It does that by claiming that 
there is a process of human development that is unique to Africans, and concludes that
98 Oladipo, “Reason. Identity, and the African Quest,” 29.
99 Wole Sonyinka, Art, Dialogue, and Outrage: Essays on Literature and Culture (Ibadan, 
Nigeria: New Horn Press, 1988), 179.
100 Rahman Anisur, ‘Tow ards An Alternative Development Paradigm.” International Federation 
Development Alternatives, Vol. 81 (April/June 1991), 23.
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the African culture, which is supposed to be a product of process, has already exhausted 
its potential human creativity.
There are many flaws with this assertion of Senghor’s argument. First, let us look 
at the response to the European degradation of the African culture, which I consider as 
essential and necessary. Senghor attempted to argue for the equality of human race and 
the need for the mutual recognition and appreciation of African cultures by other human 
beings. However, to achieve this purpose, he asserts African difference and particularity.
While above concession may have been acceptable, it undermined African 
identity with other human beings, mainly, the universals of culture.101 It would have 
further, and ironically, confirmed the belief that Africans were people quite unlike others. 
In other words the acceptance of the Senghorian philosophy in totality constitutes 
Africans own self-denial of equality with other humans. On a more crucial note, it is 
injurious to progress. For in that frame of thinking, a dynamic culture conducive to a 
responsive development process degenerates into a liability that must be overcome.
It should, however, be noted that Africans do have certain cultural traditions 
which are indigenous, mainly those in the reserve zone. However, they share with others 
the cultural attributes in the universal zone. It is due to the possibility of this sharing that 
allows them to interact and communicate with other human beings,102 especially at this 
time of “globalization of the productive forces and relations, internationalization of
101 Kwasi Wiredu, “Are There Cultural Universals?" The Monist, Vol. 78, No. 1 (January 1995):
52-64.
102 Kwasi Wiredu, “A Philosophical Perspective on the Concept o f  Human Communication,”
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1980): 199-206; “Cannons of Conceptualization”
The Monist, Vol. 76, No. 4 (October 1993): 450-76.
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consumption patterns and markets, and the complexity in the intensification of the 
operations of technological communications.”103
The above-discussed Senghorian philosophy of complacency based on a thinking 
embedded in a mythological paradigm inhibits African leaderships from formulating 
policies towards scientific culture. A culture that could have allowed Africans to tap into 
their domain of thought to understand natural law towards creation, and ultimately enable 
them to enhance their productive capability and ameliorate natural transaction costs that 
intensify regional poverty. Clearly African leaders have failed to establish scientific 
culture to stimulate the region’s economic development. Ironically, the leaders of Africa’s 
dominant institutions, e.g. politics and economics still follow the colonial paradigms that 
were established before independence.104 In many cases the leaders have accelerated 
negative aspects of those paradigms, rather than transforming the culture.
Contemporary leadership activities, especially in pursuit of personal wealth and 
power, have been inhibiting the establishment of cultures of science and trust. As is 
shown later, the postcolonial leaders actions have hampered economic development in 
SSA. Their violent actions have been brutal, creating a culture of distrust. Most thinking 
and planning in governments, firms, universities, educational systems, the media, 
religious institutions, and other areas, in sub-Saharan Africa, continue to ignore the 
culture of scientific analytical thinking. This ‘fatal flaw’ is what has undermined sub- 
Saharan Africa’s economic development.
103 N ’Dri Assie-Lumumba and Lumumba-Kasongo, The Silent Crisis in the International Transfer 
of Knowledge in African Societies and Their Education System: A Theoretical Perspective, CODESRIA 
Bulletin, No. 4 (1994): 9.
104 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
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SUMMARY
Leadership is obviously important for a nation’s development. In fact, the 
literature suggest that a nation’s economic development depends on the ability of 
leadership to transform the society and economy105 Along the same line of reasoning in 
the literature, Casson also articulates the importance of leadership in building a national 
culture, which reduces transaction costs and ultimately enhances the economic 
performance of a nation as a group. The author further notes that societies with high 
morals and scientific beliefs as cultural attributes have high economic performance, while 
societies with low characteristics of these cultural attributes lack the prerequisites for 
economic development.106 However, despite the importance of leadership and culture in 
development, little research has been done by modernization and dependency theorists in 
linking the role of leadership to development in developing countries. Likewise, the 
importance of cultural behavior has been neglected in economic development analysis by 
the two major development paradigms with the assumption that economic rationality is 
not compatible with cultural subjectivity.107
This chapter has laid out the theoretical framework for linking leadership, culture, 
and economic development. The leadership, culture, and development (LCD) model 
highlights the link between the three variables. Through interpretation and legitimation of 
values, leadership establishes an accepted system of practice and behavior that leads to a 
culture of a group. Culture as a technology is linked to  economic development as social
105 Doe, "Economic Development o f  Francophone Africa.”
106 Casson, The Economics o f  Business.
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capital. It is also clear that from economic perspectives that culture is compatible with an 
individual’s optimization. Deductively, therefore, it becomes economically driven and 
becomes linked to economic development. The interactive phenomena between and 
within these three variables demonstrate the relationship between leadership and 
development.
Leadership is a process phenomenon where individuals with high moral capability 
rally group members to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome for the group. Leaders 
accomplish such objectives through interpretation and legitimation of social norms with 
the power invested in them by the group members as a whole. Dialectically, the 
legitimation and interpretation powers of leaders make them social engineers as well as 
cultural architects upon whom citizens rely for society’s development. Cultures are 
accepted systems of social practice of behavior and prescriptions, meaning that cultures 
are meaningful orders of thoughts and values with maximum utility for human living.
There are two broad aspects of culture, namely, the reserve and the universal 
zones. The reserve zone is mainly utilized for personal actualization that has no essential 
bearing on the question of human well-being, truth, or falsehood. On the other hand, the 
universal zone anchors cultural elements of religion, the science of creation, and 
philosophy, all of which possess human values essential to the quality of human life. 
Religion offers moral attributes from which legal trust culture is derived, while scientific 
beliefs offer informative ways of understanding technological manipulation and industrial 
creation. Together, both elements form the basic fabric upon which social and material
107 Casson, ‘Cultural Determinants."
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development of a nation is erected. Therefore, the ability for leaders to establish these 
cultural attributes in their societies may determine how the society as a whole develops.
Countries with leaderships that are able to engineer these scientific and moral 
cultural attributes develop a certain level of social and scientific knowledge that, when 
applied, become technology, which assists them in improving their living from nature. It 
is the acquisition of the capability to improve and sustain living that constitutes 
development. Based on this reasoning, the prerequisite for development becomes socio- 
scientific culture. Hence, the lack of it brings about underdevelopment as most countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing. Development then is when a nation, through 
accumulative causation by virtue of cultural process, acquires an understanding of the 
natural law of creation and uses it to attain technological capacity enabling it to produce 
diverse products and services to meet social needs.
As the analysis of this chapter shows, leadership and culture are therefore 
essential to development, especially in regions of the world like sub-Saharan Africa. The 
importance of these variables is reflected in the difference of development in Ghana and 
Botswana. In the next two chapters, the case studies of Botswana and Ghana empirically 
demonstrate the relationship between leadership, culture, and economic development in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
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CHAPTER IV
LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF BOTSWANA
There is a general consensus about the importance of leadership and culture in 
national development. However, other than the work of Casson that focuses on leadership 
and culture in industrialized countries and Eastern Europe, none of the development 
theories articulate the relationship and the importance between leadership, culture, and 
development.1 To strengthen the connection between leadership and development, a 
theoretical analysis was devised in chapter three to establish the link between leadership, 
culture, and development. The linkage was demonstrated with an LCD model. The 
connection, as previously explained, was made possible through leadership’s ability to 
legitimize some behaviors while denouncing others. This exercise of power by leaders 
produces socially accepted systems of behavior. It was emphasized that societies that are 
able to establish both high scientific and high moral cultures become prosperous through 
industrialization and moral altruism. In order to draw qualitative conclusions about the 
research question posed in chapter one, this chapter and the next consider two case 
studies to address this question. I begin by examining the role of leadership in Botswana’s 
development.
In 1800, the territory of modern-day Botswana was populated by a variety of 
independent autonomous societies: Kwena, Ngwato, Ngwaketse, and Tawana.2 The 
communities were affected by the global capitalist economy long before they collectively
1 Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
2 Louis A. Picard. The Evolution o f  M odem Botswana (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 
1985); Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History.
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became British protectorates.3 After becoming protectorates in 1885, the traditional 
chiefs became colonial chiefs, partially subjected to the authority of European officials in 
Mafeking, South Africa. In 1966, following decades of political maneuvering by 
traditional leaders such as Tshekedi Khama and their Western educated young heirs, the 
territories were amalgamated into the nation of Botswana to gain its independence from 
Great Britain. Recently, Botswana, under the tutelage of its leaders, has been considered a 
“miracle” country with phenomenal economic growth and a well-entrenched multi-party 
democratic system that surpasses almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa.4
When Botswana attained its independence on September 30, 1966, few people 
were optimistic about the country’s prospects for social and economic progress. Indeed, 
there were many African experts who doubted whether Botswana would survive as a 
separate nation. At the very least, the consensus was that it would become a “puppet” of 
South Africa’s apartheid government or a Bantu state.5 The pessimism arose from the 
superficial knowledge of British colonial history and from South Africa’s prior 
determination to incorporate Botswana into the Union of South Africa.6 Perhaps, judging 
from the overall economic performi-mce of African countries, those who held a low 
expectation of the country’s economic performance at the time may have had good
3 Neil Parsons, “The Economic History o f Khama’s Country in Botswana 1884-1930,” in Robin 
Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds.. The Roots o f Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, 113-143 
(London: Heinemann Press, 1977); Isaac Schapera, Tribal Innovators: Tswana Chiefs and Social Change 
1795-1940 (London: Atholne Press, 1970).
4 John D. Holm, “Democratization in Africa, Botswana: An African Success Story,” Current. No. 
366 (October 1994): 36-40.
5 Michael Crowder. Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa,” The Journal o f  Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 25. No. 1 (1987): 25-42.
6 Picard, The Evolution o f  Modem Botswana.
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reason. Land-locked Botswana’s geographic position left it at the economic and political 
mercy of South Africa, making the prospects for development grim if not impossible.7
At independence, Botswana inherited an agreement with South Africa, under 
which Botswana received a small share of South Africa’s custom revenue. In monetary 
affairs, the country had no currency of its own but used the South Africa’s rand} 
Botswana’s only physical contact with free Africa was a ferry across the Zambezi River 
through Zambia. The citizens lived off their cattle and what little food they could grow on 
the arid land depending on rainfall. The economy was mainly agrarian and the population 
had no alternative means of getting cash except to work in mines in apartheid South 
Africa. The conditions were exacerbated by a long succession of drought years that 
caused the death of hundreds of thousands of cattle and had left about 25 % o f the 
population dependent on relief aid for their basic food needs.9 The country’s 
transportation and communication depended on dry-weather roads and tracks. Its railway 
system was owned, managed, and controlled by Rhodesia Railways.10 In short, when the 
Protectorate was lifted and Botswana become sovereign, it was completely impoverished 
and one of the poorest nations in the world.11
7 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa."
8 Derek J. Hudson, T he Establishment of Botswana’s Central Bank and the Introduction of New 
Currency,” Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 10(1978): 119-35.
9 John Cathie, Food Security and Macroeconomics Stabilization: A Case Study o f  Botswana 1965- 
85 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).
10 Richard Paul Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland: The Former Higher Commission 
Territories (London: Pall Mall Press. 1967).
11 Steven C. Smith, Case Studies in Economic Development (NY: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1997).
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Botswana’s economic status today proves that the pessimists overlooked two 
crucial factors in their assessments: the Tswana culture of cohesiveness (kagisano) and 
the conscientiousness of their colonial and postcolonial leaders like Tshekedi Khama and 
Seretse Khama. As a leader of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and president at the 
time of independence, Seretse Khama remained undaunted by the above economic facts. 
As a committed high moral conscientious leader, he followed the steps of both his 
grandfather, Khama the Great, and his uncle, Tshekedi Khama, and devoted his energies 
to maximizing his people’s welfare. Seretse did not allow himself to be caught up in the 
surface glamour and inevitable privilege as a head of state.12
From the beginning of his leadership, Seretse emphasized and strengthened the 
culture of self-reliance and internal moral discipline. He stressed the importance of 
democracy and the involvement of the people in decision making through a combination 
of traditional and modem institutions. He then designed the actions of his government to 
promote such attitudes. Under his leadership, emphasis was given to promoting moral 
principles that could prevent corruption so as to create the kind of society that could bring 
development and prosperity to the people of Botswana.13 In his search for a path toward 
the future, he began modernization by grafting institutions upon the roots of traditional 
values and traditional practices under the rubicles of kagisano: unity, harmony, and a 
sense of community.14 The achievements of his leadership, and that of his successors, are
12 Gwendolen M. Cater and Philip E. Morgan, eds.. From the Frontline (London: Rex Collings,
1980).
13 Roger Charlton, “Exploring the Byways of African Political Corruption: Botswana and Deviant 
Case Analysis,” Corruption and Reforms, Vol. 5 (1990): 1-27.
14 Pauline E. Peters, Dividing The Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994).
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that no one questions the reality of Botswana’s existence and the economic progress it has 
made since independence.
This chapter focuses on the role of leadership in the development of Botswana.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the precolonial era 
of Botswana. It demonstrates how leaders organized their societies towards social 
development until the British protectorate was sought to shield the then Bechuanaland 
from Afrikaner encroachment during the latter’s migration into Africa’s interior.15 The 
second section focuses on the “colonization” era when the British tried to transform the 
Protectorate Bechuanaland into a colony. I demonstrate how Britain’s colonization of 
Botswana was indeed different from other colonies in Africa. The section also sheds light 
on one of the “colonial” traditional leaders, Tshekedi Khama. He prevented both Britain 
and South Africa from colonizing and annexing Botswana. This allowed the Protectorate 
Bechuanaland to preserve its traditional institutions with leadership legitimacy to provide 
political stability for its economic development in later years. Finally, the third section 
looks at the postcolonial era of Botswana’s development under the tutelage of its first 
President Seretse Khama and his successors.
15 Louis A. Picard, The Politics o f  Development in Botswana: -4 Model o f  Success"! (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).
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PRECOLONIAL BOTSWANA
Modem Botswana occupies a land that had been inhabited for thousands of 
years.16 However, little is known about the origins, social, and political organizations of 
the early people.17 The origin of the current population dates primarily from the
eighteenth century, when the migration of the Tswana groups moved westward from
I sSouth Africa. Prior to the creation of the protectorate, a series of tribal states occupied 
much of the territory. The four main Tswana tribal states were Bangwato, Kwena,
Tawana, and Ngwaketse.19
Politically, the states were hierarchically organized with succession following 
inheritance rules. The chief (kgosi) was the embodiment of the community as a whole. He 
was the guardian of the people, their livestock, and their land. His powers included the 
power to allocate land for grazing, crops, and residence. He was responsible for the 
defense of his people by mobilizing the males into an army when necessary. The chief 
exercised his authority through a hierarchy of relatives and officials, including his close 
advisors, traditionally known as the kgotla (ward). The kgolta was the administrative and 
ideological center of the nation. The chief usually discussed national matters and law 
making with his headmen before bringing them up for popular discussions in the public.
16 Jack Parson, Botswana: Liberal Democracy and the Labor Reserve in Southern Africa 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
17 Ibid.
18 L. Ngcongo, “Origins o f the Tswana,” Pula. Botswana Journal o f  African Studies,V  ol. 1, No. 2 
(1997): 21-46.
19 Ibid.
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20 In most of the states, non-Tswana groups and conquered communities were 
subordinates and were retained in a position of servility by the Tswana. The non-Tswana 
groups rendered tribute in the form of produce and labor, and, even within the Tswana 
communities, there existed ranking of subordination.21
Economic control during this period was rooted in, but not limited to, the 
ownership and control of cattle. The chief (kgosi) owned large herds of cattle.22 The 
ruling class allocated land, adjudicated disputes, and made decisions about social service 
and collective behavior.23 The chiefs loaned their cattle to those on whom they depended 
for political support. This socio-economic system that bonded the chiefs and their people 
together was referred to as mafisa,24 The society’s production limits were the limits of 
technology, nature, and social and political relations. The societies were autonomous, 
based on pre-capitalist tributary social formation marked by the existence of two major 
classes. The peasantry organized communities and the ruling class that monopolized the 
function of the given society’s political organization and exacted tributes from rural
20 Peters. Dividing The Commons.
21 Thomas Tlou, “Servility and Political Control: Botlhako Among the Batswana of Northwestern 
Botswana ca. 1750-1906, ” in Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, eds.. Slavery in Africa: Historical and  
Anthropological Perspectives, 367-390 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).
22 Parsons. 'T h e  Economic History of Kham a's Country.”
21 Picard, The Evolution o f  M odem Botswana.
24 Ismail Abdi Samatar, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in 
Botswana Development (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).
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communities.23 Through this patronage-client system, both economic and political 
systems were stabilized.26
To maintain the social structure for continuity, young people were inducted into 
the social strata through age regimentation known as mephato that was always presided 
over by a kgosi.21 The initiation process instilled a sense of group unity and educated 
young people about Tswana tradition with emphasis on dedicating their loyalty to their 
nation (morafe) and the chief.28 Using this indigenous traditional Tswana custom, the 
leadership established a culture of solidarity and unity among young people to erase tribal 
differences and to create unanimity among Batswana.
Was Botswana Ever Colonized?
Most writers on Botswana treat the country as a one-time colony of Great 
Britain.29 This label is far from accurate because in the true sense of the word, Botswana 
was never a colony but rather a protectorate.30 By the same token, others disagree with 
this assessment and argue that there is no difference between a colony and a
25 Amin. “Unequal Development."
26 Tlou, ‘T he Nature of Batswana States.”
27 Peters. Dividing The Commons.
28 Tlou. ‘T h e  Nature o f Batswana States.”
29 Samatar. An African Miracle.
30 Picard. The Evolution o f  Modem Botswana,
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protectorate.31 This unresolved situation clouds the true status as to whether Botswana 
was colonized or not, and therefore warrants a qualitative definitional clarification.
The difference between the two concepts is that the protectorate was based on a 
mutual arrangement between the indigenous leaders who requested it, and the British 
government who provided it as a security measure to keep the territories out of reach 
from intruders. On the other hand, colonization was a rule that was arbitrarily imposed by 
a colonizer.32 In this context, the protectorate could not be characterized as a colony; 
rather it could be deemed as an alliance that was based on a mutual agreement between 
two parties. With such a distinction, it is fair to assert that technically Botswana was not 
colonized.
The cause for the protection and its request by the traditional Tswana leaders was a 
protracted phenomenon in the late nineteenth century. However, the final straw that 
precipitated it was the forced migration that brought Afrikaners to the interior of Africa. 
During the course of their migration, the Afrikaners came in contact and in conflict with 
the Tswana people that resulted in hostilities/3 As time went by, there were more and 
more invasions of Tswana territories by the Afrikaners that led to the development of 
informal protectorate agreement between the British government and Tswana chiefs.34 
Subsequent German and Afrikaner hostilities against the territories forced the Tswana
31 William Duggan, ‘T h e  Kweneng in the Colonial Era: A Brief Economic History" Botswana 
Records Notes and Records, Vol. 9 (1977): 1-20.
32 Picard, The Evolution o f  Modern Botswana.
33 Kevin Shillington, The Colonisation o f  The Southern Tswana 1870-1900 (Johannesburg, South 
Africa: Ravan Press, 1985).
34 Ibid.
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leaders into a formal protectorate alliance with the British, whom the Tswana chiefs 
believed could help them resist the Afrikaner’s encroachment. Initially, the Protectorate 
Alliance was deemed as a beneficial agreement between the two parties/3 The agreement 
secured British influence in the region and access into central Africa. In 1893, during the 
rule of Khama HI, the alliance led by the Tswana chiefs assisted the British to win the war 
against the Matebeles from Rhodesia. For the Tswanas, the protectorate eased the 
pressure of the Afrikaner encroachment from the southeast and the German pressure from 
the west.36 Based on the described circumstance that led to the protectorate, it can be 
determined that the conventional belief that Botswana was fully colonized by the British 
is questionable. Even if that belief is upheld, it can be further argued that the colonization 
was different based on traditional institutional and leadership freedom that existed in the 
territories at the time.
The Difference in Botswana’s Colonization
The establishment of British protectorate meant Bechuanaland, as Botswana was 
formally known, became part of the British Empire. Politically, the embryonic stage of 
the protectorate had both external and internal dimensions. Internally, parallel rule existed 
until 1930. Under the mechanics of the parallel rule, each of the Tswana tribal chiefs was 
recognized and retained authority under the supervision of a European layer of 
administration. The parallel rule concept was based on the idea that the protectorate 
administration and the native administration could be simultaneous but mutually
35 Parson, Botswana: Liberal Democracy.
36 Ibid.
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exclusive from each other. The external protectorate idea was also based on the concept 
that protection affected only external affairs, including matters dealing with missionaries 
and European affairs in the territories. It left the tribal leaders free to handle their internal 
social affairs independently and without outside interference.37
Externally, the Protectorate Bechuanaland was viewed as an appendage of South 
Africa in Britain. For example, the British representative in South Africa was, until 1963, 
the chief administrative officer of the protectorate. He reported to the Dominion, not to 
the colonial office in Britain. This management meant that the tribal territories were not 
considered as colonies, but as part of the Dominions. Inherently, the association of the 
territories with the Dominion implied that the British accepted their presence in 
Bechuanaland not as colonizer, but regarded the territories as autonomous areas with their 
legitimate traditional political and judiciary institutions. Based on the above analysis and 
reasoning, the proclaimed Botswana colonization, if it is accepted as such, has to be 
viewed with some reservations because it was different from other colonies that 
experienced direct and indirect foreign institutional colonial rule.38 The main difference 
was that while the other colonies suffered arbitrary imposition of colonial rule, 
Botswana’s protectorate was based on a mutual arrangement. More importantly, the 
Tswana leaders were allowed to rule their people without foreign authorities questioning 
their domestic legitimacy.
37 Anthony Sillery, Founding a Protectorate: History o f  Bechuanaland 1885-1995 (London:
Mouton. 1965).
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LEADERSHIP ROLE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DURING COLONIAL ERA
The protectorate administration in the territories was assigned to cater to the 
issues between the traditional rulers and the outside world, including missionaries and 
European affairs in the territories. In this respect, the protectorate administration was to 
act only as a foreign affairs department for the territories. Given this distinctive 
assignment, however, the protectorate administration intervened constantly in issues 
affecting social, political, and economic life in the territories in an attempt to impose 
direct colonization over the territories.39 As if the intrusion into the domestic affairs was 
not enough, the protectorate agreement was further thrown into confusion by the Act of 
South Africa, which authorized the incorporation of the territories into South Africa.40 By 
several accounts, South Africa raised the annexation issues several times only to be 
unequivocally opposed, on all occasions, by the traditional leaders. 41
Between 1933 and 1934, under the leadership of Tshekedi Khama,42 the leaders’ 
stiffened resistance to the annexation paid off when the Statute of Westminister of 1931 
and Statute of Union Act of 1934 solidified the sovereignty of the Union of South Africa.
18 Roger Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor in Ghana and Lesotho,” Africa, Vol. 6,
No. 1 (Winter 1997): 61-85.
39 Thomas Tlou, “A Political History of Northwestern Botswana to 1906,” Ph. D. Dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1972.
40 P. M. Landell-Mills, ‘T h e  1969 South African Custom Union Agreement," The Journal o f 
Modem African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1971): 263-81.
41 Neil Parsons, “Victorian Triumph of An African Chief: Visit of Bechuanan Chief to England 
During 1890s,” History Today, Vol. 48, No. 4 (April 1998): 25-30.
42 Tshekedi Khama became the leader of Bangwato Royal Family after the death of his brother 
Kgosi Sekgoma in 1925. The rightful ruler, Seretse Khama, was only four years old and so by tradition, 
Tshekedi become the regent until his nephew would have become o f  age to rule. See Neil Parsons, Willie 
Henderson, and Thomas Tlou, Seretse Klutma 1921-1980 (Braamfontain. South Africa: Macmillan, 1997).
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By construction, the Statute of Westminister of 1931 and the Statute of Union Act of 
1934 voided the immediate transfer of the territories to the Union of South Africa.43 The 
conjuncture temporarily prevented the annexation of the protectorate of Bechuanaland. 
However, it did not deter the British government’s determination to colonize the Tswana 
communities. The protectorate administration made changes aimed at placing the 
territories under colonial rule. First, the Dominion Offices under which the territories 
were protectively administered changed their patterns of recruitment for the protectorate 
administrative service, by bringing officers directly from Britain as part of the “Oxbridge” 
generation of colonial administrations.44 After those changes were made, the protectorate 
administration presented indirect rule reforms to the traditional leaders and proceeded to 
legislate the Proclamations of 1934 and 1938.45
Under the proclamations, the British intended to alter the traditional ruling 
institutions and their legitimacy with four major changes. First, the reforms intended to 
regulate the traditional judiciary process of the chiefs and to modify them with a British 
system. Second, the proclamations established tribal councils to counsel the chiefs on the 
affairs of Tswana communities. Third, they introduced a European bureaucratic 
administrative system by which the chiefs would have administered the affairs of the 
tribal communities. Fourth, in 1937, the protectorate administration introduced a British 
financial system by creating tribal treasuries in each district with its own financial staff to
41 Picard, The Evolution o f  Modern Botswana.
44 Louis A. Picard, “Role Changes Among Field Administrative in Botswana: Administrative 
Attitudes in Social Change,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 1977.
4’ Picard, The Evolution o f  M odem Botswana,
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assist the tribal leaders.46 The traditional leaders did not want any part of the colonization 
and, under the leadership of Tshekedi Khama, waged a relentless political campaign to 
save their peoples’ freedom and protect their land from going under the colonial yoke.
THE LEADERSHIP OF TSHEKEDI KHAMA: 1925-59
Tshekedi Khama came to the throne of Bangwato Royal House in 1925 as a 
Regent when his brother Sekgoma Khama died, and the right heir to the chieftaincy, 
Sekgoma’s son Seretse, was only four years old.47 Tshekedi’s rule was met with the 
British proclamations of 1934 and 1938 that entailed strategies for direct colonization of 
the territories. As leaders, Tshekedi and Chief Bathoen’s collective resistance to the 
British proclamations was the second major political undertaking during the protectorate 
era.48
The two leaders staged outright opposition to the British proclamations and 
reforms. They sued the High Commission’s administration, citing that the imposition of 
the proclamation impinged upon the internal sovereignty of the chiefs, which was 
reserved under the treaty. The chiefs’ primary concern was that the proclamations “broke 
with Tswana tradition and that they were in violation o f the original nineteenth century 
Protectorate agreements with the traditional leaderships.”49
46 Ibid.
47 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama. Smuts, and South W est Africa.’’
48 The first major leadership action taken during the protectorate was the activities that led to the 
creation o f the “Native Advisory Council" which was utilized as a forum to resist the annexation o f  the 
territories by the Union o f  South Africa. Picard, The Evolution o f  Modern Botswana.
49 Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana, 13.
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The court ruled in favor of the High Commission’s office by citing that the 
protectorate administration had “unfettered and unlimited power to legislate for the 
government an administration of justice among the tribes of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and that this power was not limited by the Treaty or Agreement.”50 Even 
though the chiefs lost the legal skirmish, they won a major battle. Due to the court 
challenge by the leaders, the protectorate administration was forced to drop the concept of 
tribal council— which would have undermined the traditional rule— from the reforms. In 
addition, the earlier adopted judiciary reforms in the territories were also dropped, and the 
traditional trial by the kgotlci (ward) was reinstated to become the only recognized 
judiciary system of the “tribes.”51 In both practical and technical terms, those actions 
released the territories from direct colonization and allowed their traditional institutions 
to remain in place to evolve at a gradual pace. It also meant that Tshekedi’s conscientious 
efforts led to the preservation of the internal institutions with their legitimacy sans 
polarization among its social elements. This legacy has played a crucial role in 
Botswana’s political stability and has contributed greatly to its economic growth.
The British attempt to colonize Bechuanaland was only one of the major obstacles 
that had the potential to undermine the Tswana social development during Tshekedi 
leadership. Another indirect obstacle was the annexation of the territories by South 
Africa, which was supposed to have been ameliorated by the 1931 and 1934 Acts of 
Westminister that granted sovereignty to South Africa.52 How did the problem emerge,
50 Stevens, Lesotho. Botswana and Swaziland, 132.
51 Picard, The Evolution o f Modern Botswana.
52 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama. Smuts, and South West Africa.”
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and what did Tshekedi do, once again, to deliver these nations from another regional 
colonial “yoke,” one that could have been more disastrous than the previous one 
attempted by the British government.53 To understand this, I first examine the disguised 
form in which the second annexation attempt came, and thereafter look at how Tshekedi 
Khama resolved it in order to allow a gradual social development of his country.
As noted previously, during the 1920s and 1930s the Tswana leaders stiffened 
their resistance and luckily won a victory against the incorporation of their territories into 
the Union of South Africa. The solution was serendipitous rather than deliberate, owing 
to South Africa gaining its sovereignty. The annexation problem emerged again after 
World War II in a different form when Jan Smut asked for the incorporation of South 
West Africa into South Africa as a reward for his participation alongside Britain in the 
war against Germany.54 He tried to convince the newly created United Nations to 
consider terminating the mandate of South West Africa, and to incorporate the territory as 
an integral part of the Union on the basis of geographical contiguity, ethnic kinship, 
natural economic advantage, and the desire of its people.35 That was how the disguised 
annexation of the protectorate Bechuanaland emerged.
53 There was a general knowledge among the leaders in the territories as o f how poorly the South 
African government treated its black population. Tshekedi was aware of the injustices that the South West 
African people suffered from Germans and South Africa, since there were a large number o f refugees from 
the area living in his own nation. See Picard, The Evolution o f  Modern Botswana; Crowder, ‘Tshekedi 
Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa.”
54 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South W est Africa."
55 John H. Wellington, South West Africa and Its Human Issues (Oxford: Oxford University Press
1967).
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Tshekedi Versus Smut: The Leadership of National Preservation
Tshekedi’s decision to become involved in the South West Africa issue was 
important. Almost form the day he became the Regency of the Bangwato, he resisted 
British attempts to hand over the Bechuanaland Protectorate to South Africa. In 1946, the 
concern was still very much a live issue to Tshekedi when Smut requested the integration 
of South West Africa. Smut had communicated to the House of Representatives in Cape 
Town early that year his intention of raising the protectorate issue on his trip to London 
because he believed that the territories were part and parcel of the Union.56 For that 
reason, Tshekedi was concerned that if South Africa had gotten its way with South West 
Africa, the people of Bechuanaland would have suffered a loss of sovereignty. By 
subscribing to the domino theory concept, Tshekedi reasoned that once one o f South 
Africa’s neighbors had fallen into her clutches, others like Bechuanaland would have 
inevitably followed. From this line of reasoning, Tshekedi saw the bureaucratic 
annexation of South West Africa by Smut as his “fight” which deserved his full 
leadership attention to wage.57
Tshekedi began his strenuous campaign to prevent Smut from taking over South 
West Africa by asking the British High Commissioner in South Africa to forward, on his 
behalf, a telegram to the presiding officer at the United Nations dealing with the mandate 
of South West Africa. In the telegram, Tshekedi urged the UN to consider using its power 
to keep South West Africa as a separate entity from South Africa until its permanent 
policy of suppression of black people had ended. By using South African apartheid
56 Tshekedi Khama. The Case fo r  Bechuanaland (Mafeking. South Africa: Pretoria Press, 1946).
57 Ibid.
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policy, Tshekedi had invoked a human rights issue, which South Africa, itself, had helped 
the United Nations to design. Therefore, the case received the UN’s attention.58
After sending the telegram to the United Nations, Tshekedi mobilized the support 
of his fellow chiefs behind his campaign against Smut. All the chiefs signed a 
memorandum to the United Nations’ Trusteeship Committee to consider four issues that 
were important to them and the people in South West Africa. First, they requested that the 
committee disregard the request for incorporating South West Africa into the Union of 
South Africa. Second, they urged the committee to consider transferring the mandate of 
South West Africa directly to Great Britain. Third, they requested that the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate be given a free and direct access to a West Coast port. Fourth, and finally, all 
the chiefs requested that a pending case that related to refugees from the South West 
Africa, who were in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, by that time, be given 
consideration.59 By including the chiefs, Tshekedi skillfully transformed the case from a 
personal one to a national one and gave it more weight on the international level.
To intensify his campaign, Tshekedi devised another strategy. He related the case 
to a discriminatory measure that had been imposed on Indians in Natal and then sought 
help from the Indian delegation at the United Nations to lead the opposition against 
Smut’s request.60 Thereafter, Tshekedi gave extensive interviews to newspapers in South 
Africa in which he condemned South Africa’s imperialist ambition in the region. He 
described the Union as having oppressive imperialist intentions aimed at undermining the
58 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa."
59 Ibid.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
143
development of neighboring territories as a way of ensuring cheap labor for its mining 
industries.61 Even in Britain where Smut’s support was high, Tshekedi organized his 
network of allies to put pressure on the British government to refuse granting Smut his 
wish. In the end, due to the long campaign waged by Tshekedi Khama, the United 
Nations’ General Assembly rejected the incorporation of South West Africa into the 
Union of South Africa.62 In the process, Tshekedi also made the possibility of the 
incorporation of his own territories into the Union of South of Africa more remote and 
assured them their future independent sovereignty.
The above activities by Tshekedi and his compatriots during the “colonial era” 
demonstrate the effects of leadership roles on national political development of modem 
day Botswana. From those activities it becomes obvious that each step towards 
Botswana’s nationhood was a well thought out strategy orchestrated by both “colonial” 
and precolonial leaders. Leaders such as Khama the Great, for example, had established 
the culture of national cohesiveness underpinned by Tswana’s philosophy of unity, 
harmony, and a sense of community.63 The same culture motivated Tshekedi and his 
successors to carry out Botswana’s national development. From the preceding analysis 
one sees that Tshekedi and his colleagues strengthened the Tswana-dom by building a 
unified political force indivisible by outsiders so as to preserve Botswana’s sovereignty 
with its institutional legitimacy.
“ I b i d
61 "Chief Tshekedi Attack Union Policy,” Pretoria News July 21, 1946,
62 Wellington, South West Africa and Its Human Issues.
63 Cater and Morgan, From the Frontline.
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By all accounts, Tshekedi was a moral conscientious leader who believed in 
preserving the freedom of his people and their land.64 He was unique as an African leader 
in taking up the cudgel against colonial rulers on behalf of both his own people and 
neighbors. Tshekedi stood apart as the first African leader to see the possibilities of using 
the newly created United Nations to plead a case of oppressed people against the 
colonizer. The most remarkable aspect of Tshekedi was his high moral commitment to 
the cause he championed, freedom for his people. The commitment was shown in his 
devotion to the Tribal Council functions that propelled the territories into the nation of 
Botswana under his nephew, Seretse, who he had groomed to carry the torch of Tswana 
development.63 As a leader, Tshekedi continued his father’s work by preventing the 
Tswana nations from falling into colonial hands.
Leadership Role in Economic Development in “Colonial” Bechuanaland
As noted, the colonial economy of Botswana was organized according to patron- 
client pre-capitalist structures. Subsistence living was based on extensive cattle 
production and food crops supplemented by hunting. During the protectorate era, with its 
capitalist activities, subsistence farming was not utterly stripped off as a means of 
production. Some land was retained and family labor remained intact, as did political 
relationships with the headmen and chiefs.66 Those social activities continued to be 
underpinned by mafisa practices and relations of subordination. However, the demands of
64 Mary Benson . Tshekedi Khama (London: Oxford University Press, 1960)
65 Neil Parsons. William Henderson, and Thomas Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
66 Samatar, An African Miracle.
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additional needs, in the form of money to pay colonial taxes, brought increasing 
economic burdens upon families. These financial burdens made the prevailing economic 
system inadequate.67
Initially, the capitalist approach did stimulate economic growth in the autonomous 
territories. The economy prospered by supplying wagon trains, controlling trade, and 
responding to other opportunities. This fact implies that the capitalistic activities, in 
themselves, did not undermine the integrity of the Tswana economy and polity. In fact, 
the capitalist approach helped the leaders find new avenues for surplus in manufacturing 
goods. The leaders considered capitalism a rational response to market opportunities. 
However, they failed to see it as an exogenous influence for the reorganization of 
production. In other words, to the leaders, there was no need for restructuring the social 
relations of production.68 However, coercive capitalism subordinated the territories to 
extract agricultural produce and create a labor reserve to serve mining interests in South 
Africa.
The mechanism used to create the labor reserve was underpinned by two 
strategies. The first one was peasantization, a process whereby a small group of people 
who wanted to make living by agricultural production (through selling part o f their crops 
or herds) was created. The second was proletarianzation, where part of the society was 
made to become wage earners by selling its labor for low wages to the South Africa
67 David Massey, A Case of Colonial Collaboration: The Hut Tax and Migrant Labour. 
Unpublished Paper, 1978; Quil Hermans, “A Review of Botswana’s Financial History 1900-1973." 
Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 6 (1974): 89-116.
68 Parsons. ‘T he  Economic History of Khama's Country."
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mines.69 In some areas, the strategy was orchestrated by restricting access to land through 
the creation of freehold farms or limiting peoples’ access to land through the 
formalization of territorial boundaries.70 In conjunction with the limitation of access to 
land, new demands in the form of taxation were also placed on households. The first tax 
was in the form of a hut tax in 1899 in the amount of one British pound per year. In 1919, 
the hut tax was increased in conjunction with another tax, the native tax, which was 
imposed on households.71
The search for money, due to above cited conditions, compelled people to 
participate in market economy outside subsistence agriculture.72 Even in the agriculture 
sector, bureaucratic restrictions were devised. For example in the cattle market, there was 
an imposition of discriminatory regulation in South Africa against Bechuanaland cattle 
imported to South Africa. The regulation decreased Batswana’s ability to sell cattle, 
which was the main agriculture product from the territories.73 Other forms of economic 
activities, such as trade, were restricted to Batswana. The restriction spared no social 
class in Bechuanaland and even chiefs were denied licenses to trade.74 These strategies
69 Martin Legassick, “Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry in South Africa, 1885-1970: From 
Periphery to Sub-Metropole As a Forced Labour System." in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds.. The 
Roots o f  Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. 175-200 (London: Heinemann, 1977).
70 Donald Kowet, Land, Labor, Migration and Politics in South Africa: Botswana. Lesotho, and 
Swaziland (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978).
71 Massey, Case o f  Colonial Collaboration.
72 Isaac Schapera, Migrant Labour and Tribal Life: A Study o f  Conditions in Bechuanaland 
Protectorate (London: Oxford University Press, 1947).
73 Hermans, “A Review of Botswana's Financial History.”
74 Alan Best, “General Trading in Botswana. 1890-1968,” Economic Geography, Vol. 46, No. 4 
(October 1970): 598-611.
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were employed to undermine the pre-protectorate economic system in order to allow the 
creation of a colonial economy that served capitalist interests.
Against all odds, the chiefs tried to resuscitate the local economy, but to no avail. 
For example, Kgosi Isang Pilane of BaKgatla organized a tribal boring scheme to get 
water to the cattle grazing lands for his subjects.75 Unfortunately for the leaders, however, 
the social and economic facilities of the ruling class were intertwined with the 
underdeveloped facilities of the subordinate majority class. In so doing, the capital 
formation of the indigenous ruling class upon which the rest of the economic structure 
relied was undermined.76 With the chiefs loosing their autonomy and the British taking 
away lands, the chiefs were left with less means to improve their economies.77 Even the 
land that was available could not produce much food for the population due to lack of 
manpower since the male aged 15-44 years were working in South African mines.78 The 
poor economic conditions of the territories were further exacerbated by natural conditions 
over which leaders had no control. Drought and rinderpest epidemic were two natural 
conditions that worsened economic conditions.
In the capitalist labor reserve sector, there were only few jobs created to manage 
the administrative system and the economic infrastructure of the labor reserve. The jobs 
that were created included clerks, translators, messengers, drivers, and shop assistants.
75 Zbigniew A. Konczacki, Jane L. Parpart, and Timothy M. Shaw, eds.. Studies in Economic 
History o f Southern Africa: South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland, Vol. 2 (London: Frank Cass, 1990).
76 Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds.. The Roots o f Rural Poverty in Central and Southern 
Africa (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977).
77 Kowet, “Land, Labor, Migration and Politics."
78 Schapera, Migrant Labor and Tribal Life.
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These jobs required some education including basic literacy at a primary level. Thus a 
small cadre of primary school teachers developed. Such groups of people were necessary 
for the protectorate enterprise as a link between the peasants and the proletarians, but 
they also became essential in making the whole economy of the protectorate viable. The 
access to education, regardless of how mediocre, was the only important economic 
transformation that occurred during the protectorate era. In terms of material 
development, the traditional protectorate leadership achieved less for their communities.
A reversal of that was not seen until Botswana achieved its independence in 1966.
The lack of economic achievement during the protectorate era does not suggest that 
colonial leaders played a less important role in the Botswana’s development. Rather, 
while the traditional leaders used their time in winning the “war” of sovereignty by 
preventing direct British colonization and South African annexation, they put material 
development at the bottom of the priority list to be tackled by the next batch of leadership 
under the tutelage Seretse Khama.
THE LEADERSHIP OF SERETSE KHAMA
Seretse Khama was bom in Serowe to the Bangwato Royal Family in 
Bechuanaland in 1921. After the death of his father in 1925 and that of his mother in 
1930. Seretse was put under the custody of his uncle, Tshekedi, the then regent of the 
Bangwato Throne. In 1931, at the age of ten, Tshekedi sent Seretse to school at Lovedale 
in South Africa. Later, Seretse attended schools at Adams College in Natal, Tiger Kloof 
in Rhodesia, and in 1945, he left from Cape Town to study law at Oxford University.79
" Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.”
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Marriage and Exile
After one year in Oxford, Seretse moved to London. At a dance at Nuffled House 
in June 1947, he met Ruth Williams. They fell in love and married in September 1948.80 
The marriage outraged Tshekedi who felt that his nephew did not consult him. In addition 
to his uncle, authorities in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa also protested against 
the marriage. Both countries used their influence through the office of the High 
Commission in South Africa to induce the British to ban Seretse from Bechuanaland. The 
process through which the banishment was undertaken was by deception. In early 1950, 
Seretse Khama was invited to London to discuss the constitutional position of his 
marriage to a white woman. Once in London, he was asked to renounce his chieftaincy 
and Seretse declined to do so. Based on his refusal to renounce the chieftaincy, he was 
banned from returning home to Bechuanaland.81
During his exile in London, Seretse became involved with the decolonization 
discussions that were taking place in British political life. As he became more involved in 
the British political life and in the decolonization process, Seretse modified his attitude 
towards the office of the chieftaincy. When the relationship between him and his uncle 
improved, Seretse intensified his efforts to return home. In 1956, Seretse Khama 
reluctantly renounced the chieftaincy and agreed to return to Bechuanaland as a private
80 John Redfem, Ruth and  Seretse (London: Gollancz, 1955).
81 Ibid.
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citizen with the proviso that he could participate in the political life in the protectorate of 
Bechuanaland.82
The Return to Bechuanaland
On October 10, 1956, Seretse returned to Bechuanaland with the intention of re­
establishing himself as a cattle farmer.83 Seretse’s return coincided with political reforms 
that had been initiated by the High Commissioner. The protectorate administration, based 
on instructions from the High Commissioner’s office, was gradually phasing out the 
principle of hereditary rule and was replacing it with a limited form of local 
representative democratic system. Based on his uncle’s recommendation, Seretse 
accepted a position as an assistant Tribal Secretary that allowed him to follow Tshekedi 
to tribal meetings. Despite these developments, Seretse downplayed any interest in active 
national political leadership, even though he had been involved in development 
discussions with the then District Commissioner of Serowe. It was only after the death of 
Tshekedi in 1959 that Seretse began to assert his political position.84
Prior to Tshekedi’s death, Seretse had been encouraged to play an active role in 
the process of political change. In 1958, as an assistant to his uncle, he attended both the 
Joint Advisory Council (JAC) and African Advisory Council (AAC) meetings with 
Tshekedi and made contributions to the debates of both organizations. In the JAC, he 
supported a call made for the creation o f a Legislative Council (Legco) by Tshekedi and
82 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.”
83 “Seretse Given a Delirious Welcome,” New Age (Johannesburg), Vol. 2. No. 51 (October 18,
1956).
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Russel England.85 After the death of Tshekedi in 1959, Seretse took over his uncle’s 
position in the Tribal Council.
At some time before the Legislative council meeting in June in 1961, Russell 
England approached Seretse Khama with a proposition of forming a political party. 
Seretse respectfully declined Russell’s suggestion and expressed no interest at the time. 
Despite this seeming disinterest. Seretse continued to play a role in the legislative council. 
According to Henderson, Seretse was operating on a similar traditional realm like his 
grandfather Khama the Great and Tshekedi, his uncle, all before him. He was concerned 
about the issue of stability and racial harmony. He opposed communism and approved of 
discussions and negotiations as strategies towards resolutions of conflict of interest.86
The Formation of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)
In August the same year, Seretse met President Kennedy’s Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs George Mennen Williams during the envoy’s visit to
87Botswana. Shortly after the two men met, during the November 1961 session of the 
legislative council, Seretse called together a caucus of Legco African members and urged 
them to consider forming a political party. With the nod of the African members, Seretse
84 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.”
85 Russell England was born in Poland but identified himself as a British Bechuanalander. He was 
agriculturist turned settler fanner and by that time had lived in Bechuanaland for forty years. See Parsons, 
Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
84 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.”
87 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou. Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
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founded the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).88 To his dismay however, Chief Bathoen 
and Chief Mokgosi disassociated themselves from the party.89 At the party’s inaugural 
meeting in Gaborone in 1962, its leadership was diverse. There were few white members, 
and a significant number of the members were heirs to the traditional chiefs.90 At the 
inaugural, Seretse Khama was elected president of the party, and the vice-president 
position was given to Archie Tsoebebe. Benjamin Steinberg, a white trader and a cattle 
owner, was elected treasurer.91
The Consultation Constitutional Talks
At the beginning of 1963. the secretariat of the protectorate administration invited 
the leaders of the three political parties, Philip Matante of Botswana People’s Party 
(BPP), Seretse Khama of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), and Motsamai Mpho of 
Botswana Independence Party (BIP), together with the traditional chiefs to attend 
constitutional talks at Lobatse.92 At the constitutional talk, a plan was devised to forge a 
unified leadership between the traditional chiefs and the new emerging political officials. 
In a more cautious fashion, the leaders made concessions to each other and agreed on a 
political equation that would serve the interest of both parties and the nation at large. The
88 Ibid.
89 Quett Masire was a well-educated journalist who prior to joining Botswana Democratic Party 
worked for Bantu World as a correspondent. He was a self-made man who possessed a large herd of cattle 
and later became the President of Botswana after the death of Seretse Khama in 1980.
90 Samatar, An African Miracle.
91 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou. Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
92 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
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new generation political parties’ leaders reserved an un-contested place for the traditional 
leaders in the new legislative assembly underlined by a constitutional guarantee. The 
traditional leaders, in tum, voluntarily transferred the national institutional legitimacy to 
their heirs who had become the new political officials. In a bipartisan manner, the two 
groups of leaders put Tswana national interests beyond their personal interests to build a 
united leadership.93
The smooth transition and leadership unification can be traced to the membership 
of the BDP and the leadership provided by Seretse Khama. At the outset Khama adopted 
the concept of political socialization.94 Based on that concept, the elements o f the BDP 
were drawn from the then newly reformed tribal councils in all the territories, whose 
members were mostly the heirs of the traditional leaders.93 By using that strategy, Khama 
assured his party of political legitimacy in that the choice of the membership defused 
potential power struggles in his would-be nation. Moreover, his choice of membership 
signaled that his party stood for a unified nation as opposed to the inter-tribal federalism 
that existed at the time.96 Furthermore, by adopting political a socialization strategy, 
Khama implicitly minimized the concept of tribal politics that has commonly undermined 
nation-building efforts in Africa.
93 Ibid.
94 Here political socialization is defined as a gradual orientation of various community member 
into participating in national political process. See Michael Jones-Correta. “Different Paths: G ender, 
Immigration and Political Participation” International Migration Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Sum m er 1998): 
326-49.
95 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
96 ‘T h e  Role o f Chiefs Today” Botswana Daily News, 27 November 1969.
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To solidify legitimacy, traditional leaders were included in the new political 
machinery in two ways. First their heirs who were in the tribal council that had become 
part of the BDP were included in the political process. In addition, Khama supported a 
constitutional mechanism for guaranteeing the chiefs a place in the new legislative 
assembly in the form of a House of Chiefs.97 Those political moves allowed Khama to 
forge a bond between the new political officials and the old traditional leaders.98 Khama’s 
political transformation was well orchestrated and executed with the right socially 
legitimized class, to the extent that the roles and functions of social classes were 
maintained to avoid social conflict and political instability.
In essence, the transition was smooth and the leadership was unified for two 
reasons. First, most of the new political officials were heirs to the traditional chieftaincies 
whose political institutions had ruled in the territories since precolonial times. Second, 
colonialism had preserved the traditional leaders and their institutions without subverting 
them and replacing them with new leaders. Seretse Khama. for example, was the heir to 
the Bangwato royal family. Chief Bathoen, who by constitutional arrangement, sat in the 
House of Chiefs was a traditional ruler o f the Bangwaketse royal house.99 The 
smoothness of the transition was also due to the fact that the changes related only to the 
political apparatus and not to the vicissitudes of the power base. In other words, the 
Botswana constitutional talks that prepared the nation for independence was mainly
97 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
98 Randwezi Nengwekhulu, “Some Findings on the Origin o f Political Parties in Botswana,” Pula,, 
Botswana Journal o f  African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1979): 47-76.
99 Kogsi Sir Beepitsto, the current Botswana Ambassador in the United States, is the son of Chief
Bathoen.
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related to the political machinery than changes in political power as occurred in other 
African nations during the decolonization process. This partially accounts for much of the 
success of the transition that assured the future political stability and economic growth of 
Botswana.
The General Election Towards Botswana’s Independence
The Lobatse constitutional arrangements of August 1963 changed the political
landscape of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Thereafter, the important political issue at
hand was no longer about cooperation and conflict; rather it was the concern for the
principles and policies of future governance. After the talks, political developments
advanced smoothly, and in 1964 the secretariat announced March 1st, 1965 to be general 
i noelection date. The three registered political parties, Botswana Independence Party, 
Botswana People’s Party, and Botswana Democratic Party intensified their campaigning. 
The BDP was represented at all 31 constituencies; the BPP contested in 26 constituencies, 
and the BIP contested in 24 constituencies. On March 1st, 1965, the elections were held 
peacefully all across the territories. The election results came in slowly from the 
beginning but when the votes were finally tallied, the BDP won by a landslide victory, 
capturing 28 out of the 31 seats. The BPP managed to secure three seats with its leader, 
Matante being elected in Francistown. The third party, BIP, did not secure any seats. Out
100 Konczacki, Parpart. and Shaw, Studies in Economic History o f  Southern Africa.
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of 140,788 votes cast, Seretse Khama’s BDP received 113,167; Philip Matante’s BPP 
received 19,964; and Motsamai Mpho’s BIP received only 6,491 votes.101
On March 9th, 1965 the new cabinet was swom in with Seretse Khama as the first 
Prime Minister. In his inaugural address to the new legislative assembly, Khama set a 
developmental agenda for Botswana. He emphasized democratic principles, efficiency, 
and education as the important attributes that the country needed. In conjunction with 
those Khama made it clear to his countrymen that, due to the lack of qualified Batswana. 
his government was adopting a policy of slow localization for the civil service. This, he 
argued, was important because the country needed an efficient bureaucratic system to 
effectively administer the aid that the country was receiving towards development. Based 
on that need, the prime minister told his people that his government was retaining all 
foreign expatriates who wanted to stay and work in the country. Emphasizing the scarcity 
of resources and the dependency of Botswana on foreign aid, Khama emphatically told 
the people, especially the leadership, to refrain from waste and corruption. The avoidance 
of corruption later became the theme in many of his speeches, which helped foster a lack 
of tolerance for corruption in Botswana. 102
After the general assembly elections in 1965, national political events proceeded 
quickly. On the morning of September 30th, 1966 Botswana became independent with 
Seretse Khama swom in as its first president. Botswana adopted an open parliamentary 
democracy with a president and national assembly, which comprise Elected Members, an
101 Dieter Nohlen. Michael Krennerich, and Bernard Thibaut, eds.. Elections in Africa: Data 
Handbook ( NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 113.
102 Naomi Mitchison. Mochudi Dairies No. 13 (NY: University o f New York Press, 1965).
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Attorney General, and the House o f Chiefs.103 Seretse Khama and members of his 
leadership team had built a nation out of the territories that his uncle Tshekedi had 
protected from being colonized by the British. The same territories that his grandfather, 
Khama the Great, 81 years earlier, had unified into a confederacy and for which he sought 
British protection.104
EVALUATION OF BOTSWANA’S DEVELOPMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE
At independence, the economy of Botswana depended on a meager agriculture
production supplemented with migrant labor remittance from South Africa.105 The per
capita income of the population was estimated at $50, and the country had about twenty
miles of tarred road, with its capital Gaborone still under construction. Besides traditional
herbalists, no modem healthcare facilities were in existence for most of the local 
106residents. Statistically, there were only 247 primary schools in Botswana with a total 
enrollment not exceeding 75,000 or half of the school age population.107 There were only 
1,400 students enrolled at the secondary school level (Table 4-1). Jobs were scarce in 
Botswana therefore people were forced and work in mines in apartheid South Africa.
103 Peters, Dividing The Commons.
104 Parsons, “Victorian Triumph o f  An African Chief.”
105 Cathie, Food Security.
106 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
107 Republic o f Botswana, Transitional Plan fo r  Social Economic Development, School o f Oriental 
and African Studies Library (London: London University Press, 1966).
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Table 4-1
Education Enrollment in Botswana 1966-95
1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Primary Sch. Enrollment (in’000) 75 83 116 171 223 283 319
Primary Sch Enrollment Rate % 50.0 63.0 71.0 91.2 105 114 112
Secondary Enrollment (in’ 000) 1.4 3.9 12.1 18.3 32.3 56.9 104
Secondary Enrollment Rate % — 7.5 15.4 18.8 29.0 42.5 63.5
University Enrollment (in’000) .083 .140 .465 .928 1.77 3.68 5.50
Sources: Clark J. Leith, Botswana: A Case Study o f Economic Policy Prudence and 
Growth, Washington DC: World Bank, 1999; Republic of Botswana, Transitional Plan 
fo r  Social Economic Development, London: London University Press, 1960
As Table 4-1 shows, the trends however have changed since independence. 
Primary school enrollment has gone from 75,000 in 1966 to 319,100 in 1995. That 
translates into a yearly average compound growth of 5.4%. Meanwhile, secondary school 
and university enrollments, from a much lower base at independence, have grown at 
double digits growth rates. Improvements have also occurred in other human 
development sectors. For example, the healthcare system fared badly when the country 
came under the leadership of Seretse Khama. As depicted in Table 4-2, there were only 
four doctors to every 100,000 people and only about 1,000 hospital beds in the country. 
Today, Botswana’s healthcare system has considerably improved. Virtually all urban and 
83% of the rural residents are within 10 miles of a primary care facility.108 This has 
resulted in a dramatic fall in the infant mortality rate from 95 per 1000 live births in 1970
108 Kwesi Dugbatey, “National Health Policies: Sub-Saharan African Case Studies 1980-1990,” 
Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 49 (1999): 223-39.
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to 58 in 1997.109 The improvement has largely been due to leadership's policy and 
strategies, which since the mid-1970s have emphasized the widespread provision of 
primary health care.
Since 1980, the government has expanded the health care system by increasing the 
hiring of nurses in the primary care clinics (Table 4-2). Compared to other sub-Saharan 
African countries, where the average is 50 nurses to every 100,000 people, Botswana has 
217 nurses to every 100,000 people. Similarly, there are 24 doctors to every 100,000 
people in Botswana as compared to the region’s average of 11 doctors to every 100,000 
people. In addition to human development, Botswana has experienced an increase in its 
per capita income. In 1998, the per capita income of Botswana was $3, 070 as compared 
to the $50 at the time of independence. Moreover, the country’s per capita income in 




1966 1980 1985 1990 1994
Doctors per 100,000 4 15 17 18 24 11
Nurses per 100,000 — 124 156 216 217 50
Hospital Beds (in‘000) 1.00 2.0 2.5 3.2 3.3
Sources: Clark J. Leith, Botswana: A Case Study of Economic Policy Prudence and 
Growth, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999 
*A/A 1995: The African Average.
109 World Bank, Development Progress Indicators (Washington, DC: W orld Bank, 1999).
110 World Bank. World Development Indicators. 1997.
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The above economic picture supports the testimony of many social science 
observers in sub-Saharan Africa who have positively evaluated Botswana’s economic 
performance.111 The evidence clearly shows that Batswana living conditions since 
independence have far surpassed those of the protectorate era. To some, the cause of 
Botswana’s success has been attributed to the country’s revenues from its mining 
industries.112 Others have associated the economic improvement to the ethnic 
homogeneity of the country.113 These factors have clearly contributed to the overall 
development of the country, but they are not sufficient conditions to explain Botswana’s 
achievement because the mining wealth could have been squandered, as is obvious from 
other countries experiences.114 There are countries in the region such as Nigeria, Gabon, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ghana that possess mineral endowments that are 
greater than those of Botswana. However, none of these countries has experienced the 
level of growth that Botswana has nor has any utilized its resources effectively to upgrade 
the living conditions of its people. By comparison, in spite of the doubling of the 
country’s population, the real GDP of Botswana has increased about tenfold since
111 Christopher Colclough and Stephen McCarthy, The Political Economy o f  Botswana: A Study o f 
Growth and Distribution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Charles Harvey and Stephen R. Lewis, 
Policy Choice and Development Performance in Botswana (Basingstoke, South Africa: Macmillan, 1990); 
J. R. Parkison, “Botswana: Adjustment to Wealth,” in Chris Milner and A. J. Rayner, eds.. Policy 
Adjustment in Africa: Economic Studies in Economic Development, Vol. 1 (Basingstoke, South Africa: 
Macmillan, 1992): 197-219.
1.2 Stephen R. Lewis Jr., ‘T he Potential Problems o f Diamond-Dependent Development,” in 
Charles Harvey, ed.. Papers on Economy o f  Botswana (London: Macmillan. 1981): 14-28
1.3 Smith. Case Studies in Economic Development.
114 Gould. Bureaucratic Corruption.
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independence, and in most years the country’s economic growth has been in double 
digits.115
From Botswana’s political and economic achievements since its independence, it 
is hard to doubt the country’s prosperity. But then, one may legitimately ask, how did 
Botswana manage to achieve this impressive growth with improvement in its human 
development? Just as some associate Botswana’s success with its diamond revenues, 
others hold the conviction that the success of the country’s economic growth and 
improvement in living conditions is associated with the country’s leadership quality.116 It 
is the latter conviction that this study postulates. Towards supporting that argument, the 
next section focuses on some of the economic policy methodologies that Khama and his 
successors have used to achieve the current economic status of Botswana.
Khama’s Solicitation and Utilization of Foreign Assistance
After Botswana’s independence, Seretse turned his attention to the financial issues 
he deemed critical for his country’s development. To secure more finance for his 
country’s budget and economic development, Seretse and Quett together with a *eam of 
negotiators went to London to secure a post independence British contribution to match 
Bechuanaland’s financial needs.117 Thereafter, Khama devised a strategy for future 
development assistance. He flew to Israel where he sought and received commitments 
from the Israeli government to assist Botswana with technical aid in dry-land farming and
115 John A. Wiseman, ‘T he Slow Evolution o f the Party System o f Botswana." Journal o f  Asian 
and African Studies. Vol. 33. No. 3 (August 1998): 241-64.
116 Samatar. An African Miracle; Harvey and Lewis. Policy Choice.
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water development. In addition to Great Britain and Israel, Seretse Khama solicited aid 
from other parts of Europe and North America.118
By the early 1970s, Khama’s solicitation of aid and his democratic political 
ideology began to pay dividends. Nordic countries, the United States, Canada, and West 
Germany responded with multifaceted assistance. Botswana received grants, volunteers, 
and technical aid in such areas as healthcare, education, water, road construction, and 
economic development administration. The country’s donors were diverse and consistent 
with aid, and Botswana leaders used the foreign aid strategically, with most of it going 
into social services. Norwegian aid was primarily channeled into healthcare and road 
construction, while Swedish aid was directed towards water development for people and 
livestock in rural areas. Aid from the United States focused on provision of primary and 
secondary education as well as private sector developments while aid from Great Britain 
was used for balance of payment adjustments.'19 After securing financial aid. Khama and 
his government turned to institution building to create an environment for the effective 
utilization of resources toward development.
Khama’s Institution Building
At independence Botswana’s economy was in poor condition and needed to be 
resuscitated. To do that, Seretse Khama embarked on building effective institutions. Out 
of the many institutions he built, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
117 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
"® Stephen John Stedman, ed., Botswana: The Political Economy o f  Democratic Development 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).
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(MFDP) and the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) have become hallmark institutions 
in Botswana’s economic growth. In order to make the institutions effective and efficient, 
policies were designed to shield them from particularistic interventions by the group’s 
individual members. The successors of Khama, former president Masire and, now, Festus 
Mogae have adhered to the same approaches to enable them to protect the collective 
interests of the country as opposed to personal gains.
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP)
Established in 1970, the MFDP is the institutional brain to the economic policy­
making process. Its central role includes overseeing the complex development planning 
and Botswana’s budgetary process. By maintaining the no tolerance for corruption policy, 
which became the theme in Seretse Khama’s public speeches during his presidency, the 
institution thoroughly checks for corruption in all national dealings in two w ays.120 First, 
before any project is included in the country’s development plan, sectoral ministries are 
obliged to justify the project’s economic viability. Projects that pass the viability test are 
the only ones included in the annual development budget as a precaution to avoid budget 
deficits and corruption. Second, to avoid corruption in the MFDP itself, the institution 
and the government have created monitoring and auditing systems to ensure and enforce 
proper legitimate use of public funds.121 This has allowed the government and its leaders
119 Cole lough and McCarthy, The Political Economy o f Botswana.
120 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
121 Jan Isaksen, Macroeconomic Management and Bureaucracy: The Case o f  Botswana. Research 
Report No. 59 (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of Africa Studies, 1981).
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to hold all public officials accountable for abusing their office and, as such, minimized 
systematic corruption and excessive rent seeking in the institution.122
In Botswana, the stringent practices of institutional autonomy and accountability 
to ensure efficiency and effectiveness are not limit to the financial sector. The leaders 
apply similar standards to the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), one of the important 
institutions that serve the interests of the general population. It was established in 1966 as 
a non-profit institution to cater to the needs of livestock owners. Also operating 
autonomously and adhering to the policy against corruption, the BMC has become very 
effective and beneficial as the sole exporter of meat and it’s by-products for both the 
peasantry and the dominant classes. The commission has successfully generated capitalist 
economic development in the livestock industry for the last three decades. It manages its 
financial affairs without falling into the two main traps of African parastatals: huge losses 
and heavy extraction of resources from producers.123 The commission has increased 
supplier/producer prices and consistently returned bonuses to producers despite 
monopolistic power. For the last twenty years, the BMC’s affiliate, the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Animal Health and Production Department, has helped the rural livestock 
owners by keeping the country disease-free, particularly from foot and mouth disease.124
122 Kenneth Good, “Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana: A Best Case Example,” The 
Journal o f  Modem African Studies Vol. 32, No. 3 (1994): 499-521.
121 Samatar, An African Miracle.
124 Ibid.
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The achievements of both MFDP and BMC in Botswana’s economy stand in 
sharp contrast with the general decay of African public institutions.125 The problems of 
African institutions fundamentally represent the incapacity of African leaders to create 
institutions capable of successfully imposing a developmental agenda. These failures 
emanate from the leaders’ inability to recognize that their collective interest requires 
discipline within the leadership ranks. That is. the need to protect state institutions from 
themselves and other interest groups. The achievements of the MFDP and the BMC 
demonstrate that Botswana’s leaders, unlike their counterparts in other sub-Saharan 
African countries, do realize their social responsibility and the necessity of building 
effective public institutions which ensure society’s common interests. In Botswana the 
elements responsible for this leadership success include a disciplined leadership 
consciousness and an efficient accountable civil service shielded from power politics.126 
Khama adopted similar precautionary measures in other policy areas, especially in 
monetary, trade, and mining policies.
Policies in Mining and Trade
Botswana’s independence in 1966 was followed by the discovery of diamond 
deposits in the country. With cautious planning, Khama negotiated with private investors 
in the mining industry to receive a portion of the equity in the mining operation at no 
charge for his country. By the arrangements, he was able to extract for his nation a
1:5 Zambia, Botswana’s neighboring country, has some of the worst managed parastatals 
institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. See Kenneth Good, “Systemic Agricultural Mismanagement: The 1985 
'Bumper' Harvest in Zambia," The Journal o f  M odem African Studies, Vol. 24, No. I (March 1986): 257- 
84.
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significant share of continuous mineral revenues. In addition to the distribution of the 
revenues from the mining operations between the nation and foreign investors, the leaders 
strategically bought into capturing a share of the market rents by participating in the 
Central Selling Organization (CSO). As a member of the cartel, this allowed Botswana to 
obtain long-term access to high profits in mineral rents.127 The policy has paid off for 
Botswana by generating most of its national revenues from the diamond mining industry. 
The careful leadership planning and policies are not only directed to the mining industry 
but are also applied to the trade industry.
In trade, shortly after independence, Seretse Khama embarked upon export 
promotion to strengthen the trading position of Botswana. First, he renegotiated 
Botswana’s trading position in favorable terms within the South African Custom Union 
(SACU), of which the country had been a member since 1910.128 The renegotiated 
arrangement has allowed Botswana to earn more revenues as its imports grew rapidly 
with the growing diamond revenues.129 Khama and his successors have utilized the 
regional trade association to reach other markets. The provisions of the arrangement 
allow members to have transit rights through other members’ territories with goods for 
other destinations. Since Namibia’s independence in 1990, the provisions have allowed 
Botswana to gain another route to a seaport besides those of South Africa.
126 Leith, Botswana: A Case Study o f  Economic Policy.
127 Harvey and Lewis, Policy Choice.
128 Cathie, Food Security.
' 2', Clark J. Leith, ‘T he  Static Welfare Effects of a Small Developing Country’s Membership in 
Custom Union: Botswana in South African Customs Union,” World Development. Vol. 20, No. 7 (1992): 
1021-38.
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On the international arena, Khama played a key role in securing market access for 
Botswana’s beef. He personally attended the Lome Convention to arrange for his country 
to receive a special provision of 90 percent rebate on European Union (EU) import levy; 
thereby allowing Botswana to receive a net price nearly equal to the internal European 
price for its beef exported to the EU.130 Even though beef exports are modest relative to 
diamonds, the widespread ownership of cattle allows this trade policy of Khama to have a 
positive effect over a large part of the population, especially farmers in the rural areas.
Botswana's Monetary Policy After Independence
Botswana’s financial sector was basic in 1966 when independence was achieved. 
Currency in circulation was the South African rand and banking activities were provided 
by agencies, which opened a few hours a week.131 With the prospects of growing 
revenues from minerals, the leaders decided to issue a national currency for Botswana. In 
1974, the leadership began preparation for the country’s own central bank, and a new 
currency, the pula, was launched in August 1976.132 In establishing monetary policy to 
manage the licensing of financial institutions and foreign exchange reserves, Khama 
adopted a transparent system to regulate monetary affairs.133 His administration placed 
monetary affairs under the joint management of the Central Bank and the Ministry of
130 Clark, J. Leith, “Botswana’s International Trade Policies,” in J. S. Salkin, ed.. Aspects o f  the 
Economy o f  Botswana: Selected Papers, 527-548 (Oxford: James Curry, 1997).
131 H. C. L. Hermans. ‘T he  History o f the Bank o f Botswana,” Bank o f  Botswana Research 
Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 2 (September 1996): 1-48.
132 Hudson. ‘T he  Establishment of Botswana's Central Bank.
133 Republic of Botswana, A Monetary System fo r  Botswana: Government White Paper,
Government Paper No. I (March 1975).
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  rep roduction  prohibited w ithout perm iss ion .
168
Finance and Development as a strategy to check government fraud and to prevent any 
potential corruption.134
In 1982, due to high influx of revenues from newly discovered mining centers, the 
country accumulated a substantial balance of payments surplus. To prevent inflation the 
leadership, under president Quett Masire, refrained from unnecessary expenditures and 
devised new ways to put Botswana’s money to effective use. The leaders did two things 
in this regard. First, operating on a fixed exchange rate, the government set the country’s 
rate of exchange level below what would have been indicated by the equilibrium flow.lj5 
Masire’s policy allowed Botswana to deliberately avoid “Dutch Disease,” a well known 
economic problem caused when a strong currency undermines exports. Second, the 
government devised a strategy, with the World Bank’s cooperation, to invest its excess 
foreign reserves to eam more revenues for the country.136 President Masire turned his 
nation’s excess foreign reserves into an income earning property for their country. Today, 
the use of excess foreign reserves to generate income has become second only to the 
diamond industry as an income generating instrument for Botswana.iy7
Since independence, Botswana’s leaders have strategically devised three major 
revenues sources to fund social developments. The first one relates to the mining 
industry, which since independence has consistently generated high revenues for the
134 Herman, ‘T h e  History of the Bank of Botswana.”
135 Clark J. Leith, “Botswana's Exchange Rate Policy,” Bank o f  Botswana Research Bulletin , Vol. 
14. No. 2 (September 1996): 21-35.
136 Lina K. Mohohlo. "Central Bank as a Protector o f  National Wealth: Botswana’s Case,” in J. S. 
Salkin, ed.. Aspect o f  the Economy o f  Botswana: Selected Papers, 241-271 (Oxford: James Curry, 1997).
137 Ibid.
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country. The second one is the renegotiated of the customs union arrangements in 
conjunction with trade arrangements with the EU, which also continue to generate 
revenues for the country. The third is the strategy devised by the leaders to use excess 
foreign reserves to generate more revenues. Botswana’s leaders have managed to channel 
most of the revenues towards improving basic living conditions.
Large portions of the revenues spent by the government have gone into basic 
infrastructure, including electricity, water, roads, and government services to the mining 
and agriculture sectors. These expenditures have been growth promoting, because without 
such infrastructure and service very little growth would have occurred. The ongoing 
success of the country’s economic improvements has been mostly due to the quality of 
the country’s leadership.
DOES BOTSWANA’S ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT MEAN DEVELOPMENT?
If the definition of development means the reduction of poverty,138 then the 
argument can be made that Botswana is on the right track. However, if development is 
defined, as the acquisition of the ability to produce diverse goods and services to satisfy 
the population’s needs, then Botswana, like many other African nations, has not been 
successful. The nation does not produce most of its industrial needs. The reason for this 
deficiency is because Botswana lacks the technological industrial capacity needed to 
manufacture its own industrial goods. In economic terms, it does not have the
138 George Akeya Agbango. ed.. Issues and Trends in Contemporary African Politics: Stability, 
Development and Democratization (NY: Peter Lang, 1997).
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comparative advantage in industrial production due to a lack of scientific culture in 
creation.
This deficiency is obvious by looking at its production sectors. Despite the 
country’s accomplishments in economic growth, a careful observation reveals that the 
structure of its economy is dominated by mining and service sectors. Those two areas 
have grown considerably since independence. As Table 4-3 shows, the mining industry, 
which was at only an exploratory stage during independence, grew to 31.6% of the 
national GDP in a decade. By 1986, due to more discoveries of mining centers, the sector 
constituted more than half of the country’s GDP. As of 1998, mining was still 
commanding 48.0% of the national economy. Simultaneously, the service industry 
reached a high of 50.5% of GDP in 1996 and declined slightly to 48.6% in 1997. 
Conversely, the agriculture sector has continuously declined from 25% of GDP in 1976 to 
3.40% in 1997. Similarly, the manufacturing sector of the country that was 6.8% in 1976 
has also consistently declined throughout the years to 4.7% of GDP in 1997.
The inference here is that Botswana’s economy lacks growth in its industrial 
sector; hence, the dwindling of its industrial production sector in the overall economy. 
This suggests that while the leaders have been effective in devising monetary and trade 
policies, they have failed in other important areas. Despite their high moral convictions 
that have helped to improve living conditions for the people, they have failed to devise a 
coherent progressive policy towards establishing scientific culture; a culture that is 
needed to help gravitate the nation towards industrial creativity and ultimately induce 
industrialization.
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Table 4-3
The Structure of Botswana National Economy 1976-97
% of Gross Domestic Product 1976 1986 1996 1997
Agriculture 25.0 5.5 3.8 3.4
Mining Industry 31.6 58.3 45.7 48.0
Industrial Manufacturing 6.8 5.1 4.7 4.7
Service 43.5 36.2 50.5 48.6
Private Consumption 60.9 37.3 30.0 28.4
General Govt. Consumption 18.2 22.0 28.2 26.8
Imports of Goods & Service 62.4 47.3 35.3 37.5
Sources. World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
1998).
Botswana’s Scientific Culture
As Table 4-3 shows, the size of the country's industrial production signals that 
there is very little scientific culture in Botswana. By all accounts, basic science and 
intermediate science courses are part of the country’s school curriculum up to the 
university level.139 However, the leaders have failed to synergistically integrate scientific 
education and industry.140 In this case, Botswana, just like the rest of sub-Saharan African 
countries, has no definite scientific policy that attempts to establish long-term scientific 
culture towards industrialization. The industrial related technology that is being pursued 
in Botswana is small scale technology known in many African countries as Appropriate
139 Carr, “Intermediate Technology in Botswana.”
140 Ahmad, “Science and Technology.”
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Technology (AT).141 AT focuses on devising technologies that are deemed suitable and 
applicable to rural food production and processing. From a development perspective, the 
major problem with AT is that it is more labor intensive and less technologically oriented, 
and therefore lacks the potential to assist in developing the culture needed for Botswana’s 
industrial development.142 For that matter, Botswana cannot claim that adopting AT will 
propel it towards scientific culture capable of industrialization and ultimately assist it in 
attaining sustainable economic development.143
In other words, Botswana lacks adequate national policies aimed at establishing 
scientific culture of creation suitable for industrialization and sustainable economic 
development as defined in chapter three. For this reason, and despite its high moral code 
of ethics that minimizes corruption, Botswana is not yet developed. What Botswana’s 
leadership, however, has done is to distribute social services to benefit its citizens by 
using the revenue from its depleting natural resources endowments. This they have been 
able to do because, as the improvement of the country shows, the leadership has fostered 
one of the two aspects of the prerequisite cultural elements of development mentioned in 
chapter three, namely, moral culture. The evidence shows the veracity of this occurrence 
because corruption is low in the country, and the leadership has been altruistic to provide 
social services to the population.144 In comparison with other sub-Saharan African
141 Aaron Segal, “Appropriate Technology: The African Experience," Journal o f  Asian and 
African Studies, Vol. 27. Nos. 1-2 (1992): 124-33.
142 Francis Stewart, ed.. Macro Policies fo r  Appropriate Technology in Developing Countries 
(Boulder: Westview, 1987).
143 R. S. Eckaus. “Appropriate Technology: The Movement Has on A Few Clothes On,” Issues in 
Science and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 2 (W inter 1987): 62-71.
144 Good, “Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana."
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countries, as the human development indicators have shown in this case study, the leaders 
have devised effective policies to improve the living conditions of their citizens.
SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that the precolonial Botswana leaders organized their 
societies based on the political rule of an inherited hierarchical system underpinned by a 
patron client economic system.145 In those days, the leaders established a well-entrenched 
political and economic apparatus that served the mutual interests of both the ruled and the 
rulers. Economically, production in Botswana at the time was mostly agrarian, and the 
elite and leaders controlled the distribution of land and owned most of the cattle that were 
used for both production and consumption. Through their cattle loaning (mafisa) system, 
the political leadership was able to establish a social fiduciary' relationship that supported 
and maintained social stability.
The social system was maintained by inducting young people into the social strata 
by age regimentation. The process instilled a sense of group unity among the Tswana 
youth by acting as a catalyst to create unanimity among Batswana by erasing tribal 
differences.146 That social methodology, created by the precolonial leaders, facilitated the 
creation of a Tswana-dom that crystallized in the ethnic homogeneity founded in 
Botswana today.147 In precolonial days, social matters concerning the whole community 
were democratically deliberated in traditional wards (kgolta). In times of security crisis,
145 Parson. Succession to High Office in Botswana.
146 Tlou. "A Political History of Northwestern Botswana.”
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leaders like Khama the Great rallied other traditional chiefs to form military alliance to 
repel attackers from their territories. By these organizational strategies, political and 
economic issues were managed by leaders to serve the welfare of their communities and 
to facilitate social development.
In the mid 1800s. the migration of the Afrikaner Boers into the interior of Africa 
brought them into conflict with the Tswana nations. The Tswana sought an alliance with 
the British government that later turned into a protectorate agreement. Politically, the 
protectorate was underlined by a parallel rule that allowed the protectorate administration 
and traditional rule to exist simultaneously, but mutually exclusive from each other. The 
arrangement obliged the British to recognize the traditional leadership as autonomous 
authorities without impinging on their legitimacy to rule. The arrangement also made the 
British government treat the Bechuanaland protectorate as part of the Dominions. The 
association of Bechuanaland with the Dominions allowed the territories to remain 
autonomous with their indigenous internal political institutions and its leadership with 
less foreign institutional influence. This characteristic made Botswana’s colonization 
different from other African colonies that experienced both direct and indirect foreign 
institutional colonial controls that came with leadership different from what existed prior 
to colonization.148
When the British attempted to change the protectorate arrangement of Botswana 
by replacing it with direct colonial rule, the traditional leaders resisted the change and
147 Smith. Case Studies in Economic Development.
148 Michael Crowder. West Africa Under Colonial Rule (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968); Crocking , “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."
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preserved their legitimacy. Tshekedi Khama. the traditional leader of the Bangwato at the 
time, took the High Commissioner to court to stop it from imposing outright colonization 
on Botswana. In addition to his efforts against the British, Tshekedi successfully used the 
United Nations to prevent South African from annexing the High Commissioner’s 
territories of which Botswana was part. By Tshekedi’s relentless efforts, traditional 
leaders consciously averted Britain’s colonization and South Africa’s annexation 
attempts. The leaders efforts preserved Botswana’s domestic institutions with their 
legitimacy without creating polarization among its social elements. This legacy has 
played a crucial role in Botswana’s political and economic development. Despite colonial 
leaders’ political accomplishments, they were unable to transform Botswana’s economy 
to benefit their people materially. The territories were turned into labor reserves to serve 
capitalist interests in South African mines. At independence, Botswana was plagued with 
high unemployment and with a very poor economy.
As the new leader of independent Botswana, Seretse Khama emphasized and 
strengthened the culture of self-reliance and internal discipline. He stressed the 
importance of democracy in decision-making through a combination of traditional and 
modem institutions and designed the actions of his government to promote such attitudes. 
Khama emphasized moral principles that avoided corrupt attitudes among leaders and 
brought about economic growth and prosperity for his people. In search of benign paths 
towards economic growth, he began modernization by grafting institutions such as the 
MFDP and BMC on roots of traditional moral values under the principles of kagisano: 
unity, harmony, and sense of community. He did that by emphasizing rural development
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and human development by providing clean water, education and health facilities for his 
people.
Today, with effective governance and little corruption, Botswana’s per income 
capita stands above $3000. Leaders since the death of Khama in 1980, such as former 
president Quett Masire and current president Festus Mogae, have followed the moral 
culture laid by Khama. Both leaders have taken actions and made policies that meet the 
needs of their people in villages. Improvements have been done to develop cattle raising 
by providing grazing land for the poor. However, these actions by no means suggest 
Botswana has solved its development problems.
Botswana’s economy still remains agrarian with most of its revenues coming from 
raw materials in the mining industry. There is hardly any industrialization in Botswana 
due to lack of scientific culture to empower creativity and technological innovations. 
Unfortunately, the leaders have failed to design policies that could establish the scientific 
culture needed to make sustainable economic development possible. However, in 
comparing both economic and political standards in Botswana with other countries in the 
region, Botswana leaders have made great progress in laying a moral cultural foundation 
upon which development can flourish.
The development of Botswana has undergone three leadership phases, with each 
phase adding some progressive dimension to it. The first phase was led by Khama the 
Great, who laid the foundation for ethnic homogeneity by bringing different tribes 
together under the Tswana-dom. Khama sought British protection against Afrikaner 
Boers who attempted to overtake the Tswana territories. In 1895, he led a delegation of
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chiefs to London to oppose the annexation of their land by Cecil Rhodes o f South Africa 
in order to protect the freedom of his people and their land.
Tshekedi Khama led the second phase during the ‘colonial’ era. During that time, 
Tshekedi successfully resisted the British attempt to impose outright colonization and 
preserved the established leaders legitimacy. The preservation of that legitimacy provided 
the foundation upon which political stability has been provided for Botswana’s 
contemporary development. The third, and the current phase, also began under the 
tutelage of Seretse Khama. It started at the dawn of Botswana’s independence and it is 
still unfolding. Seretse started the third phase by politically doing two things. First he 
united the chiefs and the commoners by transforming the individual tribal councils and 
their territories into the nation of Botswana. Second, he transformed the country’s rule of 
inherited hierarchical system to an open democratic system.
Economically, Seretse transformed the previous production system that used to be 
based on patron-client relations into one based on the class relations of capitalism. In 
order to achieve a political stability, he transformed the traditional aristocrats into 
elements of petty bourgeoisie. Knowing that economic development was the ultimate 
goal that his people were seeking, he fostered an anti-corruption culture and built 
autonomous, but accountable, institutions catering to collective interests. His personal 
distaste for corruption prevented leadership kleptocracy, thereby enabling the nation to 
channel available revenues from the mining industry into social services (e.g., education, 
healthcare, and clean water) to improve the welfare of his people.
Before Khama’s death in July 1980, he had laid a moral foundation that has 
become a guiding principle for his successors. The immediate successors of Khama,
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Quett Masire and the current successor, Festus Mogae have adhered to democratic 
principles, promoted intolerance for corruption, and sought bureaucratic efficiency in 
serving the people of their country. No one knows for sure how and where the third phase 
will end. For now, however, Botswana is an example in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
country’s experience demonstrates how leadership and moral quality are central for social 
and economic progress.
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CHAPTER V
LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF GHANA
Modem day Ghana occupies a land that used to be controlled by the Ashanti 
Empire. However, until the emergence of that Empire, the area was occupied by different 
nation-states such as the Fanti, Denkyira, and Dagomba. The nations had two types of 
leadership namely Chieftaincy and Kingship. Chiefs headed tribal groups, and the Kings 
headed hegemonic nations. Each of the leaderships organized their societies based on 
their own set of rules and institutions. The communities were agrarian societies, which 
also engaged in commerce. Moreover, the global capitalist economy affected them before 
they were colonized in the late nineteenth century. Before the colonization, however, the 
leaders failed to collectively organize their societies. Instead, they led their individual 
states and waged wars against one another for political and economic control.1
Following colonization, the British put the nations together and named it the Gold 
Coast. Thereafter, the British demoralized the traditional leaders, disenfranchising them 
from the political economic decision-making process. In the mid twentieth century, 
nationalist movements emerged to demand self-rule. In 1947, nationalists such as Joseph 
B. Danquah and others organized UGCC toward the objective of nationalization. The 
Gold Cost attained independence in 1957 under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, a 
Ghanaian who had studied in the United States during the depression years.2 In 1966,
1 Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
2 Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f  Kwame Nkrumah (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
1957).
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military officers, led by Lieutenant-General E. K. Kotoka and Colonel A. A. Afrifa, 
toppled in a bloody coup the elected government of Nkrumah. Between 1966 and 1981, 
Ghana alternated from one military regime to another, which included intermittent 
civilian leadership. This turmoil of political corruption and poor economic policies ruined 
the country’s economy. Today, Ghana is considered one of the poorest countries in the 
world.
When Ghana attained independence in 1957, the nation was the envy of its 
neighbors. Though its economy was predominantly agrarian, it had foreign exchange 
reserves in excess of US $300 million.3 The country was self-sufficient in food supply 
and food imports had a negligible trade impact.4 Many African experts were optimistic 
about Ghana’s future development.5 Undoubtedly, judging from Ghana’s economic 
position and its educated class at the time, there was no cause for alarm in terms of it’s 
future prosperity. It was the leading world producer of cocoa, which was commanding 
high prices on world market. The nation’s mining of gold and diamonds was not the 
highest in the world, but both had good prospects. In addition, the forestry industry 
provided some of the best wood in West Africa, together with the human potential that 
was waiting to be tapped.
Ghana’s current economic status has proven that the optimists overlooked the role 
of leadership’s ability in establishing the appropriate culture to induce economic 
development. Since Ghana’s independence, its leaders have taken the economic
3 Dickson A. Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana,” 
Applied Economics, Vol. 17, No. 3 (June 1985): 395-419.
4 Gold Coast Annual Reports 1892-1954 (NY: Andronic, 1972).
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development of their country hostage by failing to establish a domestic culture that is 
conducive to development. As the first national leader, Nkrumah failed to forge an 
alliance between party officials and traditional leaders to create the needed political 
stability upon which economic development could thrive.6
From the beginning of his leadership, Nkrumah avoided democratic dialogue. He 
adopted instead a means of establishing a national stability through the legislative 
Preventive Detention Act. In addition, he failed to establish high moral principles to 
avoid corruption, allowing his party officials to use state economic institutions to satisfy 
their personal interests as opposed to fulfilling collective national interests.7 In search of 
economic development, Nkrumah failed to transform the traditional system into a 
democratic capitalistic system, which values the force of self-motivation that unleashes 
human creativity vital to economic development. Instead, he innovatively modified the 
socialist economic system, which he thought was more closely reflective o f traits of the 
African culture and which could have been operable in Ghana.8 This path, however, 
stagnated the national economy. For failing to institute a combination of capitalism with 
high moral standards, Nkrumah legitimized corruption and it was intensified by his 
successors, thus thwarting Ghana’s economic development. The legislative preventive act 
also laid the foundation for an authoritarian political culture that his successors from the
5 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
6 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f  Stability.
1 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
8 Yuri Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah (NY: International Publisher, 1987).
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military leadership and civilians leadership modeled and effectively used to undermine 
both political and economic developments.
In 1966, Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup. Successive leaders adopted 
both cultures of corruption and authoritarianism that have become the hallmarks of 
development in Ghana. Both cultures together created the recipe for Ghana’s poor 
economic experience over the last 43 years. In 1981, Rawlings’ military leadership took 
over power and added a culture of political violence. For twenty years, he remained in 
power legitimizing this type of malignant culture. The successive Ghanaian leaders after 
Nkrumah not only adopted negative cultures of development, but also abandoned all 
industrial projects that had earlier been initiated by Nkrumah. The collective 
achievements of these leaders, through the cultures they have created and legitimized, are 
amplified in Ghana’s underdevelopment and the poverty of its people.
This chapter focuses on the role of leadership in Ghana’s economic development.
It is divided into three sections, with the first dealing with the leadership in precolonial 
Ghana. This section attempts to show how those leaders organized their societies towards 
social development until colonization was imposed. It also sheds some light on how 
colonization was imposed. The second section looks at colonial leaders and explains how 
colonization in Ghana was different from a protectorate in administrative terms. It also 
looks at the economic development in the colony under the leadership of Governor 
Frederick Guggisberg and leadership of Ofori Atta, a traditional leader. The third section, 
then, examines postcoionial leaders and the cultures they have established to the 
detriment of Ghana’s economic development. This section itself is sub-divided into three, 
with the first covering Ghana’s development under the tutelage of its first President,
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Nkrumah. The second looks at what I term the interlude leadership era. It covers the 
years from 1966 to 1981, when the leadership vacillated between military dictatorships 
and civilian politicians until the second coming of Rawlings. Within this discussion, the 
hypothesis of this chapter states that even though the nation o f Ghana is endowed with 
mineral resources and human potential, national leaders have failed to establish the 
appropriate political and economic environments to channel the resources into positive 
development to the benefit the of Ghanaian public.
PRECOLONIAL GHANA AND ITS POLITICAL ECONOMY
Modem day Ghana was once occupied by various small nations of Fanti,
Denkyira, Dagomba, and other tribes until the emergency of the Ashanti Empire in the 
seventeenth century.9 Politically, there were two kinds of leadership in precolonial Ghana. 
The first kind was chieftaincy. Chiefs, with their administrative and judicial systems that 
headed tribal groupings, formed the top of the chieftaincies. The second type of 
leadership was the kingship. At the top of that system was the king. He headed an 
imperial system of a hegemonic nation, similar to that of the Ashanti Empire during the 
precolonial era.10 Many of the tribal nations’ leadership systems were hierarchically 
organized with succession following inheritance of different lineages. The Dagombas 
followed paternal inheritance, while the Ashantis followed maternal inheritance. The 
leaders administered the operations of their communities with the assistance of three
9 The best narration of the groups that constituted precolonial Ghana is contained in Fynn, Ashanti 
and Its Neighbours.
10 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
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different institutions. These were, the Privy Council, Council of Elders, and Village 
Assembly of Commoners.11
The Ashanti Empire was created under the leadership of Osei Tutu. However, it 
was other leaders such as Opoku Ware and Osei Bonsu who turned the nation into an 
empire by militarily conquering other nations.12 The central government of the empire 
was in the hands of a Union Council, which was guided by the Ashanti constitution and 
headed by the King of Ashanti. Even though the Ashanti political system was effective 
from the beginning, it later became ineffective due to the expansion o f the empire. 
Incorporation was, therefore, kept to a minimum, allowing autonomy for conquered 
nations under the imperial rule.Ij The problem with the Ashanti political machinery, 
however, was that conquered people did not identify their corporate interests with the one 
of the empire. This indifference caused the Ashanti Empire to suffer a series of internal 
revolts. Consequently, rising instabilities prevented social transformation and the 
crystallization of the conquered nations into a homogenous society. In other words, the 
Ashanti leaders’ method of building society through military conquest, as opposed to 
consociational democratic approach, had an inherent instability that prevented social 
homogeneity in precolonial Ghana.14
Economically, the nations were agrarian societies that also engaged in commerce. 
The means of production were mainly land. For that reason, leaders supervised the access
11 Ibid.
12 Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
13 David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955).
14 Ibid.
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to land to ensure that those who wanted to farm were not denied that opportunity. Leaders 
used their supervisory role to bind to them those on whom they depended for political 
support.13 However, the leaders did not monopolize the means of production and hardly 
extracted tributes from citizens except on a volunteer basis in the form of gifts. The 
general cultural sentiment of leaders avoided placing restrictions on individual economic 
activity because they perceived intervention as producing an economic welfare burden on 
the entire society. In that regards, the leadership created the necessary cultural conditions 
for their citizens to engage in progressive economic activities.16
In commerce, precolonial Ghana consisted of great trading nations and was rich in 
natural resources such as gold, ivory, and spices. On the southern shores, the nations 
engaged in international commerce with agents of various European nations.17 All the 
nations regarded the trade with Europeans as important because it was seen as a means to 
procure guns that enabled them to embark on political and economic expansion.18 The 
competition for access to trade directly with Europeans made the Ghanaian leaders 
shortsighted and selfish, thus preventing them from rallying themselves into a unified and 
homogenous society for mutual social benefits. The myopic leadership in precolonial 
Ghana enhanced tribal divisions that, in tum, prevented political and social cohesion prior 
to the colonial tribal demarcation at the colonial epoch. In other words, precolonial Ghana
15 Wickins, An Economic History o f  Africa.
16 M. J. Fields, Social Organization o f  The Ga People (Accra, Gold Coast: Government of Gold 
Coast Printing Press, 1940).
17 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
18 W. E. F. Ward, A History o f the Gold Coast (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948).
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did not become a social melting pot like the United States, even though the federal 
characteristics o f the Ashanti constitution were comparable to that of the United States.19
Despite civil wars and the lack of able leadership to construct a homogenous 
society, corruption among leaders was eschewed by institutional arrangements in 
precolonial societies. For example, chiefs in Ashanti were prohibited by law to meet with 
any foreigner without a member from the council of elders. Such a traditional injunction 
was intended to enhance the sanctity of the leadership and also check the misuses o f 
power. Violations resulted in immediate removal from office.20 Apart from the 
leadership’s inability to form a homogenous society, the nations were free of corruption 
and leaders maintained economic and political stability to ensure social welfare until 
colonization.
Was Ghana Colonized?
As previously defined in chapter four, colonization is an arbitrary imposition of 
rule and authority by a stronger nation over a weaker one, with the intention of the ruler 
to economically exploit the ruled. During such imposition, the ruler sets the laws and 
regulations of the weaker nation to the advantage of the strong and to the disadvantage of 
the weak.21 Was this what happened in precolonial Ghana? The competition for trading 
with the Europeans formed the primary cause of the tribal fighting in Ghana. The internal 
domestic tribal wars left the nations to defend themselves against each other.
19 For a brief review of the Ashanti Constitution see Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
20 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
21 Picard, The Evolution o f  M odem  Botswana.
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Consequently, they became collectively vulnerable to outside influences. For that reason, 
the Fantis at the coast affiliated themselves with the European traders as a shield against 
the Ashanti because of the European’s firepower.
Part of the trade between the nations and the Europeans was in the slave trade, 
which was taking place clandestinely despite the fact that it was outlawed in 1807.22 In 
the first half of nineteenth century, the British government’s dissatisfaction with the 
company of merchants’ inability to prevent the slave trade in conjunction with the killing 
of Charles MaCarthy by the Ashantis led the British to withdraw the company’s charter 
and to contemplate abandoning the Gold Coast.23 The British Merchant Companies, on 
the other hand, found the business there valuable and, in 1830, sent George MacLean to 
take care of their forts at the coast. He was given limited jurisdiction and was restricted to 
the narrowly prescribed area of the settlements only. It was under MacLean’s jurisdiction 
that the first real social and political impact of Western institutions made themselves felt 
on the coastal people.24 Through his own personal honesty, MacLean gained an esteemed 
local reputation as a judge, a reputation that went beyond his official duties at the forts.25 
The Fanti chiefs brought their disputes to MacLean to settle whenever there was one 
among the chiefs. Though his position was unofficial, the chiefs accepted his adjudication 
without question. It was within this judicial sphere of influence that MacLean affected
22 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
23 Ibid.
24 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
25 J. D. Fage ‘T h e  Administration o f George MacLean on the Gold Coast, 1830-44,” G old Coast 
and Togoland Historical Society, Vol. 1, Part 4 (1947): 22-35.
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later policies of British rule in the Gold Coast. In 1842, after MacLean had established 
peace between the Fantis and Ashantis and commercial activities were flourishing, a 
committee in England recommended that the control of the Gold Coast be reverted back 
to the Crown and that the government recognize the informal method of jurisdiction that 
MacLean had established.26
MacLean’s system had no legal foundation but had arisen only out of necessity. It 
was given legitimacy and a formal recognition by the British government in 1843. In that 
year, in an effort to clarify the relations between the English and the Fantis, an agreement 
document known as the Bond of 1844 was signed by both parties.27 The agreement 
contained a vague acknowledgment on the part of the Fanti chiefs of transfer of 
jurisdictional power to the British. This concord stated:
1. Whereas power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf 
o f Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, within divers 
countries and places adjacent to Her Majesty’s forts and settlements on 
the Gold Coast; we, chiefs of countries and places so referred to, and 
adjacent to the said forts and settlements, do hereby acknowledge that 
power and jurisdiction, and declare that the first objects of law are the 
protection of individuals and property.
2. Human sacrifices, and other barbarous customs, such as 
panyarring, are abominations, and contrary to law.
3. Murders, robberies, and other crimes and offenses, will be tried and 
inquired of before the queen’s judicial officers and the chiefs of the 
districts, modeling the customs of the country to the general principles 
of British laws.28
26 Ward, A History o f  the Gold Coast.
27 Joseph. B. Danquah, T h e  Historical Significance of The Bond of 1844,” Transactions o f  the 
Historical Society o f Ghana, Vol. 3 (1957): 1-15.
28 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition, 33-34,
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This above document sold the soul and sweat of the Gold Coast people into 
colonization. The agreement coerced the coastal chiefs to abdicate their legitimacy and 
authority to rule their territories and transfer those to the British government. The last 
section of paragraph 3 of the Bond became the cornerstone of the colonization effort 
because it de-legitimized the authority of the chiefs by setting aside their guidelines of 
ruling embedded in traditional institutions. Second, “molding the customs of the country 
to the general principles of British laws in the Bond became the central piece of the 
British political objective of the Gold Coast.29 Though no protectorate was proclaimed, 
nor was there any mention of a territorial cession in the document, the British took the 
Bond agreement as a point of departure to unilaterally impose colonization on the coastal 
areas. Though the Fantis might have been looking for protection against the Ashantis, 
they did not have a mutual agreement with the British based on those facts. In that 
context, the arbitrary imposition of the British rule on the coastal people constituted 
colonization rather than protection.30 Even if the implied protective argument is invoked 
and accepted under that pretext, it would be hard to see how the Bond of 1844, due to the 
parties involved, could have been applied to the Ashanti and the Northern regions in the 
Gold Coast. This second condition substantiates the fact that the British rule in Gold 
Coast was arbitrarily imposed and therefore constituted colonization.
29 Gocking, "British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony,”
30 Picard, The Evolution o f  M odem Botswana.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
190
The Three Phases of Gold Coast Colonization
The colonization of precolonial Ghana by the British has always been treated as a 
one-day event that was not well planned.31 This view of the former Gold Coast is 
misleading because the region was not under a political structure that could have made 
one-step colonization possible.32 The colonization of Ghana was gradual and took three 
phases. The first phase was achieved with the Bond of 1844, by which the coastal leaders 
were coerced into abdicating their inherited thrones to transfer their legitimate powers to 
the Queen of England.33 The second phase of the British colonization of the Gold Coast 
was the annexation of the Ashanti province.
The years preceding the annexation of the Ashanti province were filled with many 
events making British control of the Ashanti desirable. Those events can be traced back to 
1807 when the Ashantis conquered the Fantis, demolished one of the British forts, and 
forced them to pay rent on the coastal land they occupied. Since that time the military 
superiority o f the Ashanti became a dilemma for the British and the desire to do 
something about it became apparent.34 In 1872, the transfer of Elimina forts from the 
Dutch to the British incensed the Ashantis. That anger, in conjunction with other political 
incidents, led to an outbreak of another war, the sixth one, between the Ashantis and the 
British and its allies on the coast. This time, the British decided to settle the matter for 
good. In 1874, the British brought in troops from England with new technological
31 Donald Ray, Ghana: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: Fances Pinter, 1986).
32 Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
33 Danquah, ‘T he Historical Significance o f The Bond of 1844.”
34 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition; Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
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fighting weapons. The contingent marched to Kumasi, the Ashanti capital, and defeated 
the Ashantis and left the capital in flames. The war ended with the treaty o f Fomena, 
which urged the Asantehene to renounce his suzerainty over the states that the Ashantis 
had previously recognized in the MacLean Treaty of 1831.35
In 1895, due to the British suspicion of France’s possible encroachment from the 
East, and German advancement from the West, they urged the Asantehene, Osei 
Prempeh, to accept protection. Besides the demand for his submission, which Prempeh 
refused, the British requested an immediate payment of an overdue indemnity of 50,000 
ounces of gold. Confronted with the demand to pay such a huge sum of money and the 
possible demise o f his kingdom, Prempeh reluctantly accepted protection but refused to 
pay the money. As a punishment for refusing to pay, the British exiled him to the island 
of the Seychelles.36
The deportation caused an outrage among the Ashantis and led to the Yaa 
Asantewaa war against the British in 1896, which the Ashantis lost.37 Following the war, 
the British annexed the Ashanti Territory to the Crown colony in January 1902.38 The 
annexation of Ashanti marked the second phase of the British colonization of the Gold 
Coast. Simultaneously, with the Ashanti annexation, the British declared a protectorate 
over the Northern territories and subsequently annexed the region. The annexation of the
35 Ward, A History o f  the Gold Coast.
36 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
37 The Ashanti war of 1896 is often referred to as the Yaa Asantewaa War. Yaa Asantewaa was a 
Queen Mother o f an Ashanti Town call Ejisu, located 12 miles from Kumasi.
38 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in The Third World.
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Northern Territories marked the third phase of the British colonization of the Gold 
Coast.39 The opening of the twentieth century, therefore, found precolonial Ghana 
completely colonized and divided into three divisions consisting of two colonies and one 
protectorate.
British Colonization o f Ghana and its Administration
The colonization of precolonial Ghana can be attributed to global changes. At the 
time, industrial competition made the need for global markets, raw material, and 
investment opportunities imperative for the British. That political economic euphoria led 
the British to identify new interests in colonial expansion and contributed to their desire 
to colonize the Gold Coast.40 Therefore, the British decision to remain in precolonial 
Ghana and eventually annex it as a colony is found in the commercial interests at home.
The British ruled the Gold Coast with a mixture of direct rule by a central 
government and indirect rule. Under the system, a governor, assisted by an executive and 
legislative councils and staff of political and technical officials, administered the 
colony 41 Once the administrative apparatus was in place, traditional leaders were 
subjugated by a deliberate strategic approach through which the colonizer de-legitimized 
the traditional institutions. For example, in the Ashanti province, the leadership was 
completely demoralized by literally deporting king Prempeh to the Seychelles Island.
After the deportation of Prempeh, the Ashanti region was put under the administration of
39 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
40 Ibid.
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a British chief commissioner Sir Francis Fuller. He immediately dismantled whatever 
institutional and leadership power was left in the Ashanti confederacy. Even in the 
traditional courts where a few traditional subjugated leaders were allowed to adjudicate 
trivial civil cases, British laws were in competition with traditional laws.42
Similarly, in the coastal areas where colonization had been imposed since 1850, 
the traditional judiciary system was replaced by the British judiciary system.43 This 
delegitimization of traditional institutions continued as a means o f taking local power 
away from local leaders. In 1883, for example, a Native Tribunal Ordinance was passed 
with no provision for traditional leaders to enforce their decisions when rendered. That 
systematic elimination of the traditional leaderships' power and the implementation of the 
British judiciary system in the Gold Coast are key differences between the colonization in 
the Gold Cost and that of the protectorate system where local institutions were allowed to 
operate without being subverted.44
COLONIAL LEADERSHIP AND THE GOLD COAST ECONOMY
There were two groups of leaders in the colony, those who came from Britain and 
traditional leaders whose power had been appropriated. Before examining these two groups, 
it is important to consider the structure of the colonial economy. The precoionial economy
41 A detailed description o f the Gold Coast’s government is given by Sir Frederick Lugard in Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: Oxford University Press 1922).
42 Gocking, “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony.”
43 David A. Kimble, A Political History o f Ghana: The Rise o f Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850- 
1928 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
44 Gocking, “British Justice and the Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony"; Picard, The 
Evolution o f Modem Botswana.
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was transformed from the predominance of the slave trade and forest commodities, such as 
palm and rubber, to that of cocoa beans, gold, diamond, manganese, and timber. By 1911, 
gold and cocoa constituted 76% of exports o f the Gold Coast as compared to 12% in 1901.45 
Between 1946 and 1947, revenues from the crops quadrupled from 9.5 million to 41 million 
British pounds sterling.46 As far as economic infrastructure is concerned, there was complete 
railway service from the coastal town of Sekondi to Kumasi between 1919 and 1929, with 
extended branch lines from Tarkwa to Prestea. During the same period, another railway 
service was completed to link Accra, the national capital, to Kumasi through Nsawam.47 In 
addition to the railroad tracks, 4,578 miles o f new roads were constructed. Moreover, a 
harbor was completed at Takoradi to improve shipment of goods in and out of the colony. 
The colonial development projects also included communication, medical, and education 
facilities, with the first university being established in 1948.48
Leadership of Governor Frederick Guggisberg 1919-1927
Sir Gordon Guggisberg arrived in the Gold Coast in 1919. He was familiar with 
the region. For a few months in 1914 he worked as a director of public works in the Gold 
Coast. During that time, he became convinced that it was only the lack of opportunity that
45 Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana (London: Oxford University Press. 1964).
46 Francis K. Danquah, “Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana: 1945-51.” Agricultural 
History, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Winter 1994): 1-19.
47 Frederick Guggisberg, The Gold Coast: A Review o f the Events o f  1920-1926 and the Prospects 
o f  the 1927-1928 (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Printing Press, 1927).
48 Kwame Arhin, “In Search for Constitutional Chieftaincy,” in Kwame Arhin, ed.. The Life and  
Work o f  Kwame Nkrumah, 27-52 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press., 1993).
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prevented Africans from reaching an intellectual development comparable to that of the 
Europeans.49 With this spirit and conviction, Guggisberg was happy to be back in order to 
help the people of Gold Coast develop their society. The first economic project involved 
developing a scheme to improve and extend the Gold Coast’s national transportation 
system that would expedite the shipment of the colony’s agricultural products to the 
world market. Guggisberg started with railroad construction. By 1927, he had laid 233 
miles of railroad tracks out of the 250 miles that were surveyed.50
In spite of the governor’s disbelief in the development of the automobile industry 
at the time and, therefore, a disinterest in constructing motor roads, he built nearly 3,378 
miles of new roads and reconditioned 1,310 m iles.51 Some o f them were tarred with 
macadam making the colony’s motor roads the best in British tropical Africa.52 To reach 
the world market, the governor proceeded to construct a harbor in 1921 at Takoradi, 
which began commercial operations in 1928. At its completion, the harbor contained 
wharves for cocoa, timber, and manganese exports, including sufficient storage and 
loading space. Besides those facilities, the harbor had a petroleum berth equipped with 
pipelines from ships to tanks located two and half miles inland.53 Guggisberg’s 
Development Plan included extended communication facilities that increased both
49 Baron Sydney Olivrer, Dictionary o f National Biography: 1922-1930 (London: Muller, 1937).
50 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
51 Olivrer, Dictionary o f  National Biography.
52 Rita Hiden, Plan For Africa: A Report Prepared fo r  the Colonial Bureau o f  the Fabian Society, 
(NY: Oxford University Press, 1942): 149-55.
53 Frankel S. Herbert, Capital Investment In Africa: Its Course and  Effects (N Y : NY University 
Press, 1938).
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
196
telephone and telegraph service. The governor’s economic infrastructure was topped off 
with provisions for medical and educational services for human development.
In education, the governor appointed a committee to study the educational 
situation in the Gold Coast. The committee submitted to him a report that recommended a 
method by which the colony’s schools could be improved similar to those, which have 
been successfully established at Tuskegee and other institutions in the United States.54 
Using this report, Guggisberg drew guidelines for his officials to improve education in 
the colony. The guidelines emphasized the importance of teacher training, well-staffed 
and equipped secondary schools, equal opportunity for boys and girls, and above all an 
absolute necessity for character training so that the Gold Coast people could develop 
personal worth and leadership potential.55 Compared to the laissez-faire atmosphere of 
the nineteenth century when the missionaries provided little educational opportunities to 
the local people, education had increased in the Gold Coast by the end of the first half of 
the twentieth century. One outstanding success of the governor’s education plan was the 
Prince of Wales College at Achimota. It became one of the best schools in modem 
Ghana. Guggisberg financed most of the projects with loans and surplus money generated 
by the economic boom that characterized the colony’s cocoa market in 1919 and early 
parts of 1920.56
Contrary to the economic achievement of Guggisberg’s leadership, there was no 
positive political development for local people. By the very nature of colonialism, the
54 Thomas Jesse Jones. A Study o f West, South, and Equatorial Africa  (NY: NY University Press,
1922).
55 Ibid.
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British judicial system was adopted to subdue local judicial and political institutions. 
Political development plummeted to autocratic mle suppressing all democratic processes. 
It obstructed justice and prevented local people from participating in decision-making that 
affected their lives.
Nana Ofori Atta: Traditional Leadership in the Colonial Era
Ofori Atta, bom in 1881, was educated at Basel Mission in Akropong where he 
studied to be a missionary. After graduation he changed his mind and worked as secretary 
for his uncle, a paramount chief of Akim Abuakwa. In 1913, Ofori Atta inherited the 
chieftaincy after the death of his uncle. Three years later he was selected to the provincial 
council. In 1925, Guggisberg selected him to the colony’s legislative council, a position 
he held until his death in 1943.57 While there, he worked to forge cooperation between 
native council members in finding ways to influence the colony’s political process. In 
1934, when two ordinances were introduced concerning water supply and the persecution 
of seditious acts, Ofori Atta and the rest of the native council members objected to the 
ordinances due to their ill effect on local peoples.58 Despite the united protest of the 
native council members, both bills passed at the same session by the usual vote of 20 to 9. 
The twenty members who voted in favor were European members; the nine voting against
56 Guggisberg, The Gold Coast: A Review o f  the Events.
57 Martin Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council (London: Faber and Faber, 1947).
58 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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the bill were indigenous members. The outcome of the votes made the indigenous council 
members feel helpless before the European majority members.59
Ofori Atta saw the problem as a lack of influence on the legislative council by the 
indigenous and felt something had to be done. Rallying his colleagues together, he 
presented a case of unfair representation in the council to the colonial office in London.
He accomplished that by urging his native colleagues to broaden their grievances in the 
council to include their dislike for the constitutional set up and demand more political 
power. In July 1934, he led a delegation and presented the case to the colonial secretary in 
London. In the petition, Ofori Atta demanded the elimination of the official majority on 
the legislative council, for a permanent native representation on the governor’s executive 
council, and for the eligibility of non-chiefs as provincial members of the legislative 
council.60 Though the petition was rejected, Ofori Atta continued his call for political 
change. Other political challenges involved getting the government to increase the 
number of local people in the colonial civil service. This was an issue advanced by 
Guggisberg but which was halted after his departure.
To expedite native training for future self-government, Guggisberg had initiated a 
gradual inclusion of natives in positions usually reserved for Europeans. However, after 
Guggisberg’s departure the program was halted, and, by 1938, the number of natives in 
advance government positions was only 41 as compared to the 151 that had been
59 Ibid.
60 Gold Coast Government, Legislative Council Debate: Papers Relating to the Petition o f  the 
Delegate from  the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti-Session No. 11 (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 
1934).
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projected by the Guggisberg administration.61 It was Ofori Atta’s belief that the 
stagnation of native recruitment for advance positions was a deliberate attempt by 
Guggisberg’s successors to slow the process of future self-rule. To resolve that problem, 
Ofori Atta, once again, campaigned for the support of his colleagues. In 1938, he 
proposed the acceleration program for native inclusion in high positions of government. 
Because o f his persistence, the government developed a new policy for the civil service in 
1939, which included an intermediate grade for native officers. When native officers 
proved competent, they were sent to England for direct preparation and advancement in 
the government’s civil service.62 While Ofori Atta’s political achievements were dismal, 
his contributions in the area of economics were greater. One o f the economic acts that 
won Ofori Atta respect was a boycott that he led against European cocoa buyers. The 
protest was used to protect the economic welfare of cocoa producers.63 The reasoning 
behind Ofori Atta’s involvement was clear and simple. By the ch iefs rationale, anything 
that impinged on the marketing of cocoa had a direct economic impact on his people, 
including himself, since he was also a farmer.64
Ofori Atta’s action to lead the boycott was prompted by an agreement reached 
between cocoa buying companies. In 1936, the price of cocoa was set at forty-four British 
pounds sterling per ton from twenty-one pounds in the early thirties. In the following 
year, the European cocoa buying companies in the Gold Coast made a secret agreement to
61 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 66.
64 Dennis Austin, Joseph B. Danquah, and W. R. B. Akokoaso, A Survey o f  a Gold Coast 
Village (London: Oxford University Press, 1943).
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control the price in an attempt to prevent price competition between themselves.65 That 
act by the cocoa buyers was the root cause for Ofori Atta’s action to lead the cocoa 
boycott. He saw the buyers’ act as an attempt at price collusion that would have robbed 
millions o f dollars from the cocoa producers. In order to prevent this from happening, 
Ofori Atta rallied almost all traditional chiefs in cocoa growing areas and the farmers 
union to take action together. The chiefs decided that the best remedy was to stop selling 
their cocoa to the buying companies. To make sure the boycott became successful, Ofori 
Atta held consultative meetings with cocoa producing fanners of the colony on the 
subject o f halting cocoa sales to European buyers.
In October 1937, as the main cocoa season began, the farmers united under the 
guidance of their chiefs, and the farmers unions and stopped selling their cocoa to the 
European buyers. Not only did they refuse to sell their cocoa, they also boycotted the 
retail stores of the companies connected with the cocoa buying companies.66 The boycott 
continued until a representative from London, William Nowell, arrived in the Gold Coast 
to negotiate a deal between the parties. In April 1938, a deal was struck in favor of the 
producers. A later report issued by the Nowell Commission strongly condemned the 
buyers attempt to control cocoa prices.67 With his strong leadership commitment, Ofori 
Atta was able to protect the economic interests of the Gold Coast cocoa producers.
65 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
66 Joseph B. Danquah, Liberty o f  the Subject: Gold Coast Cocoa Hold Up and Boycott o f  Foreign 
Goods 1937-38 (Kibi: Gold Coast Press, 1942).
67 Ibid.
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As the evidence in this case study portrays so far, the colonial development legacy 
was more positive in some areas than in others. In the economic arena, leaders were able 
to transform the precolonial economy of slavery and spices trade to a more desirable 
commodity based on cocoa production, an economic transformation that helped raised the 
welfare of the people along with a greater moral and humanitarian touch. They also laid 
an economic infrastructure and introduced some social services including education and 
medical provisions for human development. However, while colonial leaders had been 
partially successful in the economic arena, their achievements in the political sector were 
minimal.
As Ofori Atta’s delegation to London demonstrated with its petition, native 
participation in decision-making was non-existent. The colonial rule was autocratic, and 
even when the legislative council was introduced in 1925, its membership excluded 
representatives from both the Ashanti and the Northern territories.68 That action meant 
that both the Ashanti and the Northern territories had no representation and were only 
dictated to by their chief commissioner who was stationed in Kumasi.69 From those 
political lenses, it can be asserted that Ofori Atta’s leadership was only regional as 
opposed to national. He condoned the colonial autocratic divide-and-rule system and 
failed to fight for the inclusion of the other regions in the legislative council. In essence, 
he became a comprador for British rule and failed to provide the leadership needed for 
unifying the colony towards social transformation and development.
68 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
69 Sir Francis Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty: Ashanti (London: Cass, 1968).
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Despite their political shortcomings, the evidence suggests that these colonial 
leaders left a mixed legacy. The legacy had a positive economic development on one hand 
and a negative political development on the other, yet without corruption and political 
violence. That was the legacy mantel left to be picked up by subsequent leaders in the 
postcolonial era. Whether or not that torch was progressively carried after independence 
was achieved will be treated later. However, before discussing the postcolonial leaders 
and their activities towards socio-economic development, attention is first given to an 
examination of how self-rule was achieved in the Gold Coast.
Gold Coast’s Road to Nationalist Self-rule and the 1948 Riots
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, an increasing number of educated 
commoners and their chiefs had crystallized into an opposition force against colonial 
rule.70 However, a broad nationalist movement did not emerge until the 1948 riots in 
Accra.71 Nevertheless, the immediate preceding years had witnessed political and 
economic welfare changes. Prior to the 1948 riots, the dissatisfaction of the Bums 
constitution prompted a few educated elites and some businessmen to form the United 
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947. The UGCC’s main objective was to attain self- 
rule for the colony at the earliest opportune time.72 The party recruited Kwame Nkrumah, 
who at the time was studying in London, to become its general secretary. Those changes 
amounted to nothing until the 1948 riots in Accra.
70 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
71 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
72 Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (NY: NY University Press, 1957).
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The 1948 riots were triggered when a group of ex-service men marching to the 
governor’s residence to present their grievances were fired upon by government police. 
Two ex-service men were killed and Five people wounded. The disturbances continued 
for two days and quickly spread to other cities and towns. Six UGCC leaders were 
arrested and blamed for inciting the riots. The six men, included Kwame Nkrumah and 
Dr. J. B. Danquah, became popular heroes and were widely acclaimed as the “Big Six.”73 
A commission was appointed to investigate the cause of the riot. It determined that the 
frustration over the lack of social mobility and limited opportunities in government 
angered the educated classes.74 As a solution, the report recommended constitutional 
reform and suggested the formation of a native government. The publication of the study 
and its recommendations became known as the Watson Report.75
The Constitutional Talks and the Birth of the Convention Peoples Party
In January 1949, the government invited thirty-eight people, including chiefs, 
educated leaders, and some members of the UGCC, except Nkrumah, to discuss a new 
constitution. The commission’s final report recommended the adaptation of a British type 
of representative government for the Gold Coast without specifying a role for traditional 
leaders.76 The report received high praise and became the building block of the 1951 Gold 
Coast Constitution. However, many people, including some educated elites whom the
73 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
74 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
75 Ibid.
76 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
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report had favored, did not accept the constitution. The main flaw of the constitution,
according to its opponent, was that it gave little power to local people and their leaders.
As expected, by his exclusion from the constitutional talk, Nkrumah and his
growing supporters rejected the new constitution. The Accra Evening News, Nkrumah’s
newspaper, characterized the group’s position in regards to the constitution as follows:
As for us, we have already declared our stand with regards to the new 
Constitution that only full Dominion Status...will satisfy us and by this 
demand we shall stand and face all storms however strong they are.
Ghana must be free and free N O W .77
The above position brought Nkrumah into conflict with the UGCC leaders who 
supported the constitution. The executive committee of the UGCC leadership felt 
Nkrumah had betrayed the trust they had given him in his appointment as secretary of the 
organization. This difference created a divide between Nkrumah and the UGCC leaders. 
Therefore, Nkrumah together with his followers, which included K. A. Gbedemah and 
Kojo Botsio, came to the conclusion that a separate political party was necessary. This 
decision marked the beginning of a new type of nationalist movement in the Gold Coast, 
one that appealed to the politically awakened masses, the Convention Peoples Party. On 
June 12, 1949, Nkrumah and his followers founded the CPP. Nkrumah was careful to 
explain to the rank- and- file o f the UGCC that it was their leadership that the CPP 
opposed. The purpose of the opposition, he made clear, was that the UGCC leaders were 
fighting for “full self-government within the shortest possible time.”78 On the other hand,
77 Quoted from Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence, 172.
78 Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f  Kwame Nkrumah.
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the CPP was interested in gaining “self-government NOW.”79 After the formation of the 
CPP, Nkrumah’s opposition to the constitution remained strong. He attacked it as a 
‘Trojan gift horse” and as “ bogus and fraudulent”, speaking instead of the need for 
“positive action.”80
In spite of the government’s warning that political strikes were illegal, the CPP 
declared a nation-wide strike and boycott effective at midnight, January 8, 1950. On 
January 20th, Nkrumah and his organizers were arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison. 
While Nkrumah was serving his term in prison, elections for the 1951 constitution were 
held on February 10, 1951.81 Extensive campaigning by the two parties dominated the 
months preceding the elections. Leaders of the CPP, who had finished their prison 
sentences, campaigned vigorously throughout the country. Nkrumah, who had stood for a 
seat in the elections in one district in Accra, campaigned from prison with taped speeches 
to the public. When the election ballots were counted, the CPP won a decisive victory. 
Nkrumah won a seat from prison, and Sir Charles Arden Clarke released him on January 
12, 1951, to form a government, in which, he was given the position of government 
leader of business.82
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid. ; Nkrumah’s definition of positive action was “ the adoption of all legitimate and 
constitutional means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in the country. The weapons were 
legitimate political agitation, newspapers and boycotts, and non-cooperation based on the principal of 
absolute no-violence as used by Gandhi” in Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f Kwame Nkrumah, 111-112.
81 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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DEVELOPMENT UNDER KWAME NKRUMAH’S LEADERSHIP
The years following the formation of the Nkrumah’s colonial government were 
marked by some degree of economic development. The prosperity was due to the 
accumulated surplus during the war and the high prices of cocoa in the world market. As 
Table 5-1 demonstrates, when the first native government was formed, the Gold Coast 
had 137.2m British pounds in reserves.
Table 5-1
Gold Coast (Later, Ghana) Reserves 1950-57









Source: Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer; Ghana: End o f  an Illusion, NY: Monthly 
Review Press, 1968,45.
Despite the reserves balance from 1951 until independence in 1957, Ghana was 
underdeveloped. The economy was narrow in its dependence on only cocoa and limited 
mineral exports. Even though Guggisberg had made important advances in economic 
infrastructure, basic public services of all kinds needed to be expanded. In this regard, 
Nkrumah continued the development strategy initiated by previous governments,
82 Ibid.
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providing agricultural services, improving road systems, and extending power and water 
supplies to several parts of the country.83
In the social services, Nkrumah also extended services to both Ashanti and 
Northern regions where those services were lacking, introducing free universal basic 
education and healthcare. On some economic fronts, Nkrumah and his ministers showed 
great maturity and prudence, while on others they were less successful due to the 
emergence of corruption in the administration.84 The handling of large sums of money in 
the interest of the nation opened the door of temptation to many ministers in Nkrumah’s 
colonial cabinet. Corruption and misuse of national funds became rampant, leading to 
inquiries on some ministers and resignations by others.85 Corruption also permeated the 
CPP and its affiliated organs including the Cocoa Marketing Board.86
Nkrumah’s Political Challenge: Partial Reason for Political Instability
The first political challenge that faced Nkrumah dealt with the local government 
administration. Prior to his ascendancy to power, Nkrumah was against the new 
constitution because it gave little power to local leaders. He had described it as a Trojan 
horse. After wining the elections, he decided to make good use of the constitution during
83 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
84 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
85 Gold Coast Government, Report o f  the Commission o f  Enquiry in Mr. J. A. Braimah 's 
Resignation and Allegations (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1954).
86 Gold Coast Government, Report o f  Commission o f  Enquiry in the Affairs o f  the Cocoa 
Purchasing Co. Ltd "The Jibowu Report," (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1956)
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the period until a new instrument of governance could be obtained.87 The problem that 
faced Nkrumah was that he had to implement a constitutional ordinance for local 
government that shifted power at the local level from the traditional leaders to political 
party officials in the form of a representative local council.88 To the chiefs, the instrument 
was deemed as undemocratic because the nature of the ordinance assigned them to the 
political sidelines and transferred their traditional powers to local council members 
leaving them with no role to play. In addition, the chiefs argued that the constitution gave 
political officials, who happened to be in the CPP, domination over local as well as
og
national politics. Most important to the chiefs was the shift in power. The change meant 
a loss of influence and revenue, and indeed, of their very position as leaders of the people. 
Nkrumah recognized the problem himself, and it had influenced his decision, prior to his 
wining the election, to oppose the constitution.90
A solution to the problem could have been to amend the constitution to include 
the traditional leaders in power sharing, as Nkrumah might have thought about himself.91 
An opportunity arose for Nkrumah to do that when the secretary of the colonial office 
asked him to seek the opinions of chiefs and other political groups to a possible 
constitutional change towards self-rule. In response to Nkrumah, many groups suggested
87 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
88 Gold Coast Government, Local Government Reforms in Outline: Government Ordinance o f  
1951, No. 29 (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1951).
89 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
90 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
91 This thought might have occurred to Nkrumah when he decided to use the 1951 constitution 
until such a time that a new constitution could be approved. See Bourret, Ghana: The Road to 
Independence.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
209
that a second chamber in the house be included in the constitution to accommodate the 
chiefs. This institutional accommodation, the proponents argued, was important because 
it would honor and safeguard the chiefs and their traditional roles. In addition, the 
proponents believed that an upper house for the chiefs would have enabled them to add 
their experience to the immature policies of the newly emergent parties.92 In essence, the 
inclusion of the chiefs would have resolved the constitutional flaw of excluding them 
from the national rule and could have acted as an alliance formation tool between the old 
guard and the new political officials. To the dismay of many groups, Nkrumah rejected 
the suggestions regarding the inclusion of the upper house that could have included the 
traditional leaders in the national democratic building process.93 In essence, Nkrumah’s 
government failed to make any provisions for the traditional leaders to participate in the 
power sharing.
The above narration of the local government problem and Nkrumah’s refusal to 
include the traditional leaders demonstrated that once Nkrumah gained power, he became 
increasingly authoritarian. He refused to allow participatory democracy that could have 
enabled stability to thrive, and his decision to do so meant he failed to provide the 
democratic leadership needed for economic development. In response to the above 
circumstances, the chiefs and their allies raised a staunch opposition to Nkrumah and his 
party. The opposition caused, in many areas of the Gold Coast, violence in party
92 Apter, The G old Coast in Transition.
93 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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politics.94 In retrospect, Nkrumah’s refusal to allow traditional leaders to participate in the 
political process was seen by the chiefs as dictatorial on Nkrumah’s part. That belief, in 
turn, set the tone for non-cooperation on the part of the chiefs and led to the 
crystallization of political instabilities in undermining economic development in Ghana.9s
As an outgrowth of the political opposition to Nkrumah, a new political party, 
the National Liberation Movement (NLM), was formed in 1954 in the Ashanti region 
with the support from the Asante King and his traditional chiefs.96 The party demanded a 
federal form of government that Nkrumah rejected. Thereafter, the NLM adopted a new 
strategy against the CPP and its request for self-rule.97 It allied with the Northern Peoples 
Party (NPP) and, together, the parties sent a joint delegation with a resolution to Britain 
that their territories wanted to secede from the Gold Coast. The succession bid became 
not only a political nightmare but also a dilemma for Nkrumah because the Gold Coast 
self-rule was based on the conditions that all the territories would remain together.98 By 
its implication, any disagreement among the regions had the potential to jeopardize the 
self-rule that Nkrumah was seeking. In fact, by the delegation’s request at the time, the 
independence of the colony was in doubt. Fortunately, the situation was saved by Lennox
94 A. Hannigan, “Local Government in the Gold Coast," Journal o f  African Administration, Vol. 
12 (July 1955): 73-86.
95 Ibid.
96 Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f  Kwame Nkrumah.
97 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
98 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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Boyd, the secretary of state for the colonies, who visited the Gold Coast to broker a deal 
between the three parties and amended the constitution.99
Many chiefs were embittered when they sensed that the country was falling under 
the control of the CPP. The Ashanti chiefs were not the only group that distrusted 
Nkrumah and his CPP. Antagonism developed in various regions based on the conflict 
between sectional and national interest. In the Northern Territories, for instance, sectional 
feelings also ran high. The conservative chiefs in the region looked askance at the 
possibility of Southern control. The ambivalence made them cling to treaties of 
friendships, trade, and protection that their former chiefs had signed with the British.100 In 
fact, Northerners acceptance to join the Gold Coast in its transition to the nation of Ghana 
was based on the condition that the British would ensure that their regional rights were 
protected in the constitution of Ghana.101 The roots of the ambivalence emanated from 
their witness of Nkrumah’s intolerance to weave a natural cohesiveness essential for 
political and economic developments in advancing the welfare of the people. Even though 
Nkrumah repeatedly emphasized in his public statements the importance of fostering a 
spirit of national consciousness in nation-building in Ghana,102 the irony was that under 
his leadership the government never heeded that advice.
The evidence presented suggests that the years between 1951 and 1957, when 
Nkrumah took over the colonial government, can be characterized as a “double edge
99 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition
100 R. S. Rattray, Tribes o f  the Ashanti Hinterland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932).
101 London Times, September 18, 1956.
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sword” in terms of development. On the economic front, there were some positive 
developments, however the emergence of the corrupt culture undermined overall 
economic achievements. On the political front, however, development was mediocre at 
best. Nkrumah’s refusal to include traditional leaders halted any possible democratic 
process in the country and accelerated the drifting apart between the leaders and their 
people. In short, Nkrumah failed to lay the political cultural foundation upon which 
economic development could thrive. At independence, Ghana had a fractured and divided 
political structure with embedded animosity among various groups. The question that 
faced Ghana at independence was whether Nkrumah could tum the country around, reach 
out to the traditional leaders, and form a national union that could have laid a culture of 
political stability needed for economic development.
Postcolonial Leadership in Ghana
On March 6th, 1957, Ghana gained independence and became the first sub- 
Saharan African nation to throw off the imperial yoke. At the time, it had adequate 
foreign exchange reserves in excess of $300 million.103 The education system had 
improved to include university level learning, and there were 4,882 primary schools with 
an enrollment of 468,000 students.104 The health service was one of the best in sub- 
Saharan Africa with thirty government hospitals equipped with approximately 2,630
103 Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana."
104 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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hospital beds.105 The country also was self-sufficient in food supply and food imports 
were negligible. In addition, the per capita income was about $242.106
Presently, the trends have changed for the worst because Ghana’s economy has 
deteriorated.107 On the national balance sheet, Ghana continues to have negative foreign 
exchange reserves (see Table 5-2). In 1975, Ghana’s reserves were in the red at negative 
$108 million. Twenty years later, in 1994, this figure improved only slightly to negative 
$93 million. As Table 5-2 shows, the national debt rose from $721 million in 1975 to $ 
5.8 billion in 1995, including a rapid increase in debt service. This poor financial position 
indicates that since 1975, the national economy has deteriorated constantly affecting all 
essential developmental social factors including health and education.
Table 5-2
Ghana’s National Debt and Debt Service 1975-95 (Millions US$)
1975 1985 1994 1995
National Total Debt 721 2,257 5,463 5,874
Total Debt Service 57 159 367 370
Change in Net Reserves -108 48 -93 -
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Between 1994 and 1998, the share of public education expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP remained roughly 3.6%.108 With the cost of inflation adjustment, the 
overall education expenditure declined by 4 % annually.109 Within the same time as,
Table 5-3 shows, the share of education expenditure allocated to universities in the 
country declined 8.3% while enrollment doubled.110 What is even more alarming is the 
stagnation in enrollment of the country’s basic education system. Based on data from the 
Ministry of Education, the enrollment in senior secondary schools declined from 236,000 
in 1994 to 188,000 in 1998. In the junior secondary, the enrollment inched up from 
693,000 in 1994 to 695,000 in 1998. In percentage terms the change was nominal with 
only an increase o f 0.1 %. Primary school enrollment also rose slightly from 1,960 in 
1994 to 2,027 in 1998, seeing an increase of 0.8%.
Together these figures indicate that between 1994 and 1998 there was less than 
one percent annual growth in basic education. Given a population growth of 3 % these 
figures imply a decline in basic education enrollment.111 There also has been deterioration 
in the healthcare industry. For example in 1970, there were 9 physicians to every 100,000 
patients in Ghana. Today, there are 4 physicians to the same number of patients.112 The 
situation on the political front does not look brighter either, especially considering the
108 Sudharshan, C ., and Xiao Ye. Public Health and Education Spending in Ghana 1992-1998 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).
109 Perran Penrose, Budgeting and Expenditure in Education Sector in 1995 (Accra: Ghana 
Ministry o f Education, 1998).
110 Sudharshan and Ye, Public Health and Education Spending.
111 United Nations, Committee on the Rights o f the Child: Initial Report o f  Ghana (N Y : United 
Nations, 1995).
112 Sudharshan and Ye, Public Health and Education Spending.
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fact that five coups have led to five different administrations.11,5 Ghana has suffered 
political violence and human rights abuses.
Table 5-3
Education Enrollment in Ghana 1990-98 (in thousands)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1998
Primary Enrollment 1,803 1,807 1,848 1,903 1,960 2,027
Junior Sec. Enrollment 569 592 629 660 693 695
Senior Sec. Enrollment 168 199 225 247 236 188
University Enrollment — — 11 12 13 26
Source: C. Sudharshan and Xiao Ye, Public Health and Education Spending in 
Ghana in 1992-1998. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999.
The above conditions suggest that Ghana has not only remained undeveloped but 
it has also receded economically and politically. According to orthodox explanations, 
Ghana’s problems, like the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, are caused by exogenous factors 
such as globalization and the impact of multinational institutions.114 There is no doubt 
that those factors play a role in Ghana’s economic affairs, but they alone are insufficient 
to explain the country’s economic underdevelopment since there exist examples of 
nations, such as Mauritius and Botswana, with similar exogenous environments that have 
not fallen into such deplorable economic conditions.115 In contrast to this view, others
113 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f  Stability.
114 George B. N. Ayittey, “How the Multinational Institutions Compounded Africa’s Economic 
Crisis,” Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Summer 1999): 585-600; Rodney, How 
Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
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believe that Ghana’s economic problems are largely its own doing. This group of pundits 
relates the current negative economic state of affairs in Ghana to bad policies, abuse of 
power, and corruption.116 It is this school of thought to which this research subscribes. 
This study, explicitly argues that Ghana’s developmental problems are due to a lack of 
leadership to establish a culture conducive to development.
Nkrumah’s Leadership in Postcolonial Ghana
As noted above, Kwame Nkrumah was not new to Ghanaian politics at the time of 
independence. Nkrumah was bom in 1909 at Nkroful in the Nzima area of Ghana. During 
the depression years, he lived and studied in the United States. After ten years in the 
United States, he went to England to study and also helped organized Pan -Africanist 
movement. In 1947, he returned to the Gold Coast as the Secretary General of UGCC. 
Nkrumah left the UGCC in 1949 and formed his own political party, the CPP in 1949. He 
was the first native during the colonial rule to become a national leader of government 
business from 1951 to 1957.117 He led Ghana to its independence and became its prime 
minister and, later, the nation’s first president.
Prior to independence Nkrumah had a firm belief that national unity and stability 
were essential for development.118 The issue became more compelling because political 
quibbles between the various leadership groups immediately before independence had 
divided the political groups to the point where the need to unify the nation for stability
116 Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press. 1992).
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towards development became imperative. The main duty, therefore, facing Nkrumah was 
to patch the loose factions of the nation into a strong state. Prior to independence, 
different political groups had submitted a petition to Nkrumah to amend the constitution 
to include traditional leaders. Nkrumah, however, rejected that provision. The opposition 
then resorted to political violence because they felt that the democratic means of 
participating in political ruling was no longer a viable option. The opposition made a 
couple of attempts to disrupt Nkrumah’s government. First, it tried to overthrow the 
government and, later tried to kill Nkrumah.119 The above events, coupled with 
Nkrumah's inclinations to exclude other political groups from sharing power, led him to 
the conclusion that political “pluralism” was both inapplicable and dangerous in the 
context of Ghana’s young independence.120 This decision caused Nkrumah to orchestrate 
two political strategies, both aimed at achieving stability through authoritarian 
dictatorship.
With the intent to secure national stability for development, Nkrumah used the 
legislative process to adopt the Preventive Detection Act in July 1958.121 This act allowed 
his government to arrest individuals suspicious of engaging in treason or subversive 
activities, without sanction by judicial bodies, to be jailed for five days. Once arrested, if 
the case was considered to be a threat against the state, then the person was tried in court; 
otherwise, the individual was released. Nkrumah used such intimidation tactics to crack
118 Arhin, “ In Search for Constitutional Chieftaincy.”
119 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
120 Peter Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy o f  an African Dictatorship (London: Hurst and 
Company, 1970).
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down on democratic expression and established an authoritarian culture as a means of 
maintaining stability and control.122
To enhance this authoritarian form of rule, Nkrumah sought for and received a 
new constitution that bestowed upon Ghana the status of republican sovereignty. The 
constitution allowed him to dissolve the provincial assemblies and transferred full 
legislative and executive powers to the national assembly. The constitution also 
weakened the regional powers and created a presidential position with broad powers 
including cabinet appointments, making changes in governmental bodies, and also 
making the president the commander in chief of the army. After the constitutional 
changes, Nkrumah called for a national referendum in the process o f selecting a president. 
He asked the people to choose between him and the opposition leader for the presidency. 
The referendum approved Nkrumah as the president by 89%.123
On July 1st, 1960, Ghana became a republic, and Nkrumah became the president. 
Those political developments initiated by Nkrumah helped him to erase all that remained 
of Ghana’s democratic features. In other words, the above actions by Nkrumah 
immediately after independence transformed Ghana’s political system from the semi- 
democratic system that had previously existed to a complete dictatorial system. The 
traditional domestic political institutions and their leaders were completely 
disenfranchised from the official national political process. Until the morning of the 
February 24,1966 coup that toppled the CPP government, Nkrumah had removed any
122 L. Rubin and P Murray, The Constitution and Government o f  Ghana (London: Cass. 1961).
123 Ibid.
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hint of a real democratic process from the political system and had turned the electoral 
process into a political ploy.124
A second major political development was the transformation of party politics in 
Ghana from that of a multi-party system to a one-party system. To do this, Nkrumah 
argued that Ghanaians needed to be conscious of their “Africaness.” He denounced the 
multi-party democratic system as a Western concept that had no kinship with African 
political culture and, as such, was incompatible for Ghanaian politics. In place of the 
multi-party system, Nkrumah urged Ghanaians to adopt the one-party system, in this case,
Ihis CPP. The irony, however, is that, on the one hand, Nkrumah was disenfranchising 
the traditional leaders, while, on the other, he was telling them to be conscious of their 
Africaness in terms of political culture. By 1964, the one-party system was inaugurated 
in disregard of the feelings of Nkrumah’s political opponents and Ghanaians in 
general.'26
When Nkrumah made Ghana a one-party state, the CPP became the only political 
institution through which citizens could participate in national politics. Therefore, many 
Ghanaians who did not identify themselves with the CPP were excluded from the national 
political process.127 By adopting the one-party system, Nkrumah also found a political 
means to prevent his leadership from being accountable to the populace. In this context,
124 T. Jones, Ghana ’s First Republic 1960-1966 (London: Methuen, 1976).
125 George P. Hagan. “Nkrumah’s Leadership Style: An Assessment From a Cultural Perspective," 
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Nkrumah’s political transformation represented a transfer from the political dictatorship 
of the aristocracy of precolonial days to that of a contemporary dictatorial presidency. In 
that regards, there was no political achievement as far as progressive democratic 
development is concerned. There is no doubt that Nkrumah mobilized people in Ghana 
and made them strike for freedom;128 however, his later actions purged civil liberties and 
rights from Ghana’s political process and thereby halted Ghana’s democratic evolution 
for many years.
POSTCOLONIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER NKRUMAH
Despite Ghana’s good financial position at the time of independence, the national 
economy was underdeveloped. The productive sector was backward with a lopsided 
structure. Ghana’s main exportable commodity was cocoa beans, and most of its 
industrial consumption commodities were imported. Taking that national position as a 
point of departure, Nkrumah embarked on a new economic policy in which he sought to 
do two things. His first goal was to diversify the agricultural sector, and the second 
objective was to embark on industrialization.129 Knowing very well that Ghana’s 
development cannot be financed by the price volatilities of cocoa, Nkrumah solicited 
development assistance.130
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Nkrumah’s Solicitation of Financial Assistance
Nkrumah had sought financial and technical assistance for Ghana’s development 
long before independence. In 1951, during his visit to the United States as the leader of 
government business, he spoke of the need of technicians, machinery, and capital to 
develop Ghana’s natural resources. He visited the United Nations in New York and 
signed an agreement with the UN Secretary General to obtain technical aid from the 
organization. The agreement allowed Ghana to receive multilateral aid from the 
International Labor Organization, World Food and Agricultural Organization, World 
Health Organization, and United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization.131
On the bilateral level, Nkrumah campaigned for aid from both East and West. In 
the West, Nkrumah sought aid from Europe and North American countries. In 1958, he 
visited Canada and the United States. While in America, he was received by both 
President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon. Nkrumah used these occasions to appeal 
for technical and financial aid. Canada responded generously to Ghana’s request for aid 
from that time onward, donating millions of dollars in aid. Nkrumah used the Canadian 
financial and technical aid to drill water wells in the Northern Territories of Ghana. 
Assistance from the United States went towards the construction of a hydroelectric dam, 
the centerpiece of Nkrumah’s development project.132
130 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
2 2 2
Nkrumah’s Economic Approaches
For the first couple of years of independence, Nkrumah adopted economic policies 
based on liberal economic approaches laid down by Arthur Lewis. The policies adhered 
to outright privatization without government intervention.lj3 However, since Ghana’s 
private sector was limited, the nation had to rely on foreign private capital investment as 
an instrument of economic development. But, despite Nkrumah’s incentives and 
guarantees to foreign investors, there was a lack of private capital inflows that could 
stimulate the economy. Ghana started to experience a large foreign trade deficit and sharp 
decreases in currency reserves contrary to the gains that were supposed to have come 
from economic liberalism.134 In the beginning of the 1960s, Nkrumah came to the 
conclusion that development based on economic liberal concepts was inoperable and thus 
adopted a socialist model. He made an official visit to the Soviet Union and subsequently 
adopted a communist central planning system.135
Nkrumah’s plan was to mobilize available resources to implement 
industrialization. In the agriculture industry, he embarked on a gradual withdrawal from 
the monoculture specialization. Instead of relying on only cocoa as the export product, 
Nkrumah planned to increase the production of maize, millet, yams, plantains, and meat 
for domestic consumption and export. To accomplish that objective, Nkrumah established 
state farms and created Worker’s Brigades for the countryside. The Worker’s Brigades 
became one of the main avenues for job creation for young people. By the mid-1960s, the
133 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
134 Ibid.
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program had created about 35,000 jobs and substantially reduced unemployment in the 
cities.136
In the industrial sector, Nkrumah embarked on several projects throughout the 
country. One of the largest projects was the completion of the hydroelectric dam.
Nkrumah saw the project as essential because it was to be the source of energy to run all 
the industries in the country and also provide energy for residential use. In addition to the 
hydroelectric dam, industrial development projects included the construction of an oil 
refinery, prefab house-building factories, chocolate factories, meat processing factories, 
several canneries, and textile factories.137 Nkrumah’s development projects included 
social services with a special emphasis on health services and education. As a leader of 
government business, he had introduced free education. Ten years later, after 
independence, he offered free and compulsory primary education for all school age 
children in Ghana. Nkrumah was, and still remains, the only Ghanaian leader to link 
scientific education to economic growth in a development approach. In health service, he 
created universal healthcare for Ghanaians/38 While Nkrumah achieved success in social 
services and industrial sectors of the economy, his strategy for national development fell 
short in establishing a proper institutional culture to support his development projects.
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The Cocoa Marketing Board
One of the institutions that was, and still is, central to Ghana's development is the 
Cocoa Marketing Board. The CMB coordinates the sales and marketing of Ghana’s most 
exportable product, cocoa. It was established in 1948 with the purpose of buying cocoa at 
a lower producer price and selling it at a higher price on the world market. The objective 
was to use the difference as a reserve fund to insulate cocoa producers from world price 
volatility when needed.139 When Nkrumah took over the CMB from the colonial 
government, he did not design effective policies to shield it from particularistic 
interventions by CPP members, so as to enable the institution to protect the collective 
interest of Ghana’s development. The CMB had no auditing and monitoring system in 
place to ensure proper legitimate use of public funds or prevent corruption. The loose 
institutional cultural atmosphere allowed it to be used by its officials as carte blanche in 
corrupt activities without accountability.140
As with other African public institutions, the CMB became less useful to the 
cocoa producers it was suppose to serve.141 Instead it served political elites, who freely 
extracted resources from producers by plundering the CMB. During Nkrumah’s 
leadership, much of the money generated from the CMB ended up in the hands of 
dubious elements of the CPP.142 Even though Nkrumah had “spoken and warned that
139 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
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bribery and corruption were evil and needed to be stamped out,” 143 he failed to take direct 
measures to establish non-tolerance policies against corruption, thus allowing his officials 
of the CMB to engage in corrupt deeds that harmed the collective national well-being. In 
essence, Nkrumah’s failure to make the institution autonomous from political interests 
hampered the role the CMB was designed to play in Ghana’s economic development. By 
the time Nkrumah’s government was toppled on February 24, 1966, the CMB had 
become the source of patronage for CPP followers.
On February 24, 1966, Nkrumah was in China when a military junta led by 
Lieutenant General E. K. Kotoka and Colonel A. A. Afrifa toppled his regime. For a 
certain period thereafter, Ghanaian leaderships vacillated between military officers, who 
seized power through coups, and civilians who acquired power through elections. That 
routine of leaderships became the pattern in Ghana’s political economy until Lieutenant 
Jerry Rawlings staged his December 31, 1981, coup and stayed in power for the following 
20 years. That period from 1966-1981, which I consider as the interlude era, warrants a 
special analysis.
Before examining the interlude leaderships, however, it is important to note that 
by the time Nkrumah was overthrown, he had begun to lay an industrial base for Ghana’s 
material development and had complimented that with basic education and health 
services. Unfortunately, he had also established a political culture that was 
uncomplimentary to economic development because it neglected democratic practices 
that are essential for development. Nkrumah also nurtured a corrupt culture by not 
confronting the corruption of party officials. In regards to institutional building, he failed
143 Ibid. 63
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to build checks-and-balances into the CMB when it came under his administration. The 
lack of effective institutional policies allowed the institution to be used for individual 
interests as opposed to economic development. However it has to be noted also that on 
some economic fronts, Nkrumah achieved progress while on others his success was 
limited due to external factors that were beyond his control. Nkrumah’s ascendancy to 
power came during the early stages of cold war politics with two competing development 
political ideologies between the West and the East. This created a hostile external 
environment for all the newly independent African nations and their leaders. In attempt to 
avoid the cold war conflict, Nkrumah subscribed to a neutralist ideology and made Ghana 
a member of the non-aligned movement.144 However, the non-aligned strategy did not 
free Nkrumah from external influences.
Economically when Nkrumah came to power, he had expected to industrialize 
Ghana with Western aid and investment. However many western donor countries 
curtailed development aid to Ghana. Moreover, the private investments that Nkrumah had 
hoped for from the west to stimulate Ghana’s development did not materialize. Western 
governments, including Great Britain who had temporary broken diplomatic relations 
with Nkrumah’s administration, used their positions in world financial institutions to 
prevent Ghana from securing international development loans.145 Consequently, 
economic growth in Ghana began to decline. In response to western countries’ action, 
Nkrumah changed his economic strategy from a capitalist market system to a socialist
144 W. Scott Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1969).
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economic system and strengthened relations with the Soviet Union. Nkrumah’s action 
prompted western countries to categorize him as a communist ally, which led to greater 
economic isolation from the west.
External forces also offered support to Nkrumah’s political opponents to 
destabilize his government and its policies. In 1962, Ghana’s opposition party with the 
assistance of foreign collaborators made an assassination attempt on Nkrumah’s in the 
town of Kulungugu as they sought to overthrow his government.146 These external 
conditions had collective adverse impact on Nkrumah’s development efforts and 
objectives. To some extent, these external influences did undermine the country’s social 
and economic progress during the Nkrumah years continue to impact contemporary sub- 
Sahara African leaders’ development policies.
THE INTERLUDE LEADERSHIP ERA IN GHANA
As mentioned above, Lieutenant General E. K. Kotoka and Colonel. A. A. Afrifa 
led the February 24, 1966 coup in concert with a few military and police officers. The 
group formed the National Liberation Council (NLC) as their government body, and 
chose Lieutenant General Joseph A. Ankrah as the Head of State. The NLC became the 
first group of the interlude leaderships. Politically, the NLC also became aware o f the 
importance of stability if Ghana was to economically develop. It, however, abstained 
from a democratically consociational approach. On the contrary, the leaders adopted 
repressive methods to silence potential opposition and crack down on democratic
144 Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy1957-1966.
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principles. Approximately one week after the coup, the NLC adopted a preventive 
detention strategy through a decree that allowed the military the right to imprison any 
person without charge or open trial.147 The NLC made no attempt to solve the 
antagonistic relations among the different socio-political groups that undermined political 
unity. Rather, they clung to power by adopting repressive tactics through decrees and 
Ghana remained politically polarized.
Economically, Ankrah and his military colleagues made no efforts to transform 
the economy or to improve productivity as Nkrumah had attempted to achieve. Instead, 
the NLC cut social services, including education and health care. In the industrial sector, 
the NLC leadership abandoned all industrial development projects that Nkrumah had 
initiated. These projects included a meat processing plant, sugar factory, canneries, and a 
car manufacturing plant. In addition, they privatized 78 state-owned companies.148 After 
abandoning the projects, Ankrah and his group awarded national contracts to their 
associates in return for bribes. With that behavior, the NLC leadership legitimized and 
strengthened the already corrupt culture established in Ghana. The suspension of the 
projects exacerbated the negative economic situation and resulted in unemployment for 
the first time in Ghana.149 Abandonment of projects, increased in corruption, and the rise 
in unemployment led to negative economic growth in all sectors of the economy
147 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f  Stability.
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including agriculture. Growth in agriculture was 0.6% in 1966. In 1967, however, it 
reached 1.6%, and, declined in 1968, to 0.8 % .150
With a deteriorating economy characterized by high inflation and corruption, the 
Ghanaian society became discontent with the NLC. Political agitation and labor strikes 
increased. In view of public discontent with the economic conditions, NLC handed 
power to a civilian government in 1970. The NLC leaders who proclaimed themselves as 
liberators became the first, but not the last, to disappoint Ghanaians by failing to correct 
the economic culture for which the leaders themselves had blamed their predecessors. It 
is worth noting that, while the NLC leaders abandoned industrial projects, they held on to 
their forerunners corrupt practices.151 In retrospect, they followed a similar political 
economic culture established by Nkrumah, yet with a somewhat more damaging effect 
because they suspended social services in education and health. On August 29, 1969, an 
election was held, and the Progress Party, which was favored by the NLC, won the 
election with 58.7% of the votes.152 On March 1, 1970, Afrifa, the then Head of State 
handed power to Dr. Kofi A. Busia as the new Head of State.
The Leadership of Dr. Kofi A. Busia 1970-1972
Busia was an Oxford educator and a former opposition party leader during the 
struggle for Ghana’s independence. He went into exile in England soon after Ghana’s 
independence and remained there until Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966. When he
150 R. Pinkey. Right-Wing Military Government (Boston: Twayne, 1990): 140.
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became the premier, Ghana was still entangled in political instabilities that he had helped 
to create in the 1950s.1:53 In conjunction with the political problems, there were still the 
economic problems that had been intensified by policies of the N LC .154 The question for 
Busia was simple, would he be able to find a solution to the problems of which he 
contributed?
Politically, Busia amended Ghana’s constitution but failed to correct the 
undemocratic flaw that prohibited the traditional leaders from participating in the political 
process. Instead, he amended the constitution and fired 568 government high officials 
from different tribes, which Busia said his government could not trust.155 Busia’s action 
deepened the polarization in Ghana, making any chance of political unity and stability 
impossible. In the economic arena, he did not make any attempts to diversify or transform 
Ghana’s economy. He continued with the privatization of public industries that NLC had 
initiated. To increase productivity he put the remaining government industries on a self- 
sufficiency basis and abolished replacement funds for obsolete equipment. In other 
words, spare parts needed for public industries could not be ordered. His policies 
worsened the already dilapidated Ghanaian economy.
To resuscitate the economy, he devalued the cedi, increased taxes, raised interest 
rates, increased gasoline prices, abolished universal medical care, and finally eliminated 
free basic education for children.156 The elimination of access to medical care resulted in
153 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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a deteriorating quality of life for the poor who could not afford to get medical care on 
their own. Likewise, the elimination of free basic education stopped some children from 
poor families from receiving education. In that regard, Busia’s policies became anti­
development more so than pro-development. He made no efforts to limit the corrupt 
practices that had flourished under his predecessors. In fact, corruption escalated during 
his administration due to further economic deterioration. The impact of his austerity 
measures made the administration very unpopular. In 1972, approximately two years after 
Busia took office, Colonel Ignatius Acheampong overthrew the elected Busia 
government.157 Busia left Ghana’s political scene with nothing achieved towards 
development. The democratic deficiency, which he had correctly identified twenty years 
earlier before becoming a premier, was left unresolved.158 Economically, his monetary 
policies did not revive the negative growth trends that Ghana experienced. In human 
development, his austerity measures did more harm than good to the poor by preventing 
them from receiving medical services for themselves and education for their children.
One practice however, that Busia assisted in promoting and legitimizing was corruption.
The Leadership of Ignatius Acheampong
Acheampong’s regime under the National Redemption Council (NRC), which 
later became the Supreme Military Council (SMC), broke away from the policies of the 
previous governments. In an attempt to find a solution for Ghana’s political disunity,
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Acheampong proposed and held a national referendum between 1977 and 1978 for what 
he described as Union Government (Unigov). He suggested that Ghana abolish party 
politics and adopt a system of government where both the military and the civilian jointly 
rule the nation.159 Ghanaians viewed Acheampong’s Unigov as the same one-party system 
that Nkrumah had once tried to impose. Even though the referendum was approved, the 
opposition was so strong that the idea was aborted. Economically, Acheampong set up a 
consultative committee to evaluate the country’s economic problems. Thereafter, he 
revalued the Ghanaian currency that had suffered devaluation under Busia’s 
administration. Acheampong restored some of the public social service that previous 
administrations had halted. He launched an “Operation Feed Yourself’ program, by 
which he convinced the nation to stay away from imported foods and to grow more food 
for domestic consumption.160 Acheampong reinvigorated the national sector o f the 
economy by nationalizing some companies outright and buying 55% shares of others such 
as Ashanti Goldfields. In 1972 he made a unilateral decision to pay what he termed as 
“just” national debt and forgo what he considered an “unjust” debt. Those he deemed as 
just were placed under 10 years moratorium.161 The unilateral action made Acheampong 
very unpopular with Western creditors and foreign direct investment to Ghana rapidly 
declined.
159 R. H. Green, Stabilization and Adjustment Policies and Programmes: Country Study I (Accra, 
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In governance, army officers who lacked expertise ran most of the government 
bodies. Lack of expertise and favoritism increased bribery and corruption. At 
Acheampong’s time, young women were given millions of cedis worth o f import 
licenses, which they often resold for about two times their value. Besides the department 
heads, the members of the ruling body of the SMC not infrequently abused their power. 
Acheampong himself personally interfered with the operations of the Bank of Ghana, 
where he instructed the overprinting and over-issue of cedi notes.162 He personally 
granted unqualified concessions to his associates in contravention of government policies 
and regulations. In addition to the abuse of power, the regime was fraught with other 
social evils such as illegal arrests.163 Economic hardships increased in 1974 when prices 
of cocoa dropped and prices of oil increased. To mitigate the suffering of the people, 
Acheampong increased subsidies; however, by 1978, the economic situation in Ghana 
had become unbearable.
In the midst of the economic turmoil, there was a palace coup, in which 
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Akuffo replaced Acheampong as the Head of State. The 
only economic pronouncement Akuffo made was to emphasize the promotion of private 
enterprises, development of free-market system, and the need for aid from Western 
countries.164 Politically, sometime late in 1978, Akuffo reaffirmed his government’s 
intention of transferring power to a constitutional government in July the following year. 
Akuffo’s intended transfer of power did not happen before Flight Lieutenant Jerry John
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Rawlings overthrew his regime on June 4th, 1979. Like other military leaders before him, 
Akuffo could not find a formula for a political coalition that could have brought national 
political unity. Neither was he able to establish a favorable economic culture to help 
Ghana recover from its economic decline.
Leadership Under Jerry John Rawlings
The June 4th coup of 1979 that brought Rawlings to power was staged by a group 
of junior officers who called themselves the Armed Forces Revolution Council (AFRC).
In regards to concrete political and economic changes only a few, if any, had a definite 
view of how to proceed.165 The AFRC consisted of a group of men with frustrations that 
were shared by most Ghanaians due to economic hardships coupled with a lack of sense 
of political direction by previous leaders. “Cleansing” the society of negative phenomena, 
including corruption and distrust of leaders, was the sole objective of the group who 
made themselves national leaders through the barrel of a gun.166
In their attempt to clean house, Rawlings and his men set up military tribunals 
and made a decree that individuals found guilty in actions against the state would be 
subjected to capital punishment.167 Defendants of the first trial by the tribunals were 33 
army officers, of which three were former heads of state. The AFRC sentenced all three 
former Heads of State and many other military officers to death and carried it out with the 
public watching the firing squad at Teshi near Accra. The first round of killings took
165 Zaya Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r  Popular Power (London: New Beacon Books, 1991).
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place on June 16 and thereafter on June 29th, 1979.168 Within a few weeks, Rawlings 
killed many Ghanaians faulted for the country’s economic problems. Market women, 
whom the government suspected of overcharging sales prices on items, were sent to 
prison or flogged in public. One day of August in 1979, Rawlings and a group of soldiers 
went to Makola, one of the main markets in the capital and destroyed the market.169 
Today, the area where the market once stood is called “Rawlings Park” which ironically 
has become a monument to his brutalities.170
Besides intimidations, killings, and confiscation of property from civilians, the 
emergence of Rawlings failed to produce any positive political or economic gain for 
Ghanaian society. At best, the June 4, 1979 coup can be characterized as an explosion of 
social antagonism driven by constantly deteriorating living conditions. In the midst of the 
chaos, the AFRC allowed the already scheduled election by the previous Akuffo 
administration to take place. On September 24,1979, Rawlings transferred power to a 
civilian government under the leader ship of Dr. Hilla Limann.
Leadership Under Hilla Limann
When Limann took over the reigns of power, he faced the same lingering 
economic deterioration and political instability that previous leaders had tried to suppress 
through dictatorship. To resuscitate the economy, Limann made a trip around the world
167 West Africa, June 26, 1979.
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looking for aid but refused to accept IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment 
programs.171 With less consumer products on the market, inflation escalated and, in turn, 
exacerbated the corrupt culture that already existed. Workers who felt the economic 
hardship turned to the streets to demand immediate solutions, which the Limann’s 
government could not deliver. In trying to overcome workers’ protest and strikes,172 
Limann resorted to various repressive methods like arrest and detention rather than 
engaging in democratic dialogue with workers and other groups.173 To make matters 
worst, a corruption scandal broke up in Limann’s ruling party where the general secretary 
and the chairman of the party misappropriated funds from the party’s coffers. The money 
that the party leaders squandered was a bribe that a foreign company had paid to secure 
the job of printing Ghana’s currency.174 While the corruption case was unrevealing, Jerry 
Rawlings took advantage of the workers discontent with the economy and staged another 
coup to overthrow Limann’s government on December 31,1981.
Rawlings’ second regime marked the end of the interlude leadership era. It is 
important to note that all the interlude leaders had followed similar pattern of economic 
and political policies. In the political arena, each had criticized the others for being 
dictatorial, yet they all adopted repressive mechanisms to enforce stability. None of the 
leaders could devise a political consociational approach to form a democratic platform to
171 Jeffrey Herbst. The Politics o f  Reforms in Ghana, 1982-1991 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993).
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enhance political development that could ensure stability. Unfortunately, for democratic 
development, Rawlings’ first regime introduced political violence. The civilian leaders 
during the interlude era failed to amend the constitutional flaw that brought about the 
political instabilities in the first place. Instead of forging alliances with different political 
groups to establish a strong nation state, leaders like Busia played the tribal card to make 
the situation worst.
Economically, the NLC administration that came to power after Nkrumah 
abandoned all industrial development projects, including a food-processing plant. 
Thereafter, all the leaders’ economic policies hinged on going around the world to look 
for aid rather than focusing on building productive sectors of the economy to stimulate 
domestic production. AH the leaders within that time period pursued monetary economic 
policies that undermined human development. Busia cut funds from education and health 
care, which made it hard for the poor to improve their living conditions. While 
Acheampong restored some of the educational and health care services, he nationalized 
foreign companies. In addition, he unilaterally declared a policy of none-payment of 
national debt. That policy halted the inflow of foreign direct investment into Ghana and 
slowed the nation’s economic growth. Another common denominator among Ghanaian 
interlude leaders was their inclination towards corruption. Even though corruption had 
started during Nkrumah’s regime, it escalated during this time period. In essence, the 
interlude leaders failed to correct the corrupt culture and the political repression that they 
had condemned before coming to power. Instead, they adopted the same cultures and 
inadvertently legitimized them. They also failed to transform the Ghanaian economy or 
improve the lives of Ghanaians.
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GHANA UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF RAWLINGS 1981-2001
In evaluating leadership in Ghana, the solution to both economic progression and 
cohesive political stability provides the best litmus test because Ghana has been free from 
foreign threats since the precolonial era. The only foreign threat that Ghana faced was 
colonialism,175 which in itself was made possible due to internal territorial political 
instability in precolonial days.176 Fortunately, the attainment of independence in 1957, 
and the subsequent gaining of republic status in 1960 by Kwame Nkrumah dismantled 
colonialism.177 Therefore, when Rawlings returned to power in 1981, the problem of 
economic underdevelopment and political instability were readily apparent.
Jerry J. Rawlings
Jerry John Rawlings was bom in 1947 at Dzelukope in the Volta Region of 
Ghana. His mother is an Ewe from Volta Region and his father was a Scottish citizen 
who was once on duty in the Gold Coast during the colonial days. As a boy, Rawlings 
attended school at Achimota College. After completing his secondary education, he went 
to military training school and enrolled as an Air Force cadet. In 1978 he was 
commissioned as a Flight Lieutenant.178 Rawlings first came on the Ghanaian political 
scene in June 1979 when he was released from jail by junior officers to become a leader
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of a coup. On September 24, 1979, he handed over the reign of government to a civilian 
government. Nearly two and half years later, he staged another coup and toppled the very 
civilian government he helped to install. Thereafter, he ruled Ghana by dictatorial decree 
for twelve years, transforming himself to become a civilian leader after democratic 
political elections and remained in power for eight more years.
Immediately after the December 31, 1981 coup, Rawlings told Ghanaians that the 
reason for his return to power was to rearrange the foundations of Ghana’s politics 
through the transformation of social, economic, and political relationships. In other 
words, he intended to establish a democratic system where all citizens would participate 
in national decision-making.179 He suspended the constitution of 1979 and his Provisional 
National Defense Council (PNDC) assumed national power with him as the chairman.
Bureau of National Investigation
Politically at the time of the coup, the PNDC was made of different factions with 
only one common denominator. The commonality involved waging holy war to free 
Ghana from corrupt imperialists and their masters in the west so as to enable Ghana to 
redistribute national resources equally among its citizens.180 But, to do that required a 
political formula for national stability. To build political stability, Rawlings, just like his 
predecessors, decided to use intimidation and repressive mechanisms to coerce other 
factions in the PNDC and the whole country to succumb to his dictatorial ways.
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Rawlings and his security chief, Kojo Tsikata, successfully established 
institutions to facilitate the creation of a dictatorship and to assist in cultivating fear in 
Ghanaians. Among the institutions created for those purposes, the most successful and 
important one is the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI). The BNI was restructured 
from a previous special branch of the police force in 1982. Its main functions were to 
arrest, detain, and execute anti-PNDC elements and its agenda of dictatorship. Through 
the BNI, violence became decentralized and was perpetuated by autonomous groups in 
the armed forces and civil society.181 It operated by relying on intimidation and political 
repression to silence the public. Executions and torture carried out by the BNI had 
frequently come from the direct instructions of Rawlings. One case in point was the death 
of Alhassan Atusnab, a cook of a German friend of Rawlings. Soldiers on the orders of 
Rawlings beat the cook to death on a July 1st, 1989, on suspicion that the cook had stolen 
a 100 Deutschmark.182
The violent purge of civilians after the 1981 coup by the BNI led to the period 
between 1982 and 1990 being one of the most sordid times in Ghana's political history. 
The political repression led to what later became known as a culture o f  silence. The 
method used by Rawlings to create that culture included torture, imprisonment, and 
executions. In Africa, Emperor Bokassa had used similar tactics in the Central African 
Republic, Idi Amin used it in Uganda, and Samuel Doe used it in Liberia. In the 1950s, 
Nkrumah established the culture with Prevention Detention Act. Thirty years later, 
Rawlings re-enforced it with widespread human rights abuses.
181 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r  Popular Power.
,8- Ibid.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
241
Rawlings’ Economic Development Approaches
Rawlings’ first economic act was to set up an Economic Review Committee to 
assess the extent of Ghana’s economic crisis. Based on a socialist framework, the 
committee came up with a formula with three tenets to steer Ghana towards development. 
First, they decided to deal with corruption in business, state corporations, banking, civil 
service, and personal taxation. Second, the committee recommended that wealth be 
redistributed to the people. Finally, the third tenet o f Rawlings first economic approach 
was for the nation to solicit aid from socialist countries.183
To tackle the problem, the PNDC set up a citizen’s vetting committee to deal with 
corruption. It set up defense committees to take care of the distribution of wealth by 
confiscating from the rich and giving to the poor. In regards to the solicitation for aid, 
Rawlings sent delegations to Libya, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union to seek 
assistance. Unfortunately for Rawlings, the hope that aid from socialist countries would 
lift Ghana out of its economic chaos proved fruitless. With the exception of Libya, the 
socialist aid that Rawlings had banked on to assist his revolution was not forthcoming.184 
In other words, the implementation of the three prescriptions based on the socialist 
framework did not bring any relief to Ghana’s economic crisis, and Rawlings was forced 
to change strategies. He approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank for financial assistance and was granted a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)
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package by the two institutions. Rawlings was encouraged by these institutions to shift 
his economic policy away from redistribution and instead concentrate on increasing 
industrial and agricultural production.185 In view of that recommendation, Rawlings 
embarked on an Economic Recovery Program (ERP).186
In order to implement the program, Rawlings and his finance minister contacted 
the chairman of the Trade Union Congress and asked for the support of the workers. On 
December 30, 1982, Rawlings launched the ERP under the auspices of structural 
adjustment. In line with the program, Rawlings made cutbacks in government 
expenditures, devalued the national currency, and removed subsidies on essential 
consumer items. Price control mechanisms were also removed.187 The devaluation was 
immediately felt because it resulted in an inflation rate of 174% in 1983. The price 
increases were not well received by Ghanaian workers, people rioted in the streets of 
Accra and in other cities throughout the country as a show of resistance to the Economic 
Recovery Program by Rawlings and his PNDC.188
To explain the high prices, Rawlings called a rally at Tema. It, however, ended in 
confusion when workers bluntly told him they were dissatisfied with his budget.
Infuriated, Rawlings burst into anger and the workers jeered him. He then reacted by 
smashing his microphone to the ground and storming off in an armored car. The budget
184 D. Rothchild and E. Gyima-Boadi, “Ghana’s Economic Decline and Development Strategies.” 
in John Ravenhill, ed., Africa in Economic Crisis, 254-285 (NY: Colombia University Press, 1986).
183 Herbst, The Politics o f Reforms in Ghana.
186 Jeong Ho-Won, “Ghana: Lurching Towards Economic Rationality."
187 Herbst, The Politics o f Reform in Ghana.
188 “Report on the 1983 Budget,” People's Daily Graphic, 24 April 1983.
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issue and the manner in which Rawlings handled it reduced the PNDC’s image at home, 
but the government’s image with the international agency soared. The World Bank 
sponsored a donor’s conference for Ghana in Paris in November 1983. At the conference, 
the PNDC unveiled its long-term economic plan that included privatization of 
government enterprises. At that juncture, the World Bank agreed to loan Ghana $120 
million if the latter agreed to compensate Lonrho company for sequestration in 1972 of its 
55% stake, a condition to which the Rawlings’ team immediately agreed.189 In other 
words, the government took a loan in 1983 to pay for an investment that had gone sour a 
decade earlier.190
In the monetary sector, Rawlings allowed the Foreign Exchange Bureau to freely 
quote their buying and selling of other foreign currencies simultaneously with the cedi. 
Those actions in concert with the devaluation plunged the value of the cedi as much as 
545% between 1983 and 1986. The cumulative effect was the spread of poverty in 
Ghana.191 Other methods of implementation of the program included intensification of 
workers retrenchments, privatization of government plants, and abandonment of welfare 
services, including education and healthcare. These policies were not different from the 
ones that Rawlings predecessors had implemented to slow human development from 
reaching the poor sector of the society.192
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Economic Policies in Mining and Forestry
Among all the policies that Rawlings adopted under the ERP, two areas that were 
especially harmful were in the natural resources sector of mining and forestry. In the 
mining industry, the government issued about fifty licenses in 1985 to foreign companies 
prospecting for gold mining without negotiating in good faith. The conditions of the 
licenses did not disclose the benefit that Ghana would receive from the deals. But, it was 
known that about ninety percent of all profits were allowed to be repatriated immediately 
to offshore investors.193 Such deals tell the story of how Rawlings, through corruption, 
sold out Ghana’s resources. As one foreign mining manager described it, “the change has 
come about entirely because the PNDC has made foreign investment attractive. We can 
export profits, have tax concessions, and our foreign exchange retention rate has doubled. 
They changed the rules of the game.”194 The above testimony of a foreign investor 
reveals how Rawlings’ economic policy depleted the national resources without 
benefiting Ghanaians.
Mismanagement and Corruption in the Forestry
Mismanagement and corrupt activity that Rawlings nurtured was also evident in 
the forestry industry. A number of timber companies, agents, and officials in the 
government became involved in illegal activities that resulted in widespread corruption in
193 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r  Popular Power.
194 Home Front Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Ghana High Commission in London, March 1988 ): 8
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the timber industry.195 A case in point involved Silviconsult, a consulting company that 
advised the Ghanaian government to set up a Timber Export Development Board to 
promote Ghanaian Timber abroad and to help Ghanaian Timber Merchants to obtain 
better prices. Fraudulently, Silviconsult agents accepted orders from sister companies at 
low prices and passed them through to the Timber Export Development Board. The 
representatives of Silviconsult, acting as double agents, turned around and sold 
overpriced equipment to Ghanaian timber companies.196 This example is only one of 
several, the network of corruption in the timber sector is much wider. The web of 
corruption in the Rawlings’ government spanned across PNDC officials, timber 
merchants, senior civil servants, and some officials in the World Bank. Between 1986 and 
1989, the National Investigations Committee investigated about thirty different cases of 
corruption in the timber industry and found that within that time period more than $38 
million was siphoned from Ghana’s foreign exchange by corrupt officials and their 
foreign accomplices in the industry.197
Unfortunately, these corrupt practices were not restricted to the mining and 
forestry industries alone, nor did only lower officials participated in such corrupt 
practices. Corruption permeated the executive branch of government officials, including 
Rawlings himself. According to a former PNDC member. Sergeant Allolga Akata-Pore, a 
former confidant of Rawlings, the former head of state and his national security officer, 
Kojo Tsikata, had dipped into the national coffers as well. According to Akata-Pore,
195 William Keegan, “Forest Pay as Ghana Loses Out,” Financial Times (February 8, 1989).
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Rawlings and all the members of PNDC were embezzling huge sums of money from the 
National Consolidation Fund. The officer confessed to having participated in these
198actions.
Evaluation of the Economic Recovery Program
The success of Rawlings’ economic program since coming to power is debatable. 
By some economic indicators, ERP and its adjustment program have been successful in 
controlling inflation and reducing the government deficit. It is estimated that, between the 
mid-1980s and 1990s, the program helped Ghana’s economy grow 5 % a year for a 
decade.199 With this evidence, Ghana was hailed as the IMF ‘s great success story in 
economic development.200 While the fiscal policy section of Ghana’s budget might have 
improved due to reduction in subsidies, it did not set the economy on a development path.
In the industrial sector, Rawlings’ economic policies have adversely impacted the 
development of Ghana’s local industries. Faced with competition from abroad, they are 
unable to sell goods and foodstuffs that are locally produced. For example, companies 
like the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, and major textile companies are unable to 
compete with imported goods and therefore go out of business.201 The result is the virtual
198 Ibid.
199 Jeong Ho-Won, ‘T he Structural Adjustment Program in Ghana.’’ Journal o f  Law and  Political 
Science, No. 3 (January 1995): 167-92.
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33-35.
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absence of a manufacturing base, while the economy remains underdeveloped and 
dependent on imports. This condition, in tum, creates more economic problems through a 
balance of payment deficits. In the social sector, the ERP has had a negative impact on 
families through workers’ retrenchment.
The introduction of the ERP came with retrenchment as part of the 
conditionalities originally devised at the donors’ conference in Paris.202 At the 
conference, the Rawlings’ team was urged to make substantial cuts in labor as a way of 
reducing wages and salary bill.203 The first target of the retrenchment program was the 
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD). As a result, the staff of the COCOBOD 
fell from over 100,000 in 1982 to 40,000 in June 1989.204 Other government corporations 
suffered a similar fate including the State Fishing Corporation and the Ghana Water & 
Sewerage Corporation. In the public service sector, healthcare and education were also 
affected. At the completion of retrenchment, a total of 107,166 people were dismissed 
from their jobs.205 As stated early, if the litmus test for Ghana’s leadership is how the 
leaders rally the people towards solving economic problems to benefit the people, then 
the above evidence points to the failure of Rawlings’ leadership. However, others do not 
share this evaluation o f Rawlings. For instance, a recent article in the New York Times 
described the Rawlings’ leadership in a “borrowed robe” as a success and hailed his
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transfer of power as “ An African Success Story.”206 Such assessments appear to give 
credit to Rawlings for supposedly voluntarily and democratically relinquished power.
Ghana’s Road to Democracy under Rawlings
Jerry Rawlings had promised a democratic framework in the national decision­
making process. Towards this end, he organized the Workers Defense Committee (WDC) 
and Popular Defense Committees (PDC) as democratic vanguards.207 However, after 
realizing that the two organs had too large role in the decision-making process, he merged 
the PDC and the WDC together and renamed it the Committee for the Defense of the 
Revolution (CDR). He shifted the CDR’s functions from taking part in decision-making 
to that of a conduit for interpreting and explaining to the people the “aim of the 
revolution” as defined by the central government.208 Rawlings also realized that if the 
promise of involving the masses in the decision-making process was to be fulfilled, then a 
well-defined democratic framework had to be deduced. In place of liberal Democratic 
Party politics, Rawlings set up a National Commission for Democracy (NCD) and 
entrusted it with building a network that would become the instrument of a democratic 
process. In 1987, the NCD submitted its “blue book” report to the PNDC on how best to 
institutionalize participatory democracy and recommended that elected local assemblies 
be the vehicles through which people can participate in the decision-making process.209
206 “An African Success Story,” New York Times, January 8,2001.
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Between 1987 and 1988, the NCD, under the instruction of the PNDC, drew a 
comprehensive voter’s register and increased the number of administrative districts from 
65 to 110. 210 Out of that data, the PNDC created a structure and established functions for 
a future elected district government and proceeded to conduct an election for district 
assemblies on a non-partisan basis. The condition was similar to the one- party selection 
process that had been previously suggested by both Nkrumah and Acheampong. The 
pattern o f the district assemblies’ elections did indicate that Rawlings was not interested 
in implementing a true democratic system in Ghana. This assessment is fair because all 
the candidates for the district assemblies had been affiliated with the PNDC. Moreover, 
the government, without holding an election had appointed about one-third of all the 
assembly members of all the districts.211 In practice, therefore, all the members of the 
district assemblies were associates of Rawlings who made the entire process 
undemocratic.
The undemocratic nature of the process drew high criticism from a broad 
spectrum of opposition groups in Ghana. The most vocal among the opposition was the 
Ghana Bar Association. It organized public opposition against the Rawlings’ process. The 
opposition adopted the line of liberal democracy and called on Rawlings to lift the ban on 
political parties, release political prisoners, set up constituent assemblies, and draw 
up a new constitution. This internal pressure coincided with external pressure from 
international organizations and donors who demanded that Rawlings adopt democratic
210 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f  Stability.
211 Kumi Ansa-Koi, ‘District Assemblies As Institutional Framework for Decentralization and 
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political practices.212 In 1990 the opposition members saw the Rawlings’ NCD and the 
district assemblies with two views. First, they viewed the developments as an attempt by 
Rawlings to “finesse a constitutional legitimacy” for his PNDC government. Second, they 
saw it as another one-party system similar to Acheampong’s ill-fated Unigov experiment 
of 1977 to 1978. Based on those perceptions, the opposition members joined together to 
form the Movement of Freedom and Justice (MFJ) and built a whirlwind of momentum 
to steal the democratic initiative from Rawlings and his PNDC.213
When Rawlings and his advisors realized the opposition’s legitimate strategy, they 
reneged on their so call democratic enlargement policy. In a dramatic change of events, 
Rawlings decided to rely on his ready network of district assemblies to compete for 
power. With this strategy, Rawlings made a quick tum around and laid out a new political 
agenda where he asked the NCD to produce a report to recommend a “way forward” 
towards a Consultative Assembly, a proposal for a new constitution.214 In other words, 
both domestic and external forces compelled Rawlings to abandon his national one-party 
system to join a liberal multi-party democratic process.
In March 1991, the NCD published its report and recommended the adoption of a 
multi-party system. Simultaneously, a special committee of constitutional experts was set 
up to formulate a specific constitutional proposal, which was to be placed before the
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Studies London.
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consultative assembly.215 From then on, the democratic process took on a new dimension 
and matters proceeded at a faster pace. By the end of July 1991, the Constitutional 
Committee published its proposal to be considered by the consultative assembly. In 
August, the proceedings of the Consultative Assembly began, and at its opening, a time 
table was set for the return to a full constitutional government with a national election 
scheduled to be held in the third quarter of 1992.216
The Election of 1992
In May 1992, Rawlings lifted the ban on party politics. Almost immediately, eight 
parties formed included the National Democratic Congress (NDC) o f Rawlings and his 
associates.217 Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on November 3 and 
December 29, 1992, respectively. With his network of the district assemblies, Rawlings 
won the presidential election and his party won most of the parliamentary seats.218 On 
January 7, 1993, Rawlings became the president of the Fourth Republic.
Politically, Rawlings could not rally the political muster to correct the 
constitutional flaw that had laid the foundation for Ghana’s political instabilities to unify 
the country. Economically, Rawlings continued the structural adjustment program that 
was entering its second phase and was dominated by the privatization of state-owned
215 E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Notes on Ghana’s Current Transition to constitutional Rule," Africa Today, 
Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall 1991): 5-17.
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enterprises. The national debt expanded and interest payments increased. Rawlings failed, 
like his predecessors, in establishing high moral and ethical standards among his official 
cadre. His first term ended without much improvement in the Ghanaian economy and the 
country still remains industrially underdeveloped due in part to corruption and public 
sector mismanagement.
The 1996 elections had a little competition, yet the NDC managed to win a victory 
with Rawlings winning a second term presidency with 57.5% of the votes.219 Rawlings 
second term ended in 2000, and his Vice-President John Atta-Mills became the 
presidential candidate for NDC. At the 2000 elections, the opposition, New Patriotic 
Party’s (NPP) candidate, Joseph A. Kuffor beat Atta-Mills in a run off election. On 
January 7th, 2001, Rawlings twenty-year rule in Ghana came to a peaceful end when he 
transferred power to the elected president from the opposition party.220
TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR CONTINUED DECLINE?
Utilizing the UNDP’s human development index, Ghana is economically 
impoverished.221 By the same token, if development is defined as earlier stated in chapter 
3, then here too Ghana, just like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, is not
219 Ibid. 438.
220 “An African Success Story,” New York Times, January 8, 2001.
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economically developing.222 This is so because, after twenty years of Rawlings’ structural 
adjustment policies, Ghana still depends on imports for its consumer goods. The reason 
for this is that the economic program has not helped Ghana to develop the industrial 
capability needed to enable it to manufacture industrial goods to satisfy its domestic 
needs. In economic productive terms, Ghana lacks the comparative advantage in 
industrial production and, as such, its economy is still dominated by agricultural raw 
material simply because it lacks the scientific culture of creation for economic 
industrialization.
As Table 5-4 shows, a careful observation of the economic structure of Ghana 
reveals that the agricultural sector has remained approximately 50 % of the country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since 1975, while the manufacturing sector has been 
declining. The manufacturing sector since 1975 has declined from 13% of the GDP to 5.9 
% in 1995. Prior to 1985, the decline in manufacturing within one decade had been from 
13% in 1975 to 11% in 1985. Within the same timeframe of ten years (1985-1995), when 
Rawlings implemented his economic policies, the manufacturing sector, which 
demonstrates the ability to create and thus constitutes development as defined in chapter 
3, did decline from 11% of the GDP to 6.5 %. It further deteriorated from 6.5 % to 5.9% 
between 1994 and 1995, a significant indication that economic policies under Rawlings’ 
leadership have made Ghanaians economically worse off than they were prior to his 
coming to power in 1981.
This work defines development as a nation’s ability to acquire scientific culture that enables it 
to technologically produce diverse industrial goods. See chapter three o f this work.
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Table 5-4
The Structure of Ghana’s National Economy 1975-95
% Of Gross Domestic Product 1975 1985 1994 1995
Agriculture 47.7 44.9 46.4 46.3
Mining Industry 21.0 16.7 16.0 15.8
Manufacturing Industry 13.9 11.5 6.5 5.9
Service 31.3 38.4 37.7 37.9
Private Consumption 73.3 84.0 83.8 77.5
General Govt. Consumption 13.0 9.4 11.6 12.4
Imports of Goods and Services 18.4 13.6 36.9 33.5
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, DC: World Bank, 
1997.
Again, Table 5-4 also indicates that the agriculture sector has remained fairly 
constant between 44.9% and 47% of the GDP from 1975 to 1995. The services sector, 
which includes education and health services, increased from 31.3% to 38.4% between 
the same periods. However, from 1985 to 1995 the service sector remained relatively the 
same, between 37.7% and 38.4%. However, when an inflation rate of 27.7%, which was 
seen to be the lowest recorded in Ghana within that time period, is taken into 
consideration, then social services have been deteriorating since 1985.223 Ghana faces 
serious development problems because the economy as a whole lacks industrial capacity 
as demonstrated by its dwindling manufacturing sector. From a developmental 
perspective, the country’s situation is troubling because it suggests that the leaders have 
not been able to establish the cultural attitudes and behavior necessary for development. 
As this case study shows, leaders have legitimized low moral culture that have resulted in
223 Oxfam, Ghana Country Profile 1998-1999 (London: Oxfam. 2000)
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corruption and human rights abuses, both of which are detrimental to development. The 
leaders have also failed to devise coherent progressive policies towards achieving a 
scientific culture of creation.
What Are the Moral and Scientific Cultures in Ghana?
As noted above, the level of corruption among party affiliates and the COCOBOD 
institution in Ghana since Nkrumah’s time demonstrate that there is low moral conviction 
on the part of Ghanaian leaders. The corrupt behavior has been prevalent in all 
administrations. During the Rawlings' period, corruption skyrocketed in institutions such 
as the National Timber Export Board. There was also a rise in human rights violations.224
As far as the scientific culture is concerned, Table 5-4 reflects the decline in 
growth of Ghana’s industrial manufacturing sector. Although basic and intermediate 
science was part of Ghanaian school curriculum up to the university level in early the 
twentieth century, the country does not have the industrial scientific ability to induce 
industrialization.225 The importance of scientific culture in Ghana’s development, with 
the exception of Nkrumah’s leadership, has received virtually no attention from Ghanaian 
leaders.226 Since 1966, they have failed to integrate scientific education into national 
economic development policies. In fact, since the leaders of the 1966 military coup 
abandoned industrial projects that were under construction, Ghana’s idea of development
224 Herbst, The Politics o f  Reforms in Ghana.
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has always been based on export promotion as opposed to industrial promotion. Indeed, 
the neglect of research and development is not unique to Ghana, but it is a common 
phenomenon in the entire sub-Saharan Africa w orld .227
In Ghana, the lack of a development vision by leaders has led all postcoionial 
leaders, with the exception of Nkrumah, to avoid meaningful scientific policies as a way 
of achieving economic development. In place of intensive economic research and 
development, Ghanaian leaders have adopted small-scale technology known in Africa as 
Appropriate Technology (AT).228 As mentioned in chapter four, AT focuses narrowly on 
technologies suitable for rural food processing and production. It is also labor-intensive as 
opposed to being technological oriented. Hence, it lacks the potential to stimulate an 
industrial culture essential for economic development.229 For this reason, Ghanaian 
leaders cannot claim that adopting AT policies will propel the country towards a scientific 
culture capable of fostering industrialization and sustainable economic development 
capabilities.
While Ghana’s first leader, after independence, theoretically formulated scientific 
culture policies that could have assisted the country in attaining sustainable development, 
he had little time to practically establish such a culture before he was deposed. 
Unfortunately, Nkrumah’s successors have been less motivated to formulate and 
implement adequate policies that take scientific culture into account. In addition to the 
absence of scientific culture, the leaders have lacked the high moral discipline to abstain
227 Ahmad, “Science and Technology."
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from indulging in corruption. Therefore, they have been unable to foster the appropriate 
culture for material economic development. After forty-three years of independence, 
Ghana, a nation endowed with natural and potential human resources, remains one the 
poorest and underdeveloped countries in the world.230
SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that precolonial Ghana was occupied by different 
autonomous nations such as the Ashanti, Fanti, and Dagomba. The nations had somewhat 
similar political and economic institutions headed by chiefs and kings.231 Chiefs headed 
tribal groupings while the kings presided over hegemonic nations such as the Ashanti 
Empire. Precolonial leaders were selected through a hierarchical inheritance system, and 
they administered their societies in a participatory democratic fashion. Leaders 
administered their societies with the assistance of three different political institutions, 
namely the Privy Council, Council of Elders, and Village Assemblies of the Commoners.
Economically, the nations were agrarian societies that engaged in subsistence 
farming and commerce. Land was the main factor of production and its supervision by 
leaders made them very important and powerful. The economic role of leaders made them 
aware of their social status and moral obligations to the wider societies. Leaders refrained 
from monopolizing means of production and extracted little tribute from citizens.232 
There were institutional checks-and-balances to limit the misuse of power. Leaders
230 Rimmer, Slaying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy.
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created a high moral culture, void of corruption, which facilitated citizen engagement in 
progressive economic activities. Through such political and economic synergism, the 
individual societies maintained social stability.
At the same time, none of the leaders, with the exception of Osei Tutu of Ashanti, 
were able to establish a political system with the purpose of integrating the nations into a 
homogenous society. Ashanti leaders used military conquest as a method of building a 
homogenous empire. To manage the Ashanti Empire, the leaders created an imperial 
system under the supervision of the Union Council headed by the Ashanti king and 
guided by the Ashanti constitution.233 Due to unequal treatment from the Ashantis, 
conquered nations did not identify their interests with the empire as a corporate union.
The indifference flowing from that disconnection led to revolts. The instabilities 
prevented the crystallization of the nations into a unified and homogenous society.
As commercial societies, the competition to gain access to European trade also 
intensified tribal rivalries. That fracture left them to defend themselves against each other 
and made each tribe vulnerable to outsiders. Under the circumstance, the Fantis gravitated 
to the European traders in search of security against the Ashantis. Through the 
association, the British colonized the Fanti in 1850 through an agreement known as the 
Bond of 1844.234 In contrast to the Fantis, the Ashantis waged one hundred years of war 
with the British to ward off colonization. They accomplished and maintained this goal 
until 1902 when they were defeated and colonized. The colonization of the Ashanti
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occurred simultaneously with the annexation of Dagombas in the North. These three 
phases of gradual imposition of the British rule constituted the colonization of Ghana.235
Colonial rule subjugated all indigenous leaders together with their institutions and 
rules to those of the colonial administration. The colonial leaders sent from Britain 
imposed British rules, and de-legitimized the chieftaincy to the extent that the nature of 
leadership lost its respect among its own people. Politically, the subjugation of traditional 
leaders and the imposition of British rule are the key differences between colonization in 
the Gold Coast and protectorate in other parts of Africa. One of the earlier colonial 
leaders to arrive in the Gold Coast was Frederick Guggisberg. In 1919, when he arrived in 
the Gold Coast his administration focused on economic development as opposed to 
political development.
Despite the negative political impacts, there were some positive economic 
consequences from colonization. Guggisberg laid and improved the Gold Coast’s national 
transportation system. He laid railroad tracks to help expedite the shipment of the 
colony’s agricultural products to the world market. Besides the railroad tracks, new 
automobile roads were constructed in conjunction with a harbor at Takoradi. The 
governor topped his infrastructure plan with development in education and medical 
services for the colony. By 1929, the colony’s economy had been transformed from the 
predominance of slave trade and forest commodities such as spices, palm produce, and 
rubber to that of cocoa beans, gold, diamonds, manganese, and timber.236 On the
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traditional side. Ofori Atta was one of the first leaders to serve on the colonial legislative 
council. Politically, he led a delegation to England to ask for constitutional change to 
allow more local people on the legislative council. He also worked hard to increase the 
number o f natives in the colonial civil service. Economically, he led a boycott against 
colonial cocoa buyers who had conspired to cheat cocoa producers. Despite his efforts in 
both economics and politics, he failed to provide national leadership because he failed to 
speak for the nation as a whole and became a comprador for the British system of divide- 
and-rule.
Colonial rule lasted until 1946 when nationalist movements started to demand 
self-rule. In 1947, nationalist leaders formed the UGCC with the objective of attaining 
self-rule for the colony. The nationalist movement reached its climax in 1948 when a riot 
in the capital turned into a national disturbance. After the riot, constitutional talks held in 
1949 adopted a British type of political structure that excluded traditional leaders from 
the national political system. Nkrumah, one of the opponents of the constitutional 
framework, broke away from the UGCC to form the CPP. Elections were held in 1951, 
and the colonial government transferred power to Nkrumah and his victorious CPP party. 
Nkrumah’s quest of power prevented him from making political concessions to include 
the traditional leaders. Economically, he advanced the policies that were in place and 
increased education and health services to other parts of the country where they were 
lacking.237 However, large amounts of government funds created temptation and brought 
corruption to Nkrumah’s regime.
237 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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Prior to independence, Nkrumah had an opportunity to change the constitutional 
flaw that had undermined national politics. He, however, refused to do so. Instead, he 
adopted the Preventive Act of Detention in 1958 as a means of stabilizing the nation. In 
doing so, Nkrumah laid the foundation for a dictatorial political culture that also, in tum, 
laid the foundation for Ghana’s political instability.238 In the end, Nkrumah could not 
forge a leadership consensus to build a stable foundation to facilitate socio-economic 
development.
After independence, Nkrumah first pursued liberal economic policies but switched 
when they failed to yield positive results. He then adopted a socialist approach to 
economic development. This inward-orientation transformed Ghana’s economy and 
initiated industrial projects throughout Ghana from a meat processing plant to car 
manufacturing plant.239 Nkrumah, however, failed to provide moral leadership against 
corruption. His party members turned the CMB into a corrupt institution and used it to 
extract money from producers to satisfy the personal interests of party officials as 
opposed to broader national interests.240 Corruption and political agitations led to a 
downward spiral in the economy, and the opposition took advantage to support the 
military to stage a coup to overthrow Nkrumah’s government in 1966.
The overthrow of Nkrumah’s regime marked the beginning o f the use of military 
in the resolution of political conflicts in Ghana. From that time until 1981, Ghana moved 
from one military junta to another with intermittent civilian rule creating the interlude
238 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search of Stability.
239 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
240 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
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leadership era. The interlude leaders failed to formulate economic policies to alleviate 
Ghana’s economic crisis. Instead, they all adopted austerity measures to cut social 
services which caused economic hardship for the poor. In some cases, the cutbacks 
denied education to poor children. Interlude leaders, starting from Ankrah and Afrifa in 
1966 to Limann in 1979, all abetted the legitimization of corruption and political 
suppression of traditional leaders.241 The interlude leadership ended when Rawlings 
returned to power in 1981.
Politically, Rawlings maintained authoritarian rule under his PNDC for 12 years 
before contesting elections in 1992. As an elected leader Rawlings ruled until 2001. 
During this period, he was unable to resolve the political flaws that continue to 
undermine the political and economic stability of Ghana. Socially, Rawlings inspired 
bullyboys within the military, specially trained commandos and BNI agents to use brutal 
force against the civilian population. In the immediate aftermath of the 1981 coup, 
military brutality became a thorny problem in Ghana. Rawlings set up military tribunals 
that condemned people to death by public firing squad, and killed many citizens including 
three former heads of state.242
Economically, Rawlings adopted structural adjustment programs as an economic 
development strategy. The conditions of these programs required the removal of social 
subsidies, devaluation of cedi, and privatization of government enterprises, which led to
241 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f  Stability.
242 West Africa, July 2, 1979.
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an unemployment of 107,000 workers.243 His policies in mining and forestry also 
increased corruption to the extent that in one year more than $38 million was siphoned 
out of the forestry industry.244 After almost 20 years of Rawlings’ ERP, Ghana is 
overburdened with debt and its per capita income stands around $400. The policies have 
also brought massive increases in the cost of living for the poor, and the country remains 
un-industrialized with most of its revenues coming from raw materials. There is little 
industrialization in Ghana due to a lack of scientific culture that is required to empower 
scientific creativity and technological innovations. All evidence points to the fact that 
Ghana’s underdevelopment is mostly a result of its own doing, due in large part to the 
inability of its leaders to establish social cultures conducive to economic development. In 
place of a socio-scientific culture that promotes development, the leaders have established 
and legitimized corrupt and dictatorial cultures that Rawlings furthered through 
legitimization of political violence.245
The postcolonial leaders have made both the economic and political situation 
worse. By legitimizing corruption, dictatorship, and political violence, they have 
undermined the economic progress made during the colonial days. In so doing, the 
postcolonial leaders have made Ghana one of the poorest countries in the world.246
Ghana has experienced three leadership phases. The first one was the precolonial 
leadership; the second was the colonial leadership, and the third is the current
243 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r  Popular Power.
244 Keegan, “Forest Pays as Ghana Loses Out.”
245 Herbst, The Politics o f  Reforms in Ghana.
246 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund, 1983).
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postcolonial leadership. The precoloniai leaders managed their individual societies 
economically well but waged wars among themselves without establishing a homogenous 
society. The colonial leaders embarked on a course of meaningful economic development 
but without a democratic political apparatus. Unfortunately, the postcolonial leaders have 
undermined development by establishing a corrupt culture that siphons national financial 
resource for personal use as opposed to being utilized for national development. Political 
leaders have been less motivated to establish a scientific culture of creation to spur 
industrialization and sustainable development.
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CHAPTER VI
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Evidence from the case studies suggests that since independence Ghanaian leaders 
have fostered and legitimized a low moral culture, which has produced endemic 
corruption. Moreover, the leaders have been unable to establish scientific culture to 
induce industrialization. In addition to these conditions, Kwame Nkrumah’s first 
government constitutionally disenfranchised traditional leaders from Ghana’s 
postcolonial political order. The problem however was that with previous local patterns 
of socialization and political participation by chiefs, Nkrumah’s action created resentment 
from the chiefs. Successive leaders, since Nkrumah, have continued this practice of 
excluding traditional chiefs who have local political support and the loyalty of rural 
people. This exclusion of traditional leaders from national governance has, for a long 
time, crystallized into opposition by local leaders and their supporters towards many 
development policies that have been formulated by postcolonial leaders. These conditions 
have collectively contributed to economic underdevelopment and abject poverty in 
Ghana.1 It was also seen that Nkrumah’s initiative to transform the economy towards 
industrialization was incomplete. Since his ouster, his successors have abandoned 
industrialization and have adopted monetary economic policies with little attempt to 
transform the monoculture productive system of Ghana.2 Politically, Nkrumah adopted
1 Rimmer, Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy.
2 Nkrumah initiated industrialization as means of transforming G hana's productive system, but he 
did not adopt capitalist methodology. For Nkrumah-s socialist economic system see Smertin, Kwame 
Nkrumah.
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authoritarianism through legislative acts and disenfranchised traditional leaders from 
participating in national politics. Nkrumah’s successors have followed a similar political 
path.3 The last 20 years of Rawlings’ administration further widened the negative political 
culture to include human rights abuses.4
In contrast to Ghana, Botswana has enjoyed greater economic progress. The 
country’s economic conditions improved because its leaders have been successful in 
establishing a high moral culture to curtail corruption. Immediately after independence, 
Seretse Khama emphasized and strengthened the culture of internal moral discipline. His 
personal distaste for corruption prevented his officials from kleptocracy; thereby ensuring 
financial resources were used for social services such as education and healthcare.5 In 
production, Khama was able to transform the previous production system, based on 
patron-client relations, into class relations based on capitalism, to induce economic 
growth.6
Politically, Khama stressed the importance of democracy and structured his 
government to achieve this political ideal. In terms of political socialization, he and his 
party leaders allowed traditional leaders a role in the governing of Botswana by 
incorporating chiefs in the legislative assembly through constitutional means. This 
political inclusion of traditional leaders and their followers enabled Botswana to maintain 
political stability. Khama’s successors have adhered to political socialization to enhance
3 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f  Political Stability.
4 Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor.
5 Charlton, “Exploring the Byways o f African Political Corruption.”
6 Samatar, An African Miracle.
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Botswana’s pluralist democracy. His successors have also adhered to high moral culture 
with no tolerance for corruption practices. By establishing high moral culture, Botswana’s 
economy is doing better than that of Ghana. The explanation lies in Botswana’s 
leadership’s ability to establish high moral culture, as one of the prerequisites cultures 
needed for development.7 By the same token, the stagnation of economic development in 
Ghana is explained by its leaders’ inability to establish a high moral culture capable of 
preventing corruption in order to channel financial resources to human development.
The difference in the protectorate system that existed in Botswana during the 
colonial era in contrast to that of direct rule in Ghana explains why Botswana leaders are 
able to establish a high moral culture to benefit their country. The protectorate system 
allowed the traditional leaders and their institutions with their moral obligations to the 
people to be preserved in the postcolonial era. The inability of contemporary Ghanaian 
leaders to establish high moral culture is partially attributed to direct colonial rule. Direct 
rule eliminated the traditional leadership class and, in its place, created a new leadership 
group who had no fiduciary relations or moral obligation to the local people.
The divergence in leadership behavior, partially explains the economic progress of 
Botswana in comparison to Ghana. Botswana’s annual per capita income rose from $50 at 
the time of independence to over $3000 in 1997, while that of Ghana only rose from $242 
at the time of independence to about $400 in 1997. The economic difference is also 
reflected in educational attainment between adults and children in both countries. 
Botswana’s illiteracy rate is 30%, while Ghana’s stands at 36%. At the elementary level,
7 Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
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school enrollment for children in Botswana is 112% compared to 76% in Ghana.8 Despite 
the difference in economic improvement that favors Botswana, both countries are still 
industrially undeveloped due to the absence of a scientific culture, which could assist 
them in being more self-sufficient by enabling them to produce industrial goods 
domestically. The inability of leaders in both countries to establish scientific culture finds 
support in their adherence to Senghorianism. This philosophy, used by Senghor as a 
defense for African self-identification, postulates that scientific culture is not an African 
cultural trait as it is in the western European culture.9 Strict adherence to this philosophy 
by the first postcolonial leaders of Ghana and Botswana, Nkrumah and Khama 
respectively, made them less inclined to consider or pursue scientific culture as a tool for 
fostering economic development. Successive leaders of both countries have also 
neglected scientific culture, thereby leaving their societies technologically behind and 
developmentally bankrupt.
As already mentioned, the information from the previous two chapters offers 
convincing evidence that there is a vast difference in the economic prosperity of the 
people in Botswana vis-a-vis their regional Ghanaian neighbors. This evidence also 
shows the dissimilarities that emanate from their respective leaderships' policies and 
systems of governance. However, such a conclusion neglects any qualitative theoretical 
explanation and comparative analysis. This chapter attempts to fill that void in three 
ways. First, it compares the similarities and differences in leadership in Botswana and
8 African Development Bank, Basic Indicators on African Countries (Abidjan. Ivory Coast:
African Development Bank, 1999).
9 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
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Ghana relative to their countries’ economic development. We look at leadership 
differences during the colonial era, and how leadership transferred power to postcolonial 
leaders. The second section reviews the economic status of both countries immediately 
after their independence and compares them to their current economic status. The section 
uses the LCD theoretical model to explain the difference in the economies relative to the 
leaderships’ ability in fostering moral and scientific cultures. Third, in this chapter, I use 
the colonial factor and Senghorian dimension to elucidate why the leaders are able, or 
unable, to establish high moral and scientific cultures needed to stimulate economic 
development in their respective countries.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCE IN LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMICS
In terms of economic similarities, both precolonial Tswana and Ghanaian 
communities were affected by the global capitalist economy long before they became 
politically affiliated with Britain under colonization.10 Aside from being influenced by the 
capitalist system, the two were agrarian societies. Subsistence farming in forest 
commodities dominated the economy of Ghana, while cattle rearing was dominating in 
Botswana. In both countries, leaders played important roles in the economies because 
they owned or controlled the means of production in the form of cattle and land.11 Both 
communities also engaged in commerce. The Ghanaian communities traded in forest 
commodities such as spices, rubber, and also engaged in the slave trade. The Tswana
10 For information on precolonial Ghana coming in contact with capitalist economy, see Fynn, 
Ashanti and Its Neighbours. ; For information on precolonial Botswana coming in contact with capitalist 
economy, see Picard, The Evolution M odem  Botswana.
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communities traded in cattle with their neighboring communities. In colonial days, 
however, the economies of the two countries changed. Ghana’s economy was 
transformed from slave and spice trade to commercial crop of cocoa beans, gold, and 
diamonds. The economy of Botswana became dominated by capitalist activities such as 
supplying wagon trains, controlling trade, and other capitalist opportunities.12
Both economies prospered during the colonial era, with the Ghanaian economy 
benefiting the most. In Ghana, cocoa exports quadrupled and revenues from the crop 
increased.13 This generated income for most local inhabitants and provided revenue for 
economic infrastructure and development. Governor Frederick Guggisberg, for example, 
partially financed his development projects including railroad tracks, education, and 
medical services with surplus cocoa revenues.14 Botswana also experienced economic 
growth in the earlier stage of its encounter with capitalism but was later subordinated by 
capitalists in their need to create a labor reserve out of Botswana’s citizens.15 In addition 
to turning the territories into a labor reserve, capitalists also restricted Tswana from 
participating in other forms of economic activities such as trade.16
Unfortunately for Botswana, its leaders could not do very much to assist in 
alleviating the economic hardships because the main factors of production (land and
11 Parsons, ‘The Economic History o f Khama’s Country” ; For earlier economic system in Ghana 
see Wickins, An Economic History o f  Africa.
12 Palmer and Parsons, The Roots o f  Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa.
13 Danquah, “Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana."
14 Guggisberg, The Gold Coast: A Review o f  the Events.
15 Massey, Case of Colonial Collaboration.
16 Best, “General Trading in Botswana.”
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cattle) had been strategically constrained by British and South African governments. The 
British government devised means of taking lands, while the South African government 
put discriminatory restrictions on Tswana’s ability to export their cattle into its country.17 
However, even against those odds, some traditional leaders tried to invigorate the 
economy. For example, Kgosi Isang Pilane of BoKgatla organized a Tribal Boring 
Scheme and drilled boreholes to get water for cattle grazing land for his subjects.18 In 
comparison to Botswana, the traditional leaders in Ghana had a more positive impact on 
their economy because there were less colonial restrictions on how they could use their 
lands vis-a-vis Botswana’s traditional leaders.19 For example, Ofori Atta, a traditional 
chief, was able to lead a boycott against European cocoa buyers in Ghana when he felt 
that the buyers’ price collusion could have robbed local cocoa producers of substantial 
resources.20 In colonial politics, however, the Ghanaian traditional leaders had less impact 
in contrast with their Botswana counterparts because of differences in the protectorate 
and direct rule systems.
COLONIAL DIFFERENCES IN PROTECTORATE AND DIRECT RULES
In terms of colonial affiliation, Botswana became part of the British Empire with 
the establishment of a protectorate over the former Bechuanaland in 1885.21 The
17 Palmer and Parsons, The Roots o f  Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa.
18 Konczacki, Parpart, and Shaw, Studies in Economic History o f  Southern Africa.
19 Those interested in how other traditional leaders were involved with the development o f  the 
cocoa economy in colonial Ghana see Danquah, “Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana."
20 Danquah, Liberty o f  the Subject.
21 Parsons, ‘T he Economic History o f Khama's Country.”
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protectorate system was tied to a parallel rule arrangement, where the protectorate 
administration and the local rule were simultaneous but mutually exclusive from each 
another.22 Under the mechanics of the system, there was only British supervision of the 
central traditional government since the British did not directly govern the local people. 
The protection offered by the British affected only external affairs of the territories, 
including matters dealing with European affairs in the protectorate. Moreover, it allowed 
the chiefs to manage their internal affairs without interference.23
Unlike the protectorate in Botswana, the British colonization of Ghana entailed 
direct governance of the local people that came in three phases. The first involved the 
colonization of the coastal areas in 1850 through the Bond of 1844. That direct rule was 
followed by an annexation of the Ashanti province in 1902, with a simultaneous inclusion 
of the Northern territory.24 To avoid competing authorities once the colonial apparatus 
was in place, the British subjugated traditional leaders, preventing them and their people 
from participating in the national decision-making process.25 Another profound 
distinction between the two systems was in the judiciary sectors of the two countries. 
Under the direct rule, the traditional judiciary systems in Ghana were replaced with the 
British judicial system that forced traditional leaders to abdicate their right to 
adjudicate.26 In Botswana, however, traditional leaders dealt with judicial matters
22 Shillington, The Colonisation o f  The Southern Tswana.
23 Ibid.
24 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
25 Lugard, Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa.
26 Kimble, A Political History o f  Ghana.
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concerning the indigenous people under their kgotla judicial system. This helped to 
preserve the moral obligations, rule of law, and legitimacy of leaders in Botswana. In 
Ghana, by contrast, the competition between the customary laws and British colonial laws 
brought about non-compliance of traditional laws, which resulted in social polarization, 
illegitimate leaders, and changes in moral values.27
Based on the above differences, traditional leaders in both countries had different 
roles during the postcolonial era. In colonial Ghana, traditional leaders had been 
ostracized, humiliated, demoralized, and in many instances forced out of their political 
positions, making their impact on development mediocre at best. Under the protectorate 
affiliation, however, Botswana leaders maintained virtually all their domestic roles and 
had more impact on the domestic political process.28 Compared to their counterparts in 
Ghana, two Botswana chiefs, Tshekedi Khama and Chief Bathoen, played significant 
roles in ensuring their country was not polarized through colonization. The leaders waged 
relentless campaigns against British efforts to colonize their country and, in so doing, 
indirectly preserved their society’s moral obligation based on the Tswana tradition of 
k agisanoP
Tshekedi’s challenge and resistance to the British was only one of the fierce 
political campaigns he and his colleagues had to wage in protecting Botswana from going 
under foreign rule. On another occasion, Tshekedi waged international war through the
27 Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor. ”
28 Picard, The Evolution o f  Modem Botswana.
29 In regards to South Africa’s attempt to annex Bechuanaland see Landell-Mills, ‘T h e  1969 South 
African Custom Union Agreement” ; On the British attempt to colonize Botswana see Picard, “Role 
Changes Among Field Administrative in Botswana.”
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United Nations to prevent Jan Smut of South Africa from indirectly annexing Botswana 
through an annexation attempt on South West Africa.30 With social cohesiveness under 
the protectorate system, Tshekedi devoted the latter part of his life to organizing tribal 
councils in the territories from which his nephew, Seretse Khama, selected the members 
of his Botswana Democratic Party to lead the country to independence and to its current 
economic prosperity.31 The above activities are indicative of how the protectorate system 
enabled Botswana’s chiefs to orchestrate political strategies that preserved their moral 
values and guided political developments in a gradual evolution that offered stability for 
Botswana’s postcolonial development. In contrast, the direct rule in Ghana produced a 
different leadership scenario. Ghana was divided into three regions and administered 
separately to prevent collective national leadership from posing a threat to the colonizer.32 
On the regional levels, leaders were subjugated, de-legitimized, and baned from 
adjudicating and maintaining social order. The above-narrated colonial difference shows 
that both colonial systems offered different leadership contingencies in the two countries 
at the dawn of their colonial eras and well into the postcolonial era.
Transition to Postcolonial Leadership in Botswana and Ghana
In comparison to Ghana, where the transition to postcolonial leadership started 
with political agitation,33 the British Protectorate Commission initiated Botswana’s
30 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa.”
31 Khama, The Case fo r  Bechuanaland.
32 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
33 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
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transfer of power to postcolonial leadership without societal conflict. It was initiated by 
introducing the British democratic style of politics in an attempt to phase out the 
country’s traditional principle of hereditary rule.34 Ironically, the commission used the 
traditional leadership forum by encouraging chiefs, their heirs, and other Botswana 
citizens, including those of foreign descent, to form a Joint Advisory Council (JAC) and 
an African Advisory Council (AAC) as transitory organizations. Tshekedi Khama, the 
chief of the royal house of Bangwato, Seretse Khama’s uncle, sat on both councils.35 
When Seretse returned to Botswana in 1956, Tshekedi recommended that he accept a 
position as an assistant tribal secretary. In 1958, a legislative council (1 egco) was created 
to allow Botswana to take care of its external affairs with minimum protectorate 
administrative supervision.36 The establishment o f  Legco and the advancement of the 
political process towards autonomous self-rule led to the formation of three political 
parties in Botswana. Among the three parties was the Botswana Democratic Party, which 
Seretse Khama headed.37
By contrast, the transition arrangements for the transfer of power from colonial to 
postcolonial leaders in Ghana were not clear-cut. The transition was not initiated by the 
colonial administration, but rather was marked by political agitation between locals and 
the colonizer as well as between the locals themselves. The rivalry was due to the nature
34 Picard, The Evolution o f Modem Botswana.
35 Ibid.
36 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
37 Ibid.
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of the direct colonial ru le /8 The antagonism developed because, during the consolidation 
of the colonial rule, the British created another group of leaders by allying itself with 
local educated elite through the legal prism to protect its economic interest.39 Later, 
however, the British faced challenges emanating from some of the educated groups, such 
as the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, which wanted to protect their national lands 
from being taken over by the colonizer. With those challenges from some of the educated 
groups, the British changed its policy and allied itself with the traditional chiefs in line 
with a new indirect rule policy.40 That vacillation of colonial policies within the local 
elements created two problems for the transition. First, the turbulence created two 
leadership groups (the traditional leaders and the educated elite), both of which wanted to 
inherit power from the colonizer. Second, it created a dilemma for the colonizer because 
there was no unified national leadership group to be utilized as a medium for the 
transition process.41 Therefore, in contrast to Botswana where the protectorate had 
preserved the leadership group for the transition, direct colonial rule eliminated 
traditional leaders and created leadership uncertainty in Ghana.
Botswana’s Leadership and Power Transition
As Botswana moved closer to the transition of power, the protectorate secretariat 
invited officials of the political parties and the traditional leaders to constitutional talks in
38 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
39 Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."
40 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
41 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World; Fitch and Oppenheimer. 
Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
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1963. Due to the nature of the protectorate arrangements, the secretariat realized the 
important role of the traditional leaders and called a special meeting to consider the 
position of the chiefs in the ongoing political process.42 The chiefs’ role in the process 
was deemed critical because, during the protectorate era, they were basically allowed to 
govern their tribal territories according to their social institutions and thereby maintain 
law and order without foreign intervention. For that reason, the new political officials 
recognized the role the chiefs could play in the administration of the country. It was 
acceptable therefore, at the constitutional talks, to include a house o f chiefs in the 
legislative assembly, so the chiefs could share power and play a central part in the 
national affairs.43
The inclusion of the chiefs in Botswana’s Legislative Assembly meant two things 
that were essential for the country’s development. First, the transition of power would 
reside in both groups of leaders. This prevented the emergence of domestic political 
rivalries that might compete for power as happened in the case of Ghana.44 Second, the 
inclusion of chiefs meant tribal loyalty was secured. The traditional leaders were of great 
value. Their presence offered political legitimacy and contributed to a more effective 
local government. The traditional leaders, like their emerging political officials, also 
shared the need to build a unified domestic leadership and made the necessary 
concessions in that regard. They transferred their national legitimacy to the new political
42 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
43 Picard, The Evolution o f  Modem Botswana.
44 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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officials.45 In essence, the protectorate conditions made it possible for the new political 
leaders to realize the importance of the traditional leaders and, in that regards, reserved an 
un-contested place for them through the House of Chiefs in the Legislative Assembly. By 
the same token, the traditional leaders reciprocated by transferring the national 
institutional legitimacy to the new political officials. With those arrangements, a unified 
domestic leadership was created for a smooth transition of power into the postcolonial era 
in Botswana.
In a way, the transition was smooth. The leadership in Botswana was unified 
partially because the protectorate system allowed the transformation to be orchestrated 
and executed with the right socially legitimized class, to the extent that nothing changed 
as far as the functions of social classes were concerned. In a more abstract manner, the 
traditional leaders knew they were transferring power to their heirs who were becoming 
political officials. For example, Seretse Khama and other leaders of the Botswana 
Democratic Party, who were becoming the new political officials, were heirs to the 
various royal families in the territories.46 In that context, because o f the protectorate 
system, the change in Botswana from the colonial era to the postcolonial era involved 
only the political apparatus, not a change in the leadership group.
Ghana’s Leadership and Power Transition
The background history of Ghana’s transition to postcolonial power was a short 
one, lasting from 1947 to 1957. Nevertheless, the immediate preceding years had
45 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
46 Ibid.
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witnessed national political movements. Many of the most highly educated citizens and 
some chiefs joined the opposition to colonial rule. That led to the formation of the UGCC 
in 1947 as a political organization. However, steps towards self-govemment did not 
occur until the infamous riot of 1948.47 In investigating the causes of the riot, an 
appointed commission concluded that the riot reflected the frustration of the educated 
classes with the lack of opportunities in Ghana. As a remedy, the commission 
recommended constitutional reforms to be followed with a government made of local 
citizens.48
Based on the commission’s report, the colonial government invited thirty-eight 
people to formulate a new constitution. The group was composed of chiefs, educated 
leaders, and some members of the UGCC, the only political organization at the time. 
Unlike the transitional group in Botswana, the absence of a national traditional leadership 
forum in colonial Ghana and the presence of two competing leadership groups made the 
transition different. Given the structure of the direct colonial rule, the constitutional 
commission overlooked the role of the traditional chiefs and did not discuss power 
sharing between traditional leaders and new emerging political officials.49 Instead, with 
the colonial influence, the commission adopted a British type of representative political 
structure that meant a transformation from the traditional inherited political system to a 
new democratic process, the effect of which sidelined traditional leaders and their
47 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
48 Ibid
49 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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followers. By the end of the talk power was subtly transferred to the educated classes with 
the chiefs being left out of a role in the national constitutional rule.50
In retrospect, the direct colonial rule made the conditions feasible for power to be 
taken from the legitimate traditional leaders and given to a new group that held no 
collective legitimacy. Direct colonization did that, first, by usurping the legitimate 
authority from the traditional leaders during the initial consolidation of power. At other 
times, it usurped power by the arbitrary removal of chiefs from their positions.51 Second, 
direct colonialism made the transfer o f power to educated groups possible because, after 
one century of its rule, it had positioned itself as the natural source of legitimate authority. 
This belief created an illusion in the minds of the commission members about the 
irrelevancy of traditional leaders and their role and also enabled the commission to 
exclude them from participating in the constitutional rule.
Therefore, based on the differences in direct colonization in Ghana vis-a-vis the 
protectorate in Botswana, the transition of power in Ghana brought about two changes. 
First, there was a change in the political apparatus from that of an inherited system to a 
representative form of government. Second, there was a change from the previous 
traditional leadership group with legitimacy to a new educated leadership group without 
legitimacy. On the leadership front, Ghana had a new leadership group without power 
sharing and was backed by foreign colonial legitimacy without domestic legitimacy, 
while Botswana had a continuous amalgamated leadership which had been made possible 
by its protectorate colonial legacy.
50 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
51 Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."
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ECONOMIES OF BOTSWANA AND GHANA: BEFORE AND AFTER 
INDEPENDENCE
During the colonial days, capitalist interests subordinated most economies in 
Africa. That situation also applied to the economies of Botswana and Ghana. During the 
protectorate era, Botswana was turned into a labor reserve to serve mining interests in 
South African goldmines. That goal was achieved by a strategy devised by capitalists to 
tum some of Botswana’s citizens into wage earners by selling their labor for low wages 
by working in South African mines.52 Even in Botswana agriculture, capitalists 
orchestrated strategies to restrict access to land through the creation of free hold farms as 
a means of forcing farmers into selling their labor.53 Through such strategies and others, 
like trade, the protectorate economy of Botswana was undermined by the capitalist 
system.54
By the time Botswana attained its independence, a large part of its population 
supplemented their living with income remittance from their relatives who worked in the 
mines in apartheid South Africa.55 At independence, poverty had escalated and the 
average annual per capita income of the Batswana was approximately $50. Modem 
healthcare facilities were not in existence to cater to the needs of the local residents, and 
people had to depend on traditional herbalists.56 In education, the problem was even
52 Picard, The Evolution o f Modem Botswana.
33 Legassick, “Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry.”
54 Best, “General Trading in Botswana."
55 Cathie, Food Security.
56 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
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worse because only half of the school age children had facilities to attend school and 
there were only 1,400 students enrolled in secondary schools.57 Botswana’s capital, 
Gaborone, was still under construction, and the country could boast of only twenty miles 
of tarred road.58 Financially, Botswana had to depend on Great Britain to balance its 
meager national budget.59
In comparison to Botswana, Ghana was in a strong economic position at the time 
of independence. The colonial leadership, under Governor Frederick Guggisberg, 
undertook extensive economic infrastructure development. There were railroads tracks 
connecting all major cities in the southern part of the country. Ghana’s healthcare service, 
as noted in chapter five, was one of the best in sub-Saharan Africa. There were about 
thirty well-equipped government hospitals with approximately 2,630 hospital beds 
catering to a population of less than three million.60 Unlike Botswana, educational 
facilities in Ghana were adequate with close to 5,000 primary schools and a student 
population of 468,000. In addition, higher education was well advanced with a university 
having been established in 1948.61 Financially, Ghana was in a comparatively better 
position than its Botswana neighbor and had approximately $300 million in its foreign
57 Republic of Botswana, Transitional Plan fo r  Social Economic Development.
58 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
59 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
60 Bourret, Ghana: The Road To Independence.
61 Ibid.
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exchange reserves.62 On the average, Ghana’s per capita annual income was about $242 
in comparison to Botswana’s $50 per capita at the time.63
Since the early days of independence, the economic fortunes of both countries 
have reversed. Botswana’s economic and social improvements have surpassed that of 
Ghana’s. On the micro level, the annual per capita income of Botswana is over $3,000 as 
compared to Ghana’s per capita income of approximately $400.64 In education, the adult 
illiteracy rate in Botswana is 30%, while in Ghana the adult illiteracy rate stands at 36%.
In basic education, where Botswana had only half of its school-age children enrolled 
during independence,65 enrollment is up 112%. In contrast, Ghana’s education enrollment 
is 76% for school age children. Comparatively speaking, Botswana has a higher ratio in 
the area of primary education than does Ghana, and it also has a higher rate in adult 
literacy.66
However, both countries are still engaged in the production of raw material. 
Ghana’s economy is dominated by its major exports of cocoa, gold, and timber. 
Botswana’s economy is dominated by the diamond mining and cattle industries.67 As raw 
material producers, both Botswana and Ghana depend on imports for their industrial 
consumption needs. Botswana imports 80% of its industrial products from neighboring
62 Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana."
63 Nkrumah, Neocolonialism.
64 African Development Bank. Basic Indicators, 1999.
65 Republic o f Botswana, Transitional Plan fo r  Social Economic Development.
44 African Development Bank, Basic Indicators, 1999.
47 Lewis Jr., ‘T he Potential Problems of Diamond-dependent Development.”
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South Africa,68 while Ghana buys its industrial needs primarily from European nations. 
Financially, there has been a vast difference between the two countries since their 
independence. At independence, Ghana had a considerable amount of foreign exchange 
reserves.69 However, its financial position has substantially deteriorated. Since 1975, 
Ghana has had negative net reserves in its foreign accounts. In addition, the country’s 
national debt has soared from a mere $721 million in 1975 to over $5 billion in 1997.70 
By comparison, Botswana had no reserves at independence and therefore, it had to 
depend on Great Britain for post-independence financial contribution to supplement its 
budgetary needs.71 For what can be considered as a dramatic change of events, Botswana 
had over $5 billion in excess of its foreign accounts in 1998. In collaboration with the 
World Bank, it devised a strategy to invest the excess foreign reserves to earn interest 
revenues.72
This financial comparison makes it clear that Botswana’s monetary position is 
better than that of Ghana’s, in the sense that Ghana has become a debtor nation while 
Botswana has become a lender nation. Another profound change that has occurred in both 
countries that is important in measuring economic development lies in healthcare service. 
Improvements in healthcare relate to life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and access to 
clean water, all of which are considered to be reasonable gauges o f economic
68 Cater and Morgan, From the Frontline.
69 Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana.”
70 World Bank, World Development Indicators. 1997.
71 Colclough and McCarthy, The Political Economy o f  Botswana.
72 Mohohlo. “Central Bank as a Protector of National Wealth."
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development.73 At independence, the average Ghanaian had access to a universal free 
healthcare service, while the average Batswana, at independence, had to depend on 
traditional herbalists for their healthcare needs.74 These days Botswana’s healthcare 
service looks different. The infrastructure has been well developed with district primary 
health care facilities and teams scattered across the country providing services to the 
people.75
In relation to Botswana, Ghana’s healthcare service is now characterized by a 
lopsided allocation of resources favoring urban inhabitants. Rural dwellers have only 
limited access to health services. At the managerial level, Ghana’s health service suffers 
from qualified labor shortage and problems with poor management.76 These conditions 
have put Ghana’s healthcare service on less favorable terms in comparison to Botswana. 
For example, while 83 percent of rural residents in Botswana live within ten miles of a 
primary healthcare facility, only a few rural dwellers in Ghana have access to health 
services.77 On the national level, there are four physicians to every 100,000 patients in 
Ghana, in contrast to twenty-four physicians to the same number of patients in
77 World Bank, Better Health in Africa: Experience and Lessons Learned (NY: Oxford University 
Press. 1994).
74 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
75 L. Owuor-Omondi, D. Atlholang, and R. Diselco, Botswana: A National Health Status 
Evaluation (Gaborone: Botswana Ministry of Health, 1987).
76 World Bank, World Development Report: The Challenge o f  Development (NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1991).
77 Dugbatey, “National Health Policies."
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Botswana.78 In comparing the general population, 60% of Ghanaians have access to 
health services compared to 88% of their regional neighbors in Botswana.79
Clearly, Botswana’s leadership policies have helped the country to improve 
healthcare services better than that of Ghana. The above improvement has made 
Botswana’s human development impressive, with the one exception of HIV infection.80 
The result of Botswana’s health improvement is that there has been a dramatic fall in its 
infant mortality rate from 95 per 1000 live births in 1970 to 58 per 1000 live births in 
1997, as compared to Ghana’s infant mortality decline from 100 per 1000 live births in 
1970 to 73 per 1000 live births in 1997.81 Life expectancy in Botswana, before 
accounting for the impact of HIV/AIDS, has risen from 50 years in 1966 to the upper 60s 
by the mid 1990s, while life expectancy in Ghana only stood at 58 years by the mid 
1990s.82
Using the UNDP’s Human Development Index definition of economic 
development as the ability of a country to translate economic gains into improved living
RTconditions, the preceding analysis suggests that, since independence, Botswana’s 
economy has fared comparatively better than Ghana’s. This is the case because, among 
the several economic development indicators, Ghana is trailing Botswana. There is a
78 Leith, Botswana: A Case Study o f  Economic Policy.
79 Dugbatey, “National Health Policies.”
80 World Bank. African Findings: Botswana, An Example o f  Prudent Economic Policy and 
Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000).
81 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).
82 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1997.
83 McGillivray, ‘T he  Human Development Index.”
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common consensus in the literature that Botswana’s recent economic success is due to its 
wealth in diamonds and ethnic homogeneity.84 In defense of Ghana’s dilapidating 
economic conditions, African scholars argue that the country’s economic woes emanate 
from external factors including colonialism, globalization, and the impact of 
multinational institutions.85 These arguments, undoubtedly, have merits given the 
interdependency that characterizes the global economy. However, the arguments fall short 
in providing a complete explanation. Ghana and Botswana are both in the same global 
system, yet Botswana is doing economically better.
Similarly, the mineral arguments being advanced to explain Botswana’s success 
is also less convincing for two reasons. First, in relation to Ghana, the argument is less 
substantive because Ghana also has minerals such as gold, diamond, and bauxite. 
Moreover, exploration began in that country long before Botswana began its exploration 
in the 1960s.86 Second, the Botswana mineral argument is not convincing enough because 
there are other countries in the sub-Saharan region, such as Democratic Republic of 
Congo, that possess an abundance of mineral resources but have not experienced similar 
economic successes as Botswana.87 Thus, the explanation for Botswana’s success can be 
said to lie somewhere else other than in the exogenous and mineral endowment 
arguments that have been advanced.
84 Robert L. Curry Jr., “Botswana’s Macroeconomic Management of Its Mineral-Based Growth: It 
Used Mining Revenues for Development and Service but Now Must Broaden the Beneficiaries,” American 
Journal o f  Economics and Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 1987): 473-88.
85 Ayittey, “How Multinational Institutions Compounded Africa’s Economic Crisis."
86 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
87 Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption.
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As the two cases in chapters four and five qualitatively show, an important cause 
for the difference in the economies of Botswana and Ghana lies in the kind of social 
cultures that have been established and legitimized by their postcolonial leaders in 
managing the countries. As explained in chapter two, national economic development is a 
complex phenomenon to the extent that, even though the mainstream variables of 
analysis, such as colonialism, internal natural resources, and globalization, play a role, it 
is the determination of leadership to create the appropriate political culture in 
transforming the economic welfare of the society that is essential.88 From that contextual 
point of view, the question emerges as to the comparative differences in cultural 
conditions that leaders in Botswana and Ghana have established and legitimized in their 
respective countries. The human factor on leadership can greatly explain the difference in 
their economic outcomes.
Postcolonial Development Cultures in Botswana and Ghana
Before delving into a comparison of the postcolonial cultures in the two countries, 
colonial differences need to be reiterated and taken into consideration in relation to 
cultural establishment and legitimization by the postcolonial leaders. First, due to the 
nature of the protectorate rule in Botswana, there was a continuation of leadership in the 
postcolonial era that provided stability without political antagonism in that country. 
Second, the leadership of Seretse Khama in Botswana had legitimacy willingly 
transferred to his political officials from the traditional chiefs. On the other hand, the 
colonial direct rule under which Ghana had existed did not make those qualities available
88 Doe, “Economic Development o f Francophone Africa.”
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in that country after colonial rule ended. Kwame Nkrumah was not continuing a 
leadership that was in existence and he also did not have legitimacy from the traditional 
chiefs.89
In contrast to Seretse Khama who was an heir to the royal traditional leadership, 
Nkrumah came from the commoner educated leadership group that was vying for power 
with the traditional leaders. Therefore, when power was transferred to Nkrumah and his 
Conventions Peoples Party (CPP) from the British colonial leaders, there was no 
continuation of leadership. In the eyes of the traditional leaders, Nkrumah was a usurper 
of their legitimate authority. Therefore, the competition for power continued and the 
political stability that existed in Botswana did not exist in Ghana.90 On the other hand, 
given the legitimacy and the political stability that came with the Botswana transition, 
Khama combined the traditional kgotla democratic system with the British representative 
system and stressed the importance of democracy in decision-making. He then designed 
the actions of his government to promote such attitudes. In Ghana, the lack of collective 
legitimacy and the antagonistic political struggle between Nkrumah and the traditional 
leaders, immediately before independence, led Nkrumah to turn to dictatorial rule as 
opposed to democratic dialogue for stability.91
On the economic administrative front, Seretse Khama set high moral standards to 
prevent corruption from becoming part of the social culture. In many of his public 
speeches, he denounced corruption and administratively established and maintained
89 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
90 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f  Stability.
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policies of non-tolerance against corruption.92 In a practical move to avoid the appearance 
of corruption, Khama and his officials required national institutions, such as the Ministry 
of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), to create oversight systems to monitor 
and audit the government and thereby ensure the proper use of public funds. That step 
allowed his government and the leadership to hold public officials accountable for corrupt 
practices.93 Seretse formulated policies designed to shield institutions from individual 
interests and to cater instead to the collective national interests. In the economic 
production sector, he established a capitalist production culture by turning the colonial 
productive system that was based on a traditional patron-client system into one based on 
market relations.94
Like Khama, Nkrumah began his economic development by using a market 
approach in Ghana immediately after independence. However, he did not change the 
colonial feudal system that existed in Ghana. Instead, he adopted policies that encouraged 
privatization without government intervention in the productive sector.95 In the 
beginning of the 1960s, however, Nkrumah dropped the capitalist culture due to his 
conviction, at the time, that development based on economic liberal culture was 
inoperable in Ghana. In its place, he adopted a socialist economic culture.96 Unlike
91 Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy o f  an African Dictatorship.
92 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
93 Isaksen, “Macroeconomic Management and Bureaucracy.”
94 Samatar, An African Miracle.
95 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
96 Nkrumah, Neocolonialism.
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Khama, Nkrumah failed to set high moral standards for his officials. Even though he had 
spoken and warned against bribery and corruption, he failed to take direct measures 
against corruption.97 For failing to adopt punitive measures to stamp out corruption, 
Nkrumah inadvertently, through the concept of contributory negligence, legitimized 
corrupt culture. This outcome became apparent in the way in which his leadership 
managed national economic institutions. For example, when his government took over 
the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), no auditing and monitoring mechanisms were 
established to ensure the proper legitimate use of public funds. Without an oversight 
system, the CMB was used for institutional corruption by CPP officials, which 
established precedents in the culture of corruption.98
To enhance economic productivity, Nkrumah began to transform the Ghanaian 
productive sector, from one solely based on an agrarian economy, to one diversify in 
industrialization and fanning productions. Industrialization was Nkrumah’s way of 
introducing scientific technology into Ghana’s economy but his transformation was 
incomplete before he was ousted from office.99 The military leadership that seized power 
from Nkrumah, a group that I have described as the interlude leadership, abandoned the 
industrial scientific culture that Nkrumah had initiated.100 Since then, no other Ghanaian 
leader has attempted to foster scientific culture to enhance economic production. Unlike 
Nkrumah, Seretse Khama did not initiate scientific culture to transform the Botswana
97 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah, The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
98 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End of an Illusion.
99 Hagan, “Nkrumah's Leadership Style. ”
100 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f  Stability.
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economy from agrarianism to industrialization, but emphasized export promotion of the 
country’s agriculture based-products, especially cattle. For that reason, Botswana also 
lacks a scientific culture of creation. As the two case studies show, the successors of both 
leaders have, with few exceptions, basically followed the cultures initiated by their 
predecessors.101 The above description depicts the picture of the political cultures that the 
postcolonial leaders in the two countries have created. Botswana has advanced high moral 
and low scientific cultures towards economic production. Ghana, on the other hand, has 
created low moral and low scientific cultures.
THE LCD MODEL’S EXPLANATION FOR ECONOMIC DIFFERENCE
The Leadership Culture Development model developed in chapter three suggests a 
reason why economies of African countries are underdeveloped. It states that African 
leaders have been unable to establish appropriate cultures that spur economic 
development. The model lays out a theoretical argument that the attainment of sustainable 
economic development is conditional upon two inseparable and simultaneous premises. 
First, national leaders who are able to rally their societies in establishing a high moral 
culture with altruism in their societies satisfy one of the vital requirements for economic 
development. In addition to the high moral culture, the second requirement, according to 
the LCD model, asserts the need for a scientific culture of creation. In other words, 
leaders who are able to engender a scientific culture of creation that enables their societies
101 In Ghana, successors to Nkrumah have abandoned the industrialization projects he initiated.
The Jerry Rawlings government added human rights abuses in the form of killings innocent people and his 
political opponents to the political equation. For more information on human rights abuses by the 
Rawlings’ government see Herbst, The Politics o f  Reforms in Ghana.
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to create their material economic needs, also satisfy the other vital requirement for 
sustainable economic development. The establishment of both cultures ought to be 
synchronous. The simultaneity of both cultures is vital and critical to the attainment of 
sustainable economic development, since the combination is the only way to achieve a 
development stage that yields full economic benefits to the collective interests of society.
Given the above premises of the LCD model, its explanation or justification for 
the difference in the two economies flows logically. Botswana’s economic success vis-a- 
vis Ghana is due to the country’s leaders establishing and legitimizing one of the two 
cultural conditions that is essential for sustainable economic development. In its case, 
Botswana has been able to establish the moral culture. The leaderships’ ability to 
establish one of the appropriate cultures conducive for economic development explains 
Botswana’s economic progress. In other words, the high moral attitude has enabled them 
to abstain from corruption and avoid siphoning national financial resources away from 
the public treasury for personal use.102 That abstinence, in tum, has allowed financial 
resources to be utilized in improving human development and social welfare; which, the 
leaders have done by providing clean water, education, and healthcare services 
indiscriminately to all members of their society.103 However, according to the premises of 
the LCD model, it should not be assumed that Botswana has economically developed 
because it lacks the scientific culture of creation that the LCD model requires as a 
component in order for a sustainable economic development to occur.
102 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
103 Colclough and McCarthy, The Political Economy o f  Botswana.
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In contrast to Botswana’s positive economic performance, the LCD model also 
explains Ghana’s poor performance as due to its leaderships’ inability to establish or 
legitimize either of the two prerequisite cultures. The lack of high moral culture has 
resulted in endemic corruption by the leadership that misdirects the use of financial 
resources, thereby leaving the country with little financial resources for social 
development.104 The lack of scientific culture in Ghana, just as in Botswana, has resulted 
in its inability to produce most of the industrial consumption goods it needs. For that 
reason, Ghana has become dependent on foreign sources for industrial goods, which has 
resulted in the accumulation of debt that is undermining its prospects for economic 
development.105 Based on the LCD model, both Botswana and Ghana are economically 
underdeveloped. However, if economic development is taken in terms of human 
development then, as this comparative analysis between Ghana and Botswana has shown, 
the latter is developing in comparison to the former.
THE COLONIAL FACTOR AND THE SENGHORIAN DIMENSION
As discussed above, part of the reason why the leaders of Botswana have been 
able to establish high moral culture to benefit their economy is due to the country’s 
unique colonial experience. However, before looking at the colonial connection, we first 
consider what high moral culture is, and why it became part of the Tswana political 
culture in the postcoionial era. High morality is a human psychological attitude that takes
104 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r  Popular Power.
105 How interest payments are draining Ghana’s financial resources, see World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, 1997.
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time to nurture. It deals with doing what is collectively good for society, and its 
importance in socio-economic relationships and to political economy is well known.106 In 
Botswana, this leadership attribute can be traced back to precolonial days when relations 
between leadership and their followers were seen as a social contract.107 Under the social 
contract, precolonial leadership positions were based on the loyalty and the support they 
received from their followers. In a reciprocal fashion, it was, and still is, an obligation for 
the leadership to do what is morally right in order to continue to maintain the legitimacy 
to safeguard their positions. Through these mutual social relations, the need for high 
moral virtue became an obligation for the leaders not to uphold as their own personal 
attribute, but to foster it throughout society. As an old Tswana leadership tradition,108 the 
virtue was passed on to the postcoionial leaders, who themselves were heirs of traditional 
leaderships and had received psychological nurturing of high moral virtues.109
It was under such a moral framework and psychological mindset that Seretse 
Khama fostered the culture of high moral discipline among his officials and the 
community at large. From that perspective, Seretse was doing his duty, as traditional 
customs required of him. His background as royal heir of the Bangwato clan fostered in
106 Richard M. Coughlin, “Whose Morality? Which Community? What Interest? Socio-Economic 
and Communitarian Perspectives," The Journal o f Socio-Economics, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 1996): 135- 
52.
107 Picard, The Evolution o f Modern Botswana.
108 In Botswana, precolonial and colonial leaders such as Khama the Great and Tshekedi Khama 
saw to it as their moral obligation to keep their society together and protect its sovereignty.
109 Seretse’s mother, Tebogo, knowing that her son was one day going to be a kgosi (Chief) 
instilled in him the Royal virtues of honesty and attention that the position will require. See Parsons, 
Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980, 22.
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him these traditional leadership qualities.110 In other words, high morality as a fiber of 
human individuals behavior and conscience had been transferred to Seretse through 
familial nurturing.111 This cultural framework compelled him to fulfill his moral 
obligation as a leader and further compelled him to establish it as a socio-cultural fixture 
that could only benefit the development of his country. The question that arises then is 
how was this traditional human quality able to survive the colonial era and be fostered by 
postcoionial leaders? The difference in colonial rule becomes a factor at this point.
Under colonial protectorate rule, the British did not interfere in the domestic 
affairs of the Tswana chiefs. They left them to maintain and regulate their own customs 
and values.112 Under those conditions, the traditional institutions and their values that 
they held were allowed to continue without being subverted by new values that are 
usually associated with other institutions. This condition made preservation of the high 
moral obligation a duty of leaders to be kept and also be fostered towards social 
development in the community.113 From that lens, the colonial factor becomes the 
difference between direct colonial rule elsewhere in Africa, including Ghana, and the 
colonial protectorate system that existed in Botswana. With the latter making it partially 
possible for the high moral obligation to be preserved and transposed into the 
postcoionial era by leaders who were themselves royal heirs with that same mindset. 
Dialectically, therefore, on a personal level, Seretse Khama was motivated to foster high
110 Ibid.
111 William Murchison, ‘Those Relativist Next Door," The Human Life Review, Vol. 24, No. 3 
(Summer 1998): 7-14.
112 Schapera, Tribal Innovators.
113 Peters, Dividing The Commons.
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moral culture due to his belief and values, which were underlined by his psychological 
mindset.
Besides his beliefs, Khama recognized that to build a nation in which all citizens, 
irrespective of race and tribe could live in peace, he needed a guiding national principle 
with a traditional belief. In that regard, he adapted a Setswana concept of kagisano, which 
means unity, peace, harmony, and a sense of community. It embodied the Tswana 
national identity that retained its social cohesion and stability throughout the protectorate 
era. The concept requires high moral behavior to be fulfilled because it is based on doing 
what is good for an entire society.114 The desire and motivation to advance kagisano as a 
national guiding principle also made establishing high moral culture an obligation and 
duty for Seretse Khama. Here, too, there was a colonial link in the sense that the 
preservation of the kagisano traditional concept was made possible because of the 
protectorate system. In other words, the colonial protectorate system made the protection 
of traditional beliefs, such as the kagisano, possible and the belief, in tum, influenced 
postcoionial leaders of Botswana to establish a high moral culture.
The above explains why Botswana's postcoionial leaders have been able to 
establish, foster, and maintain high moral culture as one of the prerequisite elements of 
the LCD model for development. In essence, the preservation of the leadership and the 
kagisano national concept, were in themselves preserved under the protectorate colonial 
system. Hence, the colonial factor in the ability of postcoionial leaders in Botswana to 
legitimize high moral culture.
114 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
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The Colonial Factor and the Lack of Moral Culture in Ghana
Prior to colonization, the nations that constituted precolonial Ghana had political 
and economic systems similar to those in Botswana. The nations were under the rule of 
chiefs, with their institutions for keeping peace, law, and order guided by their customs 
and moral values. To preserve high moral attitudes and behavior among leaders as a way 
to protect society, there were social institutions in place to prevent leaders from abusing 
their office and engaging in corrupt practices.115 Why then, it is that postcoionial leaders 
in Ghana are unable to foster a similar high moral culture to satisfy one of the conditions 
espoused by the LCD model for improving economic development? Just as with 
Botswana, part o f the explanation lies in what transpired socially during the colonial era.
It was, in part, due to the type of colonial administration that Ghana experienced. In other 
words, the colonization factor also contributed to Ghanaian moral decay.
Unlike the protectorate rule in Botswana, the British ruled colonial Ghana with a 
mixture of direct rule by a central government as well as indirect rule. Through that social 
metamorphosis, direct colonial rule eradicated the traditional moral responsibility as a 
social contract between the ruled and the rulers and brought about domestic moral decay 
in the postcoionial era.116 The nature of colonialism in Ghana brought with it its own 
legal system that ilegitim ized local authority and induced local citizens not to comply 
with social norms that had been ordained by the traditional authority and its
115 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
116 A detailed description o f  the Colony’s government is given by Sir Frederick Lugard in Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
299
institutions.117 This disrupted the status quo of socially accepted moral values and fueled 
the behavior of lawlessness from a perceived attitude by followers to question the 
legitimacy of their traditional leaders. In essence, to the local people, the chiefs did not 
merit their respect because of the judicial challenge that the colonial system posed for the 
local chiefs and their institutions. Why, then did this metamorphosis take place in the 
colonial legal realm? It does so because it is within the legal arena that social elements 
within a community engage each another in contesting access to resources and labor, the 
relationship of power and authority, and the interpretation of morality and culture.118
In the Ghanaian context, as the colonial legal system evolved, new institutions 
that emerged gave the local social elements opportunity to regulate their relationships 
with the colonizer. In the process, it also gave the local elements an opportune way to 
regulate their relationship among themselves. It was through that regulation and re­
organization of relations among the social elements and the colonizer that interpretations 
of morality took a new form and priority for a high moral relationship. The result was the 
disintegration and the breaking of the moral responsibility that used to exist in precolonial 
Ghana.
No clear reason exists as to why postcoionial Ghanaian leaders are unable to 
establish high moral culture to improve Ghana’s economic development. Clearly 
however, leadership egocentrism and direct colonial rule are two reasons for the lack of 
high moral culture in Ghana. This seems to be the case because, in terms of leadership 
egocentrism, high morals would have prevented leaders from achieving their personal
117 Ibid.
118 K. Mann and R. Robert, Law in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991).
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interests through corruption since those high ideals emphasize what is best for the general 
public.119 In other words, high moral culture requires proper utilization of national 
resources and equitable distribution of national income. Leadership grounded in such 
moral certitude would disdain the misuse of public trust. Thus, the absence of high moral 
culture allows postcoionial Ghanaian leaders, such as the late General Acheampong, to 
use national money to purchase personal houses abroad.120 Similarly, establishing high 
moral culture could have acted as a psychological deterrent to stop some of Rawlings’ 
officials such as the ex-Deputy Finance Minister, A. Sorlemy, from achieving his 
ambition of amassing foreign currency for his personal interests.121 The culture would 
have similarly prevented the former president, Jerry Rawlings, from repressing his 
political critics and opponents as a means of securing his political position through 
authoritarianism and dictatorship as opposed to democratic dialogue.122 In all the above 
instances, any attempt by the leaders to establish high moral culture would have been 
detrimental for them in achieving their personal interest. Therefore, the ambition of 
satisfying self interests acts as a motivating factor for postcoionial Ghanaian leaders to 
avoid establishing high moral culture, simply because low moral culture serves their 
economic and political interests.
119 Coughlin. “Whose Morality? Which Community?”
120 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f  Stability.
121 Thomas Friedman, “Here Comes the Sun: Ghana Digs in to Dig Out,” New York Times (May 4,
2001).
122 Gyima-Boadi, “Notes on Ghana’s Current Transition to Constitutional Rule."
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The colonial experience of Ghana is also critical to understanding contemporary 
conditions. In the colonial days, the nature of direct colonial rule in Ghana orchestrated 
two strategies in the process of consolidating its power and that has had an economic 
impact in postcoionial days. First, the colonial rule de-legitimized traditional leaders who 
ruled in colonial Ghana through the legal system and initiated the outright removal of 
chiefs from office.123 The traditional leaders who were removed were sometimes replaced 
with those sympathetic to colonial interests.124 Second, traditional leaders who were left 
in power were subjugated, while other local citizens were excluded from the national 
decision-making process.125 Later, when there was an amendment to allow limited local 
participation in politics, the right to participate in the political structure was contingent 
upon certain types of behavior that demonstrated moral obligation and loyalty to the 
colonial interest as opposed to the domestic interest. Those who were absorbed into the 
system were personally rewarded.126
The inclusion of locals in the colonial political structure prompted two moral 
psychological metamorphoses in Ghana’s social development. First, all those in positions 
saw their authority as emanating from the colonizer and therefore pledged their allegiance 
to the British government, shifting their moral obligations from their country. Few chiefs 
who were allowed to participate saw their inclusion as gratifying because they felt their
123 In 1873 the British sent Kobina Gyan, a traditional leader o f Elimina, into exile in Sierra Leone 
for opposing British rule of the Gold Coast. He was not allowed to come back until 1896. See Gocking,
“British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony. ”
124 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
123 Kimble, A Political History o f  Ghana.
126 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
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positions were supported by the weight of the British authority. To the educated 
commoners, who became part of the colonial system, it was a satisfying recognition of 
status because it gave them the chance to examine problems and give decisions on public 
issues.127 That was how the high moral culture that existed was eliminated during the 
colonial era. It was those who were absorbed into the colonial system that later became 
the national postcoionial leaders.128 Hence, they had no motivation for establishing a high 
moral culture that would undermine their personal interests. In essence, the legitimization 
of low moral culture allowed leaders in Ghana to satisfy their personal interests through 
corruption, human abuses, and political authoritarianism. This is the direct colonial factor 
that has inhibited the motivation for postcoionial leaders in Ghana to establish high moral 
culture.
In Botswana’s case, however, the protectorate system provided a political shield 
that resulted with less damage to the way the people organized their social affairs. The 
protectorate provided stability that helped to preserve high moral obligation among social 
elements. The altruistic nature of leaderships’ high moral culture has resulted in 
abandonment of individual egocentrism in executing a fair distribution of national income 
to improve the living conditions of the Tswana people. Despite the favorable economic 
conditions that have come about due to the high moral culture, Botswana is industrially 
underdeveloped like Ghana. As previously noted, the industrialization inefficiency is due 
to the lack of scientific culture of creation in both countries. The lack of scientific culture,
127 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
128 In 1954 those leaders who became part o f the colonial government, including Nkrumah, also 
guided Ghana to its independence and eventually became the postcoionial leaders. See Rooney, Kwame 
Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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as earlier noted, is in tum due to the adherence of Senghorianism by the regional leaders 
including both Nkrumah and Khama.
The Senghorian Dimension
The Senghorian dimension is a philosophical argument advanced by Leopold 
Sedar Senghor.129 Senghor’s argument claims that an African way of knowing how the 
world works is different from that of European’s way. He asserts that the African mode of 
knowing is a holistic one. It is absent of dualism between men and nature. European 
thinking, by contrast, is analytic and promotes dichotomies. Senghor’s philosophy 
postulates an intuitive form of rationality that is unique to Africans. He asserts that 
Africans have a different personality that is not inferior to the European personality.130 
The argument was used by Senghor in an attempt to defend African culture and correct its 
personal denigration by some Europeans.131 The problem, however, is that this argument 
denigrates analytic scientific rationality and accepts intuition as a source of knowledge.132 
The denigration of scientific analytic rationality is not empirically evident nor is it 
physically obvious. However the philosophy’s analytical indication to that effect is 
apparent. It is illustrated by Senghor’s claim and description of European’s analytic
129 Leopold Sedar Senghor was once the president of Senegal. For more information on Senghor, 
see Rasmussen, M odem African Political Leaders.
130 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
131 Masolo, African Philosophy. For a brief discourse on the denigration of the African culture by 
Europeans and its response from Senghor, see Chapter three of this dissertation. For more detail analysis 
see the work of James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution.
132 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”
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rational mode of knowing as a dichotomous and conflict promoting culture.133 This 
assessment of the European mode of knowing by the philosophy implicitly infers the 
denigration of scientific culture and its technological rationality. Even though this 
interpretation may not be acceptable, and opened to debate, due to the opinion of others 
that Senghorianism is intended for the defense of African’s self-definition and cultural 
behavior.ljJ Despite such argument, however, the philosophy’s implied denigration of 
the European analytic scientific mode of knowing is quite obvious and can hardly be 
denied.
Senghor’s assessment of African’s mode of knowing as intuitive, inferring its no 
need for step by step analytic approach to understand how the world works, is in itself 
indicative of superiority of intuitive knowledge and a denigration of analytic scientific 
thinking. In other words through comparative analysis, the philosophy hints at the idea 
that intuitive knowledge does not have the need to go through the trial and error 
mechanics to acquire the accumulative knowledge base that empowers human thinking. 
Deductively the philosophy implies that due to its nature, intuitive knowledge avoids the 
dualistic conflicting characteristic that is associated with dichotomous analytic mode of 
knowing and makes it superior.
The denigration of European analytic rationality by Senghorianism goes far 
beyond its dichotomous nature and its non-intuitive qualities. In another writing, Senghor 
uses Frobenius to illustrate the inferiority of analytic mode of knowing in comparison
133 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
134 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest. "
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with intuitive mode of knowing.135 In his writing on Frobenius and the Revolution of 
1889, Senghor argues that the dialectical European rationalism, including Cartesian and 
anti-Hellenic rationalism were really not satisfactory. He further goes on to stress that 
indeed the traditions associated with German romanticism in the Schlegels, in Novalis, 
and Fichte were only re-enforcement and often degradation of quintessential European 
rationalism.136 Unarguably, such a view of Senghor in describing European rationalism 
and its analytical mode of knowing in no simple terms a denigration, while he viewed and 
described African cultural antiquity and its potential for development.
It was Senghor’s belief that Frobenius achievements laid in his breaking away 
from the kind of structural analytic rationalism of which Claude Levi-Strauss was the 
chief advocate.137 To Senghor, Frobenius was thus unlike both Levi-Strauss and 
Durkeheim, and was not interested in the “perpetual accumulation of facts” rather he was 
concerned with perpetual global perspectives. According to Senghor, Frobenius approach 
sought the rejection of discursive reason and a return to feeling or intuition “as mean of 
gaining insight into values, not facts of quantities” which Senghorianism deems as 
superior to analytic scientific rationalism.138
In comparing African intuitive and European analytic modes of knowing, 
Senghorianism sees African intuitive culture as a true balance in civilization and affirms
135 Michael J. C. Echeruo. “Negritude and History: Senghor’s Argument with Frobenius,"
Research in African Literature, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter 1993): 1-12.
136 Leopold Sedar Senghor, ‘T he Revolution o f 1889 and Leo Frobenius,” in Isaac James Mowoe 
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it as the equilibrium between feeling and will, soul and mind; a feature which the 
philosophy notes as missing in analytic mode of knowing. Senghor concurs with 
Frobenius that European analytic mode is engaged in a pattern of steady and destructive 
influence of rationalism.Ij9 Some adherents of the philosophy share similar views about 
analytic scientific mode of knowing and address it in identical denigrative way. Among 
that group, there is no reminder of the analytic denigration approach of the particular 
acuity of Senghor’s response than a comment of Nnamdi Azikiwe. In his evaluation of 
analytic mode of knowing, Azikiwe wrote: “I was convinced that although the western 
system was more systematic than that of African, nevertheless African philosophy was 
practical in the sense that people did not waste time on logic and frivolous arguments. 
Their philosophy was more pragmatic in that it was related to practical problems of 
everyday life which they solved by adapting themselves to the logic of reason and 
experience.”140 Most contemporary African leaders have accepted this Senghorian 
dimension in its totality as a way to preserve African identity. In one sense, the 
acceptance allows them to psychologically move African culture to its own locality, away 
from criticism, thus serving as a solution to the crisis of African self-definition. The 
dilemma is that, in doing so, postcoionial African leaders have psychologically 
acknowledged that the indigenous Africans’ mode of knowing and understanding of how 
the world works lacks scientifico-technical rationality.141
139 Echeruo, “Negritude and History: Senghor's Argument with Frobenius."
140 Nnamdi Azikiwe, My Odyssey: Autobiography (London: Hurst, 1970): 120.
141 Oladipo, “Reason. Identity, and the African Quest. ”
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As a result, contemporary sub-Saharan African leaders are less motivated to 
establish scientific culture in an attempt to understand the natural law of creation through 
analytical thinking. In other words, the rejection of a scientific culture of creation, based 
on the belief that it is an area of foreign culture per Senghor’s argument and the 
acceptance of intuition as source of knowledge embedded in mythological paradigm, as a 
reason for African cultural uniqueness, inhibits the leaders from fostering and 
legitimizing scientific culture. It is within this psychological mindset that both 
contemporary leaders of Botswana and Ghana, including all their colleagues in the sub- 
Saharan region, operate, thus making them unmotivated to establish scientific cultures in 
their respective countries. The first postcoionial leaders, Seretse Khama of Botswana and 
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, were adherents of the Senghorian philosophy and believed in 
the uniqueness of African culture in its totality without noticing the universality o f culture 
in some aspects. The subscription of Senghorian philosophy by Khama and Nkrumah, 
along with their successors, is evident by the two leaders public declarations in support of 
African cultural uniqueness.
Nkrumah, in his days as the leader, realized that the only way Ghana’s economy 
could be developed to increase productivity and serve the diverse needs of the population 
was through industrialization.142 To accomplish that objective, he embarked on setting up 
industrial projects in Ghana and sending students to study in European and North 
American countries.143 However, his adherence to the Senghorian philosophy and his 
conviction to protect all aspects of African cultural uniqueness made him apprehensive in
142 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
143 Agyeman, “Social and Political Outlook."
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replacing the mythological intuitive part of the Ghanaian culture with scientific analytic 
culture. Nowhere did Nkrumah take as much pains to demonstrate his Senghorian 
convictions as in his speech “African personality,” a concept underpinned by the 
Senghorian distinction. On the occasion, when Nkrumah was inaugurating the institute of 
African studies, he declared that “the personality of the African was stunted in this 
process can only be retrieved from the ruins if we make a conscious effort to restore 
African’s ancient glory.”144 In this regard, Nkrumah was identifying the cause of Africa’s 
retrogression as its cultural alienation from the past, something he considered as African’s 
unique personality. He went on to say that it is only in condition of total freedom from 
foreign interference that the aspirations of Africans can be fulfilled and “the African 
genius finds its expression.”145 By alluding to the concept of African genius, Nkrumah 
was not only endorsing the uniqueness of the African mode of knowing, but he was also 
advocating its preservation. Nkrumah made a further distinction between African culture 
and others by saying “by African genius, I mean something positive, our social 
conception o f society, the efficiency and the validity of our tradition.”146
After being discouraged by the lack of capital inflows from the west to spur 
Ghana’s economic development, Nkrumah shifted from a market approach to economic 
socialism. In order to justify this cultural isolationist approach towards economic 
development, Nkrumah told Ghanaians that it was essential for the nation to follow a 
development path that will enable Ghana to undergo economic transformation that
144 Kwame Nkrumah, The African Genius (Accra, Ghana: Government Press, 1963): 5.
145 Ibid.
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“would not affect the roots of society.”147 In other words, Nkrumah’s African socialism 
was theoretically conceived as a paradoxical concept, one in which, the Ghanaian society 
could have been able to associate itself with a material technical base without becoming 
part of what is deemed by Senghorian philosophy as European culture. In that context and 
on a practical structural basis, Nkrumah’s African socialism can be viewed as a parallel 
existence of material technical ability and a holistic mode of knowing that could have 
been simultaneous but mutually exclusive, with the objective of enabling Ghanaians to 
preserve their self-identification.
In a sense, Nkrumah was caught in what can be termed as the Senghorian cultural 
economic dilemma. This situation faces many sub-Saharan African leaders and prevents 
them from being able to establish a scientific culture to develop. In Nkrumah’s case, and 
perhaps in that of other African leaders, he did not intend to change the Ghanaian culture 
by defying his Senghorian belief. In that context, what he meant by African socialism can 
be fairly and accurately interpreted as creating an economic productive system different 
from the one that used to be promoted by European social democrats in the 20th 
century.148
One logical explanation as to why Nkrumah was toiling with the African socialist 
idea was his belief in the Senghorian philosophy. He had come to believe that an 
analytical culture that promotes dichotomies is a characterization of an European 
epistemology. This was amplified in his belief of wanting to separate the material
146 Ibid., 6
147 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah, 63.
148 Ibid.
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technical base from the roots of culture. In regards to whether the idea is feasible or not, 
the problem that African socialism inherently poses is that it is not theoretically feasible 
to unite a material technical based culture and solely intuitive culture. The reason is that 
the two create an antagonistic pair. The difficulty of their coexistence emanates from the 
fact that there is an inverse relation between the two aspects. The predominance of a 
culture of holistic intuitive knowledge depends on the lack of understanding in an 
analytical manner as to how the world works. On the other hand, a high magnitude of 
material technical base depends on how well one understands the analytical scientific 
informative structure that underlines natural law.
In essence, Nkrumah wanted to have the best of both worlds but that was not 
possible in such a situation. That was part of Nkrumah ‘s dilemma that partially inhibited 
him from being able to foster, establish, and legitimize a scientific culture in Ghana 
before he was ousted from office. A similar predicament has befallen all of Nkrumah’s 
successors, in the sense that, all postcoionial Ghanaian leaders have been caught in the 
Senghorian cultural economic dilemma. They have neglected fostering, establishing, and 
legitimizing a scientific culture of creation based on the philosophy of Senghor, which 
advocates that African’s culture falls outside the scientific paradigm.
As with Ghana, Botswana also lacks scientific culture as the country depends 
on foreign sources for basically all its industrial consumption goods. Its economy is 
dominated by mining and agricultural raw material production. Since independence, the 
leaders have paid less attention to fostering a scientific culture capable of inducing 
industrialization and, instead have been pursuing small seale Appropriate Technology
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which is unsuitable for industrialization that spurs economic development.149 Again, the 
question becomes why was Seretse Khama, a highly moral conscientious leader, unable to 
establish analytical scientific culture that could have stimulated the minds of his fellow 
citizens to pursue an understanding of the natural law of creation that could further 
develop Botswana?
From his youth, even though from a privileged house of the Bangwato royal 
family, Seretse Khama was confronted by European discrimination. In his native 
Bechuanaland, black children were denied schooling beyond the primary level. Only 
those who came from royal families had the chance to attend segregated black schools 
like Tiger Kloof in South Africa.150 Given that background, Seretse Khama had always 
been aware of how Europeans treated black Africans with humiliation. He tried to be 
oblivious to the discrimination but had to deal with it on a personal level in his marriage 
to Ruth Wiliams, a white woman from England.151 Protests by white leaders in South 
Africa and South Rhodesia to induce British leaders to ban Seretse from Bechuanaland 
due to his marriage made it more obvious to him as to how white Europeans scomed 
black Africans.152 Neighboring South Africa’s apartheid treatment of blacks and its 
government’s ban against Seretse from entering that country following his marriage, all 
contributed to Khama’s resentment of the European denigration of black African culture 
and identity. In that regard, and as an African nationalist leader, Seretse viewed the
149 Segal, “Appropriate Technology.”
150 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."
151 Redfem, Ruth and Seretse.
152 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."
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European degradation and its social subjugation as an insult and disgrace to the authentic 
African tradition and culture and as such accepted the Senghorian response in totality. 
Consequently, he also became a believer in the Senghorian response and accepted the 
notion that the African way of knowing was different from the analytical European way.
Adhering to this principle, Khama portrayed the African culture as different and 
therefore categorized scientifico-technical rationality as characteristically European, 
rather than African.153 With this psychological mindset, he neglected to formulate 
policies to pursue scientific culture. Khama demonstrated his conviction to the 
philosophy by making a distinction between African and non-African cultures and made 
public declarations to that effect. For example, in advocating kagisano and in responding 
to an accusation that his government had no traditional guiding principles, Khama 
clarified that Botswana’s economic development was not going to follow the path of alien 
cultures conceived in a “faraway land.” He asked his people that Botswana’s economic 
development be built “on the foundations provided by Botswana’s culture and 
Botswana’s values and traditions.”154 Khama went on to conclude that foreign cultural 
beliefs and ways “may be perfectly suitable for the countries and continents in which they 
have developed, but they can have little meaning for the majority of Batswana.” 155
From the above position one can deduce that Khama was viewing Botswana’s 
total culture as unique from others in terms of human development, a position that falls in 
line with the Senghorian belief. Captivated by the uniqueness of the African culture,
153 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
134 Ibid., 148.
155 Ibid.
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Seretse pursued relentless economic policies based on export promotion of raw materials, 
which Botswana possessed naturally or the ones that were produced under nature’s 
constraints, without pursuing scientific culture of creation. As Nkrumah in Ghana, Seretse 
believed in the Senghorian philosophy and came to accept that, by nature, the scientifico- 
technical culture is European. For this reason, he was unmotivated to foster scientific 
culture. This path has been followed by Seretse’s successors. Because of this, scientific 
culture is not being established in Botswana, rather the country is pursuing what is 
considered as Appropriate Technology which is more labor intensive and less 
technologically oriented. 156
SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that, in comparing the impact of leadership on economic 
development in Botswana and Ghana, differences and similarities exist. The differences 
in the leaderships relate to differences in colonization. The colonial administration type 
helps explain cultural ramifications that defined the economic outcomes in both 
countries. In terms of colonial difference, Botswana’s protectorate system allowed the 
traditional leaders to manage their internal political administrative affairs without foreign
i  c y
interference. Unlike Botswana, Ghana’s colonization came with direct British 
governance of the local people.158 Protectorate and direct colonization, due to their 
administrative differences, had significantly different impacts on leadership evolution in
156 Segal, “Appropriate Technology."
157 Shillington, The Colonization o f Southern Tswana.
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the two countries during the colonial era that, in turn, has had a postcolonial impact on 
both countries economies. The state of political affairs helped to maintain leadership 
continuity and moral obligations between the leaders and their followers in Botswana. In 
contrast to the leadership continuity in Botswana due to the protectorate model of 
colonization, the direct colonial rule in Ghana resulted in leadership discontinuity. At the 
time of direct colonial rule, Ghana’s traditional leaders and their institutions were 
subjugated to a British colonial judicial system.159
The colonial systems provided two different leadership contingencies for both 
countries at the dawn of the colonial era. During the transition from the colonial to 
postcolonial era, Botswana’s leadership remained continuous with the same class of 
traditional leaders.160 In Ghana, the direct colonial rule created another group of leaders 
made up of an educated class that had self-interest in the colonial administration. It was to 
that group that the colonizers transferred postcolonial leadership, with the traditional 
leaders who previously had local legitimacy being excluded from the national 
constitutional rule.161 Without legitimacy at home, the educated leadership group looked 
to Great Britain for its legitimacy and accordingly aligned its moral obligation with the 
colonizers. Based on that relationship, postcolonial Ghanaian leaders felt that they had no 
moral obligation to local peoples. This structural problem combined with low morals 
allowed them to satisfy their economic and political interest through corruption and
158 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
159 Gocking, “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony."
160 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khanta 1921-1980.
161 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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repression. In the early years of his leadership Nkrumah spoke against bribery and 
corruption but did not take any direct measure to combat the practice, thus allowing it to 
permeate economic institutions.162
Botswana leaders, on the other hand, have always thought of themselves 
differently. Given their past relationship with the people through their family 
backgrounds, as being heirs from the royal families of the individual tribes, they have 
always been aware of their fiduciary relationships with the people and the importance of 
keeping their moral obligation. Botswana postcolonial leaders have kept their traditional 
moral obligation through the Tswana concept o f kagisano, which emphasizes high morals 
between the government and people. Khama, the first postcolonial leader, established a 
high moral culture by emphasizing and developing policies of non-tolerance against 
immoral acts of corruption in his government. Khama and his successors have followed 
the high moral ground and have designed national institutions to achieve collective 
interests as opposed to fulfilling personal interests.
In essence, postcolonial leaders in the two countries have established two different 
social cultures. Botswana postcolonial leaders have been able to establish a high moral 
culture void of corruption and a democratic capitalist system teeming with political 
stability. Both traits have cumulatively resulted in higher per capita income, more 
education for all school age children, and good healthcare service for the majority of 
citizens in Botswana. The Ghanaian postcolonial leaders, on the other hand, have not 
been successful in establishing high morals. Their low moral culture has led to 
corruption and political authoritarianism. Those conditions have resulted in the theft of
162 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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national financial resources and political instability. These have deprived the society of 
economic benefits such as education to all children and universal healthcare.
Unfortunately for both countries, however, their leaders have been unable to establish 
scientific cultures, which could induce industrialization and enable their countries to 
supply their own industrial material needs.163
Based on UNDP’s Human Development Index, current economic indicators show 
that Botswana is doing well vis-a-vis Ghana. The theoretical explanation for this 
difference provided by the LCD model, is that Botswana’s leaders were able to establish a 
high moral culture as one of the essential prerequisite cultures needed for economic 
development. The high moral culture has enabled the leaders to significantly curtail 
corruption and altruistically direct national financial resources into social welfare. Again, 
Ghana’s economy is doing poorly because its leaders have been unwilling to establish 
high moral culture. The absence of this feature has allowed the leaders to siphon national 
resources for personal uses. The diversion of national resources for personal interests 
means that fewer resources are available for social welfare improvement and human 
development.
Despite the economic improvement, Botswana is still industrially underdeveloped 
and its economy relies on raw material production because it lacks the scientific culture 
of creation to enable it to produce industrial goods. Just like Botswana, in that context, 
Ghana also lacks scientific culture and depends on raw material production. In other 
words, Ghanaian leaders have not been able to establish either high moral culture or
163 Ahmad, “Science and Technology.”
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scientific culture needed for economic development; hence, its economic 
impoverishment. While reasons for failing to establish high moral culture is partially 
attributed to the colonial past, it can also be attributed to the Senghorian beliefs of their 
leaders and their desire to preserve what they erroneously deem as an African culture.
The Senghorian philosophy postulates that the African way of knowing is intuitive 
rather than analytic, one that denigrates analytic scientific thinking.164 Even though the 
original argument was used to defend African self-identification, most contemporary 
African leaders have accepted its premises in totality in terms of African culture. Part of 
the reason why Nkrumah and Khama accepted this concept of reasoning is that it helped 
them to psychologically move African culture away from criticism as a solution to the 
crisis of African self-definition.165 Both leaders believed in the Senghorian explanation to 
the point that the acceptance of what the philosophy deems as European culture meant the 
denial of who they are as Africans. Hence, the leaders’ lack of enthusiasm to pursue a 
scientific culture that is essential for economic development, but which is characterized 
by Senghorianism as un-African. It was that dilemma that led Nkrumah to adopt African 
socialism as a developmental approach. Through that path, he thought Ghana could gain a 
material technical base without negatively affecting its cultural roots.166 To avoid a 
similar dilemma, Khama believed the way to develop Botswana’s economy was to use 
African culture as opposed to cultures from foreign lands.167 To do that, he pursued
164 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
165 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”
166 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
167 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
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export promotion based on raw material production, which relies less on scientific culture 
that Senghorian philosophy condemns as un-African. This belief has been followed by all 
the successors of the two leaders and has resulted in the absence of industrialization. In 
essence, the lack of scientific culture of creation in both countries has impaired their 
desire for sustainable economic development.




Immediately after the World War II, the global political economy changed. Many 
nations in Africa that had been previously colonized by European countries began 
asserting their sovereignty. The independence phenomenon swept across the continent, 
and within a generation, most of the nations had become free from European 
colonization. However, the end of the colonial rule came with a challenge of economic 
development to the new leaders who took over the reigns of power in the newly 
independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Since then, many of those countries have 
remained economically underdeveloped. In many cases, most of these countries have had 
economic development set back, and abject poverty has become the norm for the past 
four decades. The regional leaderships have created cultural conditions that have 
undermined hopes for socio-economic development that could improve living conditions 
and fulfill the aspirations of their people.
In this research, I have examined the leadership problems that underlie the poor 
economic conditions of countries in sub-Sahara Africa. In this final chapter, I conclude 
the research by first reiterating the initial objective and review the theoretical linkage 
upon which the study was based. Second, I review the major findings, and highlight the 
work’s contributions to the literature. Third, the chapter looks at the limits of the research 
and suggests other avenues for future research relating to leadership, culture, and 
economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the chapter considers some of the
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study's implications for sub-Saharan Africa countries and offers modest policy 
recommendations.
OBJECTIVE AND THEORETICAL LINKAGE
The economic development literature maintains that leadership and culture are 
important determinants of economic development. Despite this assertion, however, a 
careful review of the literature shows that contemporary economic development advice 
offered to sub-Saharan African countries and the thinking that underlies it is misguided. 
The advice ignores a substantial body of evidence about the importance of leadership and 
culture in economic development.1 Taking the above condition as a point of departure, 
two assumptions were made for this research study. First, it was assumed that leaders 
have been impediments to economic development in sub-Sahara African countries. The 
second assumption argues that the economic underdevelopment conditions in the region 
are due to the absence of socio-scientific culture. Based on those assumptions, a 
hypothesis and two research questions were formulated. The hypothesis states that sub- 
Saharan African leaderships have failed to establish socio-scientific culture that can 
promote technological innovation for economic development. The first question asked: 
Why have the leaderships in the region failed to establish the prerequisite scientific 
culture needed for economic development? The second question assumes a failure in 
establishing the appropriate cultural environments needed for development and asked: 
What culture, created by leaders, impedes economic development in the region?
1 Casson, The Economics o f Business.
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In answering the above questions, the hypothesis has been tested by case studies 
of Botswana and Ghana. Utilizing the leadership, culture, and development (LCD) model 
in conjunction with the case studies, this research has shown a correlation between 
leadership and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. The LCD model highlights 
the association between the three variables in analyzing the progress of a nation. It 
articulates that leadership is a process phenomenon where individuals with high moral 
capability rally group members to achieve a mutual quest that benefits the group. Leaders 
accomplish such objectives through legitimization and interpretation of social norms with 
the power invested in them by the group members as a whole. Dialectically, the 
legitimization and interpretation powers of the leaders make them cultural architects.2
Cultures are accepted systems of social practices of behavior and prescriptions 
embedded with technology in the form of knowledge. They are linked to economic 
development as a social capital/ Culture is also economically related, in the sense that, it 
is compatible with individuals’ optimization. Deductively, therefore, culture becomes 
economically driven and becomes linked to economic development.4 There are two broad 
aspects of culture, namely, the resen’e and the universal zones. The reserve zone is useful 
for personal actualization and has no essential bearing on human truth or falsehood. On 
the other hand, the universal zone anchors cultural elements of religion and science of 
creation that has true human values and is essential to the quality of human life. Religion 
offers moral attributes from which moral culture is derived, while scientific beliefs offer
: Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
3 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development."
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informative ways of understanding the natural law of creation (i.e., technology). The two 
cultural elements form the basic fabric upon which human values rely.3 Therefore, the 
motivating desire and personal ability of leaders to establish those cultural attributes 
determines how their societies progress economically.0
Countries with leaders that are able to engineer both scientific and moral cultural 
attributes acquire a certain level of social and scientific knowledge that when 
synchronously applied, become social and material technologies. These, in turn, help to 
improve societal living standards. It is the acquisition of  this capability to provide the 
foundation for sustainable improvement in living conditions for a nation that constitutes 
development. Development, therefore, occurs when a nation, through accumulative 
causation by virtue of cultural process, acquires the understanding of the natural law of 
creation and uses it to attain socio-scientific capability that enables the society to produce 
diverse products and services to satisfy its population's need.7 Hence, its absence brings 
about socio-economic underdevelopment, which most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are 
experiencing.8
As discussed in chapters three through six, the hypothesized relationship between 
leadership and economic development in Botswana and Ghana is strongly supported by 
the evidence in the case studies. As the evidence suggests, the economic improvement
i Sen. “A Matter o f Choice.”
’ Wiredu, ‘‘Problems in Africa’s Self-Definition."
6 Casson. ‘‘Cultural Determinants.”
7 Kuznets, Economic Growth; Myrdal, “What is Development ’"
8 Muriithi, African Crisis, Is There Hopei
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that has occurred in Botswana is symptomatic of the presence of high moral cultural 
standards, which it’s postcolonial leaders have fostered and nurtured through policies and 
public speeches.9 In Ghana, by contrast, the economic stagnation reflects the low moral 
cultural standards that its contemporary leaders have legitimized.10 The difference in 
leadership that is being exercised by the leaders of both countries is partially elucidated 
by their different colonial legacies, and partially by the Senghorian philosophy.
Taking into account the cultures that the leaders have established and the 
difference economic outcomes that have materialized in both countries, this study 
concludes that the hypothesized relationship between leadership and economic 
development in sub-Saharan Africa is strongly supported by the evidence from the case 
studies. The case studies show that the leaders have been unable to establish high moral 
and scientific cultures synchronously. It is the absence o f both cultures to minimize 
corruption, increase institutional efficiency, and provide innovative creative thinking that 
explains the economic underdevelopment in the region.
The evidence from the case studies suggests that the answer to the first research 
question, why the leaders have failed to establish the two prerequisite cultures for 
economic development lies in part with the colonial discourse and the Senghorian 
dimension. The colonial factor emphasized that the different colonial administrations 
provided different postcolonial leaderships in sub-Saharan Africa. In Botswana, where 
there was a protectorate administration, the precolonial leadership was left intact to allow 
leadership continuity into the postcolonial era. That state of affairs allowed postcolonial
9 Samatar, An African Miracle.
10 Petchenkine. Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
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leaders to acknowledge their self-interest duty and to remain committed to the economic 
interests of the general population. With that psychological mindset, contemporary 
Botswana leaders have a motivation to foster and legitimize a high moral culture towards 
economic improvement.
In colonial areas like Ghana, where there existed direct colonial rule, local 
precolonial leaders with traditional legitimacy were subjugated and eliminated during the 
colonial era.11 Towards the postcoionial era, new leadership groups without traditional 
legitimacy were given national political power in the region by the colonizer. Without 
fiduciary relations with the general society, the leaders are psychologically disconnected 
from the masses. This fragmented relationship has led to a leadership focused on personal 
rather than collective interests. This situation has created a leadership group of immoral 
minorities, who dominate the sub-Sahara Africa’s political scene and remain unmotivated 
to establish a high moral culture for collective national developmental interests. The case 
study evidence suggests that the reason for the leaders’ inability to establish scientific 
culture resides in their adherence to Senghorianism. This philosophy advocates that the 
African mode of knowing is intuitive as opposed to being analytic.1- The acceptance of 
this doctrine by the SSA leaders inhibits them from establishing a scientific culture 
capable of inducing industrial economic development.
11 Gocking. “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony."
12 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
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Finally, regarding the question as to what culture has been created instead of high 
moral and scientific cultures: the case studies show that Botswana has been able to 
establish a culture that minimizes corruption, while Ghana has failed to do so. In Ghana, 
leaders have established low moral culture that has resulted in leadership corruption, 
political authoritarianism, and human rights abuses. It is the Ghanaian socio-economic 
cultural type that the sub-Sahara African leaders have established in place of the 
prerequisite socio-scientific culture that is essentially needed for region’s economic 
development. Based on the evidence from the two case studies and using deductive 
reasoning, this study finds that the economic underdevelopment in sub-Saharan African 
nations has been due to leaderships’ inability to foster and legitimize the prerequisite 
socio-scientific cultures for economic development.
MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDIES
It was found that precolonial Ghana was occupied by different nations. The 
nations were led by leaders who waged wars among themselves for political and 
economic supremacy and, therefore, were unable to form a homogenous society with a 
consolidated national leadership. In the fifteenth century, the Ashanti Empire emerged 
with a central government guided by the Ashanti constitution. Even though the 
centralized political system was effective from the beginning, it later became ineffective 
due to expansion of the empire. For that reason, the Ashanti leaders adopted a repressive 
method of ruling, as opposed to consociational democracy, that led to the disintegration 
of the homogenous society they were trying to build.13 Economically, precolonial Ghana
13 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
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was composed of agrarian societies that also engaged in commerce. The means of 
production was land. and. in lieu of that fact, leaders supervised the access to land to 
ensure that people who wanted to farm were not denied that right. In commerce, the 
nations regarded their trade with the Europeans as important because it allowed them to 
procure guns to embark on political and economic expansion.14
The nations were colonized between 1850 and 1902 by the British and were 
joined to create the Gold Coast. Unlike a protectorate, the British administered the Gold 
Coast under direct rule and eliminated most of the traditional leaders by either removing 
them from their positions or sometimes sending them into exile.15 Traditional leaders 
who were allowed to remain found their institutions subjugated to the colonial judicial 
system.16 In the process, the British created another class of local leadership made of 
educated elites. During the transition from colonial rule to the postcolonial era, the newly 
created local leadership group became a competitor to the traditional leaders and vied for 
national power. Due to vacillating policies of the colonial administration the two local 
leadership groups could not unite to form a united leadership for the good for their 
country.
By the end of the colonial rule, the national political power had been seized from 
the traditional leaders and was given to the new educated groups. With the adoption of 
the British representative system of democracy, the traditional leaders were excluded
14 Ward, A History o f the Gold Coast.
15 Gocking, “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony.”
16 Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."
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from the national constitutional rule.1' The transfer of power to the new educated 
leadership group during the transition stimulated a moral psychological metamorphosis in 
Ghana’s social development. The leadership group that inherited power from Britain 
lacked local legitimacy because its legitimacy to rule emanated from the colonizer. With 
that psychological perception, the leaders shifted their moral obligations and loyalty to the 
colonizer to satisfy their personal interest as opposed to seeking to serve Ghana’s national 
collective interests.
As a result, the direct colonial rule did two things that have had an impact on 
Ghana’s socio-economic development. First, by eliminating and replacing traditional 
leaders who had fiduciary relations with the masses, the direct colonial rule eradicated 
moral responsibility as a social contract between the rulers and the ruled, causing a moral 
decay in the Ghanaian society.18 This disrupted the traditional political economy system 
of the country. Those who became postcolonial leaders had no motivation in establishing 
high moral standards that could have undermined their personal interests. In 1951 when 
Nkrumah became the head of the colonial government, his quest for power prevented him 
from making political concessions to build a unified leadership for Ghana.19 Instead, he 
adopted an authoritarian approach to stabilize the nation and, in so doing, laid the 
foundation for dictatorial political culture for Ghana's postcolonial era.20
1' Bourret. Ghana: The Road to Independence.
18 Lugard, Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa.
19 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
20 Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy o f an African Dictatorship.
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Economically, Nkrumah embarked on social projects to enhance development. 
However, after independence, he failed to foster a high moral culture to curb corrupt 
practices. Nkrumah allowed his party officials to use national economic institutions, like 
the Cocoa Marketing Board to extract money from producers to satisfy their personal 
interests at the expense of national development interests.21 Through authoritarian rule, 
Nkrumah’s successors have followed and intensified the economic and political practices 
that undermine development in Ghana. Today. Ghana’s economy is overburdened with 
debt, and its per capita income stands at approximately $400.22 In education, Ghana has 
an adult illiteracy rate of 36%, and a basic education enrollment of 76% for school age 
children.2j The universal healthcare service that Ghanaians enjoyed at the time of 
independence has long been abandoned by contemporary postcolonial leaders. Today 
many citizens do not have access to healthcare. On the average, there are four physicians 
for every 100.000 patients with few rural dwellers having access to physicians.24 This 
economic decline has been further worsened by the last twenty years under the Rawlings’ 
government.
Not only has the Ghanaian economy stagnated; it is also unable to produce 
industrial goods due to lack of scientific culture of creation.25 The lack of scientific 
culture is due to its postcolonial leaders’ adherence, beginning with Nkrumah. to
' '  Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion.
African Development Bank, Basic Indicators on African Countries (Abidjan. Ivory Coast: 
African Development Bank, 1995).
Ibid.
24 Dugbatey, “National Health Policies.”
Ahmad. “Science and Technology."
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Senghoriunism. This philosophy advocates, by way of defending African self- 
actualization. that analytical scientific thinking is a European cultural trait as opposed to 
an African one.26 In evaluating Ghana’s economic development since its independence, 
the evidence points to the fact that the country’s current deplorable economic state of 
affairs is largely due to its leadership’s abuse of power and corruption.'7 In essence, since 
the end of the colonial era, Ghanaian leaders have all inhibited the country’s 
development."
In examining leadership and development in Botswana, it was found that 
precolonial leaders established a well-entrenched political and economic apparatus that 
served the mutual interests of the rulers and the ruled. Acknowledging that their 
legitimacy came from the people, the leaders maintained their moral obligation to the 
society as a whole. Politically, the leaders organized their societies based on participatory 
democracy, adjudicated disputes, and made decisions about social service. Economically, 
the ruling classes were the guardians of the people and made sure that people had land for 
grazing, crops, and residence. Through the cattle loaning (mafisa) system, the political 
leadership established a fiduciary social relationship with the people to support and 
maintain social stability and progression. In times of security needs, leaders, like Khama 
the Great, rallied other traditional chiefs into military alliance to repel attackers. By the 
time of Khama the Grate’s death, he had built a homogenous Tswana society.29
' f> Senghor. Prose and Poetry.
' 7 Rimmer. Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy.
' 8 Petehenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
■'* Picard. The Evolution o f  Modem Botswana.
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In the mid 1800’s, the Tswana nations sought an alliance with the British. The 
relationship later turned into a protectorate agreement. The arrangement obliged the 
United Kingdom to recognize traditional leaders as an autonomous authority without 
impinging on their legitimacy. That characteristic allowed the leaders to maintain their 
moral obligations to the people and also made Botswana’s colonization different from 
that of other African colonies that experienced direct ru le /0 When the British attempted 
to change the protectorate arrangement to replace it with direct rule. Tswana leaders, led 
byTshckcdi Khama, resisted the change to preserve Botswana’s traditional institutions 
and the leaders' legitimacy without polarization among the local social elements. That 
colonial protectorate legacy allowed Botswana to have leadership continuity during the 
transition from the colonial era to the postcolonial era.
The first postcolonial leadership under Seretse Khama used traditional 
institutional moral obligation to foster high moral standards to prevent corruption. ’1 In 
addition to high moral standards, Khama stressed the importance of democracy in 
decision-making and designed the actions of his government to promote democratic 
attitudes. With high moral culture minimizing leadership corruption and good 
governance, Khama channeled national resources into human development. Since 
Khama’s death, his successors have followed the path of high moral cultural standards, 
which he laid, and also have formulated policies that have improved the economic living
j0 Crowder. West Africa Under Colonial Rule.
31 Isaksen, “Macroeconomic Management and Bureaucracy.”
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standards of the Botswana people. Today. Botswana has a high literacy rate of 70% and 
a basic school enrollment has increased 112% for school age children; and many of the 
citizens live within ten miles from health care centers.JJ Botswana's per capita income is 
over $3,000 and is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that is debt free. 4
Despite the above economic achievements, Botswana, like Ghana, is industrially 
underdeveloped because its leaders have been less motivated to foster a scientific culture 
of creation that can induce industrialization. The reason for the lack of enthusiasm in 
establishing scientific culture is due to its postcolonial leaders’ adherence to the 
Senghorian philosophy. It defends African self-actualization and argues that analytical 
scientific thinking is a European culture, not an African one.35 However, in comparing 
Botswana and Ghana’s current economic status, based on UNDP’s Human Development 
Index as the ability of a country to translate economic gains into improving living 
conditions, Botswana’s economic living conditions have dramatically improved. The 
leadership’s ability to foster high moral culture has enabled the poor desert country that 
was virtually seen as another Bantu state at the time of its independence, to surpass 
Ghana. Even though the high moral culture has not resulted in economic development 
due to the absence of scientific culture, it puts Botswana on the first stage of the 
development hierarchy that Rostow proposed/6 The country’s acquisition of scientific
Samatar, An African Miracle.
33 Owuor-Omondi. Atlholang. and Diselco, Botswana: A National Health Status Evaluation.
34 African Development Bank. Basic Indicators. 1995.
35 Senghor, Prose and Poetry-.
36 Rostow, The Stages o f  Economic Growth.
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culture will complete its second stage of development process and propel it into the ‘take 
off’ stage as described by Rostow.’'
Just like the rest of the sub-Saharan African countries, there is no clear indication 
as to when both Botswana and Ghana will be able to foster and legitimize scientific 
cultures. As this research has shown, that situation will depend on when leaders emerge 
in those countries to break away from the Senghorian myth and legitimize scientific 
cultures. In Botswana, the acquisition of scientific culture can occur if a leader arises to 
rally the people in establishing a scientific culture in conjunction with its present high 
moral culture.
In Ghana, and in most parts of sub-Sahara Africa, where corruption, poor 
governance, and political instabilities are rampant, more needs to be done to change the 
prevailing dominant culture that promotes economic inefficiencies. Those countries need 
leaders who can rally the people, foster, and legitimize both high moral and scientific 
cultures. Ghana’s leadership problem mirrors that of most sub-Saharan African 
countries/8 As this study has shown, even though Botswana leaders have been able to 
establish high moral culture that minimizes corruption, the leadership’s ability to rally 
people in Botswana towards a scientific culture is presently absent. This plight is similar 
among the leaders in Ghana and many countries in all parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
Hence, leadership constitutes the missing variable in sub-Saharan Africa’s economic 
development.
37 Ibid.
38 Muriithi, African Crisis. Is There Hope?
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CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
While reviewing the literature, the importance of leadership in development was 
asserted. In fact, the literature attests that the success or failure of a nation’s economic 
development depends on the determination and the intentions of leadership/9 Following 
this line of reasoning, Casson also articulates the importance of leadership in building a 
national culture that reduces transaction costs and ultimately enhances economic 
performance.40 Despite the importance of leadership and culture in development, no 
research had been conducted by an)' of the major schools of thought on development to 
link the role of leadership to underdevelopment in the less developed countries.
By using leadership’s impact to illustrate the difference in economic outcomes in 
Botswana and Ghana, this research has introduced the leadership variable into the 
development equation. It has taken leadership beyond the governance level to show how 
leadership is responsible for transforming human behavior towards economic 
development. Previously, the importance of cultural behavior has been neglected in 
economic development analyses by the two major development paradigms with the 
assumption that economic rationality is not compatible with cultural subjectivity 41 This 
work has demonstrated that this perception needs to be re-examined. This dissertation has 
shown the types of cultural attributes that are essential in order to promote and achieve 
economic development in sub-Saharan Africa countries.
39 Doe, “Economic Development of Francophone Africa."
40 Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
41 Ibid.
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Besides leadership and cultural variables, the study also has introduced the 
colonial argument in a new way. It has used the colonial argument as an explanatory tool 
to account for the moral difference between postcolonial leaderships in Botswana and 
Ghana. Through the moral obligation lens, the colonial difference argument helps us to 
explain why Botswana leaders, through their fiduciary responsibility, have interests in the 
welfare of their people and are therefore psychologically prone to refrain from excessive 
corruption that negatively impact a nation’s economic development. This contribution to 
the literature is important because colonialism in Africa has always been looked at with 
tunnel vision and without distinction to how the differential impact of colonial 
methodologies on Africa’s socio-economic development.42 Such a narrow approach 
clouds the understanding as to why a country like Botswana is economically improving 
and countries like Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo, both with comparably 
larger mineral and human resources, are socio-economically impoverished.
Finally, it attempts to use culture to explain the extent to which countries 
progress unevenly towards economic development. Scholars, such Huntington 
recommends such an explanation. By using culture to explain economic differences 
between Botswana and Ghana, this work offers a more comprehensive explanation for the 
actual experiences of both countries. By introducing the above three variables, leadership, 
culture, and colonialism and how they impact economic development in sub-Saharan 
Africa, this work makes an original contribution to the development literature.
4'  Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
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IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
The implications of this work can be many for different segments of the African 
and non-African communities alike. For the African nationalists, one implication of this 
study is that in order to achieve development to improve the living standards of Africans, 
due cognizance must be taken of the depth and enormity of African leadership problems. 
Another implication is that in order for them to assist in resolving economic problems, 
the African nationalists need to engage in organizing their communities to pressure 
governments to embrace, foster, and cultivate high moral s tandards . In addition, they also 
need to pressure leaders to implement policies and programs that will enhance the 
economic well being of the people and reconcile, rather than divide and alienate, diverse 
ethnic groups.
For the current leaders, the first implication is that they need to steer themselves 
towards high moral standards and embark on strategies that will enhance institutional 
efficiency and minimize official corruption in government. It is urgent that the leaders 
institute monitoring and auditing mechanisms to hold themselves and their officials 
accountable of misusing public financial resources and abusing their offices. In 
governance, leader will need to institute policies that enhance transparency and enable 
their economic institutions to communicate clearly to avoid inefficiencies and 
redundancies. The social implications for current leaders are great. It is imperative for 
them to modify their current psychological mindset by developing a renaissance 
consciousness committed to their citizens, rather than one committed to ethnic 
preferences or close associates. Most importantly, there is an implicit mandatory
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
336
implication that the leaders engage in instituting democratic systems with respect for 
human rights.
In the productive sector, the implications for the sub-Saharan Africa leaders are 
also significant. Regional leaders must adopt a long-term vision towards sustainable 
development as opposed to one emphasizing growth policies alone.4'5 This direction will 
require that they embark on transforming their economies from focusing solely on raw 
material production to ones that include industrial production. In order to do that, it is 
urgent for them to abandon their Senghorian conviction and embrace scientific culture. 
That can be done only with an understanding that there are two aspects of culture, 
namely, the reserve zone and the universal zone. The former offers them and their 
societies self-identity or actualization, while the latter will offer self-improvement and 
greater human quality.44 The knowledge of this distinction will enable them to pursue the 
acquisition of scientific culture from the universal zone without the fear of alienating 
their self-identity.
Certainly, the enormity of African debt and lack of financial resources have 
always been the hindrances of economic development in sub-Sahara Africa.43 One 
alternative approach to minimize this financial stumbling block is for sub-Saharan 
African leaders to divert military expenditures to the acquisition of scientific culture. To 
attain scientific culture, financial resources need to be allocated to education. Specifically, 
the money should be channeled into research and development at the domestic level. The
43 Todaro, Economic Development.
44 Wiredu, “Problems in Africa's Self-Definition.”
45 Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa.
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implication for development agencies is that there is a need to re-examine leaderships' 
role, not only in regards to their governance abilities, but also in terms of their behavior 
as social engineers and in terms of the political cultures they establish and legitimize.
Future Research
Future scholarship is need in various areas. First, our discussion has personified 
the leadership function in terms of a simple individual in a group. Even though that was 
done for analytical simplicity,  in reality, not all groups have this kind of leadership. 
Second, in some instances, our analysis has been general and the central feature that is 
assumed to influence economic performance has been viewed in abstract terms. The third 
limit of this research is due to the fact that in the analysis we have assigned cultural 
legitimization solely to leadership. Though this makes theoretical sense, it maybe too 
simplistic, especially, in these days o f high information technology where people are 
influenced by information from everywhere and not just that is promulgated by their 
leaders.
Based on the universal applicability of leadership, culture, and economic 
development that has been argued in this research, any future research pertaining to the 
above areas will help advance the principle concept of this study. Until any of the above 
research initiative is undertaken, it is fair to note that this research illustrates the 
importance of leadership and culture in economic development. Hence, achieving 
sustainable economic development in sub-Sahara Africa will be difficult, if not 
impossible, until leaders emerge to establish the appropriate prerequisite socio-scientific 
and high moral cultures.
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